ACEH: KALLA BRIEFS ENVOYS ON "HIS" PEACE DEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 009989


DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/IET

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ECON KJUS ID
SUBJECT: ACEH: KALLA BRIEFS ENVOYS ON "HIS" PEACE DEAL

REF: A. JAKARTA 9963 - HAMID CLAIMS BROAD ACCEPTANCE

B. JAKARTA 9749 - INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF AGREEMENT

C. JAKARTA 9685 - GOI AND GAM REACH AGREEMENT

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador and heads of mission from Australia,
Finland, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK (also
representing the EU) called on Vice President Jusuf Kalla on
July 22 to receive the GOI's brief on the draft Aceh peace
accord. Kalla's presentation echoed that of lead negotiator
Hamid Awaludin the day before (ref A),though Kalla focused
more heavily on the importance of international pressure on
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM),including actions by the
Malaysian government against the outspoken member of the GAM
negotiating team living there. Kalla described an informal
consultation process with key Parliament members prior to the
August 15 signing, downplaying any domestic political
opposition. The GOI and GAM are keeping close hold the
specific number of GAM's weapons identified for
decommissioning. The Vice President called on at least some
of the international monitors to be in place by the end of
August or early September. Kalla saw the need to work
through initial reintegration issues first, which he
acknowledged would be difficult, prior to launching into new
elections. He anticipated several former GAM members sitting
in the Aceh reconstruction board (BRR),and noted the need
for up to 20,000 new homes. Kalla demonstrated his strong
sense of ownership of the peace deal, and signaled that the
GOI has begun serious thought on implementing the accord.
End Summary.

Kalla Plays Up International Role
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2. (C) Vice President Kalla, accompanied by chief
negotiators Hamid Awaludin and Sofyan Djalil, and Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirajuda, received the Ambassador and seven
other envoys July 22 to review the draft Aceh peace
agreement, his sixth such briefing of key diplomats in
Jakarta since January. The Ambassador and his counterparts
congratulated Kalla and the GOI on the tentative agreement,
remarking that the GOI had kept to the schedule Kalla had
outlined during the early days of the talks. Kalla in turn
played up the international role in achieving this
breakthrough, praising the countries represented for their
efforts in generating pressure on GAM, for example through
joint demarches that convinced GAM that it had no alternative
post-tsunami but to negotiate. The VP singled out Malaysia's
actions, following his call to Deputy Prime Minister Najib,
which included a police interview with the member of the GAM
negotiating team living in Malaysia that convinced this GAM
member to go along with other rebel leaders in support of a
deal.


3. (C) Kalla was very complementary of Finnish facilitator
Ahtisaari, who had pushed the talks forward in a constructive
direction. He also gave credit to GAM's Australian advisor
Kingsbury, who, if sometimes difficult, provided needed
reassurance to GAM leaders during the talks.


4. (C) Like his negotiator Hamid, Kalla mentioned the
December 2004 tsunami as another key factor that brought the
two sides to the table. In addition, Kalla noted the GOI's
early commitment to pursuing a peaceful resolution to the
conflict, and one that was comprehensive, preserved GAM's
dignity, and also respected Indonesian unity. This approach
had proven successful.

TNI Chief a Strong Supporter
--------------


5. (C) On the Indonesian military (TNI),Kalla said TNI
chief Endriartono Sutarto was very pleased by the deal and a
strong supporter of the outcome. Sutarto much preferred to
have his troops out of that conflict, and back and available
for other duties.

Downplaying DPR Objections
--------------


6. (C) Kalla downplayed any difficulties in selling the
agreement to the Parliament (DPR). The Vice President said
he would conduct the consultation with the DPR on the issue
of granting GAM members amnesty, and on other important
points, by inviting key Parliamentarians for discussions in
his home. Like Hamid, Kalla identified a revision of Aceh's
special autonomy law as the single legislative action
required, at least in the initial implementation phase (with
the MOU calling for passage by March 2006 of a Law for the
Governing of Aceh).


7. (C) The Vice President reviewed the general time frame
for amnesty (to be granted within 15 days of the MOU
signing),decommissioning GAM weapons and drawing down GOI
security forces. Kalla stated that the GOI and GAM had noted
in the MOU the specific number of GAM fighters to be
demobilized and weapons to be decommissioned, but both sides
were keeping these numbers very close hold. (Note: In
addition to these figures, the numbers of TNI and police who
would remain in Aceh also are not available in the text that
we have, and these presumably fall in this same "close hold"
category. End Note.)

Anticipating Problems in Reintegration
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8. (C) The Vice President admitted that the reintegration
process could face significant problems that would need to be
worked out prior to holding new elections in Aceh. He
expected that several former GAM members would take positions
in the Aceh reconstruction body (BRR),which would be
responsible for the bulk of the effort. (Comment: This is
good news since the BRR has access to funds and expertise,
along with a reputation for action and honesty. End
Comment.) Some 10,000 to 20,000 new houses may need to be
built as part of the reintegration package, Kalla offered.
He noted that the GOI does not have a good estimate of the
number of GAM members, and said GAM sympathizers in exile in
Malaysia could number as high as 50,000, some of whom would
return. (Comment: This estimate strikes us as
unrealistically high. End Comment.) The reintegration
effort would need to avoid creating social jealousy, and
could not treat ex-GAM members differently from their
neighbors. Kalla provided little other detail about
administering the reintegration effort.

Monitors to Start Arriving by August 30?
--------------


9. (C) Kalla stated that EU and ASEAN monitors should begin
deploying in Aceh by August 30, or early September at the
latest. Kalla noted the monitors' wide responsibilities
covering all aspects of the MOU. (Comment: The UK deputy
ambassador, who also represented the EU in this meeting, had
mentioned privately that the EU had been scrambling to come
to grips with the monitoring task. Only Sweden and curiously
Switzerland had offered people for the monitoring role so
far. End Comment.)

Police Training
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador noted our plan to provide human
rights training to an initial group of police instructors
drawn from Aceh. He asked the Vice President to provide us
with enough advance warning to consider and prepare for
follow-on requests.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Kalla took charge of this briefing, with Hamid
Awaludin remaining largely silent. The Vice President
demonstrated a confident grasp of the MOU, gave short shrift
to suggestions of domestic political challenges, and
recognized the reintegration process would face problems.
Overall, the meeting demonstrated that the Vice President
feels strong ownership over the peace deal, and that the GOI
is now giving serious thought to the challenges of
implementing their pending agreement with GAM.


PASCOE