Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ISTANBUL2059
2005-12-06 16:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

IRAQI SUNNI ARAB TEAM PRESENTS OLD GRIEVANCES TO

Tags:  PGOV PINS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 002059 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2025
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNI ARAB TEAM PRESENTS OLD GRIEVANCES TO
AMBASSADOR IN TURKEY MEETING

Classified By: (U) Classified by Consul General Deborah K. Jones, Reaso

ns 1.4 (b,d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 002059

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2025
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNI ARAB TEAM PRESENTS OLD GRIEVANCES TO
AMBASSADOR IN TURKEY MEETING

Classified By: (U) Classified by Consul General Deborah K. Jones, Reaso

ns 1.4 (b,d).



1. (C) Summary: At a December 4 meeting in Istanbul
organized by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, a delegation of
Iraqi Sunni Arab political figures told Ambassador Khalilzad
that the "insurgents" want the political process in Iraq to
succeed, but seek more credibility in the process. They
demanded clarifications of election procedures, calling them
opaque. Ambassador Khalilzad said the U.S. wants the
election to meet international standards and promised to
organize a meeting between the Sunni Arabs and the Iraqi
election commission (IECI) and its UN advisors. When the
Sunni Arab group called for international election monitors,
Khalilzad reminded them that violence prevented the dispatch
of international observers. If they want international
observers, Khalilzad advised, they should issue a public
statement calling for their participation and urging the
Sunni Arab community to protect them. The Sunni delegation
agreed to this, and the Turkish representatives who observed
the session said they could take such a public call from the
Iraqi Sunni Arabs to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference meeting this week.


2. (C) Summary continued: The Sunni Arab delegation
stressed that life needs to return to normal in Sunni Arab
regions and that Coalition Forces should stop raids and
detentions and release detainees not charged in Iraqi courts.
Khalilzad pointed to releases of detainees to date and said
there would be more. He cautioned that U.S. forces would
respond if attacked, and that the hunt for terrorists like
Zarqawi who will never support the political process cannot
be stopped. Khalilzad rejected the Sunni Arabs' call for a
timetable for withdrawal but underlined the U.S. has no
desire for permanent bases in Iraq; as Iraqi security forces
grow more capable the Coalition Force presence will diminish.
The Sunni Arab team also expressed disdain for the Interior
Minister; one prominent Iraqi Sunni Arab politician demanded
he be fired because of Interior Ministry abuses. Khalilzad
acknowledged there had been problems and noted that the
Americans would be involved in investigations of Interior

Ministry facilities. Khalilzad urged the Sunni Arab figures
to support more Sunni Arabs joining the Iraqi security forces
to ensure balance. End Summary.

--------------
Sunni Arab Team: Stability, Not Power
--------------


3. (C) In a meeting hosted by the Turkish Foreign Ministry
in Istanbul, a delegation of six Sunni Arab political figures
told Ambassador Khalilzad that the Iraqi Sunni Arab community
wants stability, not full political control over Iraq. They
said they spoke "on behalf of the insurgency," and sought
agreement from the Americans on technical election
modalities, near-term confidence building measures and
longer-term political changes in Iraq. The group's
spokesman, an Iraqi Turcoman businessman in Abu Dhabi named
Felah Mustafa, told the Ambassador that the Iraqi Muslim
Ulema Council, a rejectionist Sunni Arab religious body, had
a representative in Istanbul and supported the list of
proposals to be presented but would not meet with the
American team in Istanbul.

--------------
Khalilzad: Avoid Another Big Mistake
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad stressed to the group that the
U.S. wants to avoid the division of Iraq and to prevent any
foreign country from taking control of it. He urged the
Sunni Arab leaders to maximize Sunni Arab participation in
the political process, noting that their failure to vote in
the January 2005 elections was "the Mother of All Failures."
Pointing to the concentration of violence and terrorism
problems in the Sunni Arab regions, Ambassador Khalilzad
reminded the Iraqi group that U.S. military operations focus
on Sunni Arab regions precisely because of the concentration
of violence there. Ongoing security problems, however, open
the way for sectarian militias and countries like Iran that
support them. The violence, therefore, hurts the Sunni Arabs
both politically and economically. The Sunni Arab community,
he warned, should not be manipulated by hard-liners into
boycotting the political process again.

