TURKEY GETS A DATE FROM THE EU, ISTANBUL REACTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000001

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TAGS: PREL PGOV EU TU EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY GETS A DATE FROM THE EU, ISTANBUL REACTS



1. (u) Summary: The December 17 EU decision to begin
membership negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 was
greeted in Istanbul with a mixture of relieved satisfaction
and lingering skepticism. Following the initial euphoria
after the decision was announced, some Turks in academic
circles already have begun to air their concerns and
reservations about the qualifying language and conditions.
Others, meanwhile, recognize the need to begin preparing for
a long and difficult negotiating process and to downplay
public expectations for what EU membership will mean for
Turkey. End Summary.

"Full Membership" or Nothing At All...


2. (sbu) Frustrated by decades of rejection and a sense of
having been wronged on the Cyprus issue, many we spoke to in
the days leading up to the December 17 decision were prepared
to reject anything other than a "fair" invitation. Istanbul
Muncipal Housing Construction Director Ismet Yildirim, who
claims to be close to the Prime Minister, openly told poloff
that he hoped the offer would be rejected. "What do we need
the EU for anyway?" he added. Even some secular types who
have long supported EU membership and opposed the ruling AKP
admitted that they would fully support PM Erdogan if he felt
compelled to reject a sub-standard offer. Views here seem to
have been influenced by the ruling AKP's tough rhetoric in
the weeks before December 17. Asked what would constitute a
"fair" invitation, Turks here listed: 1) a specific starting
date for negotiations in 2005; 2) negotiations for "full"
membership, not some sort of special status or restricted
membership; and 3) no preconditions on Cyprus. Cyprus, in
particular, seems to have been the most emotional issue.
Educated Turks here invariably conceded that Turkey would
"eventually" have to recognize Cyprus if it hoped to join the
EU as a fellow member, but none of them was willing to accept
such recognition as a pre-condition for negotiations.

Exasperation and Suspicion Make (Some) Room for Euphoria,
Pride, Relief