--------------
Election Modalities: Sunni Complaints
--------------


5. (C) Tariq al-Hashemi, the leader of the predominantly
Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party, stated that the election
count procedures were still opaque. Mustafa said the Sunni
Arab groups want the December elections to meet minimal
international standards. The delegation proposed that:
-- there should be no delays announcing the election results
lest there be manipulation of the vote count;

-- Iraqi detainees should have the right to vote;

-- Iraqis abroad should have the right to vote;

-- because of the IECI's lack of credibility, international
monitors should come to watch the election;

-- the IECI was not representative of Iraq, as it has only
one Sunni Arab board member.


6. (C) Khalilzad agreed that the election should meet
international standards and the UN advisory team was
responsible for ensuring that it does. The U.S. agreed that
the announcement of results should be made promptly. Embassy
Baghdad PolCouns reviewed in detail American assistance
through USAID for technical assistance to the IECI overseas
vote campaign effort headquartered in Amman. He also
provided the delegation the names of the two Sunni Arab women
who are board members. Hashemi then rejoined that while
there might be two Sunni Arab board members, the vast
majority of IECI employees were Shia biased against the Sunni
Arabs. Khalilzad said the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would
arrange a meeting between the Sunni Arab group and the UN
team to review these concerns and later would facilitate a
meeting with the IECI board itself. (Comment: Embassy
Baghdad has already organized IECI board trips to Ramadi,
Fallujah, Tikrit, Mosul, Baqubah and Kirkuk during the past
three weeks. End Comment.)

--------------
International Observers - Last Minute Push?
--------------


7. (C) Khalilzad noted that while the American and British
embassies had backed efforts to bring international observers
for the December 2005 elections, the violence made it hard to
convince any to come. Only a few would be on hand. What
might help, he speculated, would be a statement from the
Sunni Arab leaders urging that international observers come,
and calling on the entire Sunni Arab community to welcome and
protect them. The Sunni Arab delegation agreed to issue such
a statement, and Khalilzad promised the Embassy would
publicly support visits from international observers. The
Prime Minister's advisor, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, who was
among the Turkish officials observing the meeting, said the
Turks could take a public Sunni Arab call for observers to
the upcoming Organization of the Islamic Conference to try to
stir interest at this late moment.

--------------
Voting in Abu Dhabi
--------------


8. (C) Al-Hashemi and Mustafa underlined their concern that
Iraqis resident in the Gulf have easy access to an expatriate
polling station to be established in Abu Dhabi. They
complained that the UAE authorities have issued guidance that
Iraqis may not drive to Abu Dhabi from neighboring states
like Qatar and that they must have confirmed hotel
reservations. Khalilzad agreed to look at how the U.S. might
be helpful with the Emirati authorities to facilitate Iraqi
expatriate voting.

--------------
Sunni Arabs Want More Parliament Seats
--------------


9. (C) The Sunni Arab team claimed that the IECI decision
on distribution of seats in the future national assembly is
unfair because it robbed predominantly Sunni Arab
governorates of eight seats. They asserted that Planning
Ministry population data made clear that the seat allocation
was unfair. The Ambassador reminded the group that the seat
distribution came from the election law passed in the autumn
by the Transitional National Assembly. It made January 2005
voter lists, not Planning Ministry data, the basis for seat
allocation in the December 2005 election. The Sunni Arab
team highlighted that Dohuk governorate had an unbelievable
ratio of voters to population far beyond the norm. Khalilzad
said the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would look at the data in a
September 11 announcement to Iraqi political parties from the
IECI. He also urged the Sunni Arab team to raise this
question directly with the UN and IECI.


10. (C) A second set of proposals from the Sunni Arab
delegation concerned steps the U.S. could take on security
operations that would build Sunni Arab community confidence
in the near term. It was urgent that life return to a
semblance of normality in Sunni Arab regions, they stated.
They proposed that:

-- Coalition Forces stop raids on homes and attacks on Sunni
Arab towns and cities;

-- the Coalition Forces release Iraqi detainees not charged
in an Iraqi court with crimes; and

-- the U.S. agrees to a timetable for withdrawal of
Coalition Forces.


11. (C) Khalilzad responded that a premature Coalition
Force withdrawal would be bad for the Sunni Arabs and for
Iraq generally. That said, the U.S. aims to withdraw totally
from Iraq as soon as possible. He told them that the U.S.
does not seek bases in Iraq. We would not set a timetable,
but our strategy is clear: we will reduce our forces as
Iraqi security forces gain the capability to operate better
on their own.

12. (C) In the meantime, Khalilzad cautioned, Coalition
Forces will respond when attacked. In addition, there can be
no stop to the hunt for terrorists like Zarqawi who do not
support the political process in any case. Meanwhile, the
U.S. had released 280 prisoners on December 4 and planned to
release more after the election. (Hashemi said it was a
useless political gesture to release hundreds of prisoners on
the one hand while refilling detention centers with newly
arrested prisoners.) Khalilzad said he would seek a meeting
between the Sunni Arab group and MNF-I CG Casey to discuss
security issues.

--------------
Post-Elections: A Sunni Longer-Term Agenda
--------------


13. (C) Several Sunni Arab delegated asserted that the U.S.
must restructure the Iraqi army to include more Sunni Arabs
while removing militia members from its ranks. Falah called
for "credible" Sunni Arabs to be named to head the Interior
and Defense ministries (but they did not press this point).
Defense Minister Saadun Dulaymi is a Sunni Arab, Falah
acknowledged, but he is only a "puppet." Khalilzad stated
that the U.S. wants more Sunni Arabs to join the Iraqi
Security Forces, but the response often has been limited. He
asked why Sunni leaders have not denounced the intimidation
campaign against Sunni Arab recruits. Embassy Baghdad
PolCouns reminded the Sunni Arab delegates that then Ulema
Council member Shaykh Ahmed Abdelghafur Samarai'e had urged
Sunni Arabs to join the ISF, but few others had joined that
public appeal.

--------------
Interior Ministry - Sunni Arab Venting
--------------


14. (C) The Sunni Arab delegation asserted that the
Interior Ministry was responsible for widespread abuses,
including murder and torture of detainees. Hussein Falluji
charged that Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh was ignoring
court orders to arrest officers of the Volcano and Hawk
brigades on charges of illegal actions. (Comment: we have
not heard of this court action, and Falluji when he was not
proselytizing PolCouns promised to give us copies. End
Comment.) Falluji called for an independent Iraqi judicial
commission to look into the abuse allegations across Iraq.
The Islamic Party's Hashemi warned that the Interior Minister
was staining American credibility and called on Khalilzad to
have him suspended.


15. (C) Khalilzad rejoined that Iraq was a sovereign state
and the U.S. could not fire its ministers. However, the U.S.
had strongly urged the government to investigate what had
occurred at the Jadriyah bunker and suspend anyone found
responsible pending a final determination of what had
occurred. Khalilzad said that together with the Iraqi
government, the U.S. would begin checking on other detention
facilities in Iraq on December 8. Finally, he told the Sunni
Arab delegation that he would work against anyone with ties
to a militia from occupying a sensitive security post in the
next government.


16. (C) Participants:

Felah Mustafa, Iraqi Turcoman businessman in Abu Dhabi;
Tariq al-Hashemi, head of the Iraqi Islamic Party;
Hamed al-Mutlak, Iraqi National Dialog Front (Salih Mutlak's
brother);
Raad Nasser, Iraqi Loyalty Gathering;
Ali al-Mashadani, Iraqi Loyalty Gathering;
Shaykh Ali ad-Daham, Iraqi Loyalty Gathering;
Hussein al-Falluji, Conference of Iraqi People (Adnan
ad-Dulaymi's group)

Ambassador Khalilzad
Baghdad PolCouns Ford
Baghdad Special Assistant Hutchings
Baghdad Communications Advisor Hopkins

Amconsul Istanbul CG Jones
Amconsul Pol/Econ Chief Smith

NEA/I - Michelle Siders

Oguz Celikkol, Director General for the Middle East, Turkish
Foreign Ministry
Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, Advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan
Nabi Avci, Press Counselor to the Prime Minister
Hakan Cakil, Iraqi Desk, Turkish Foreign Ministry
JONES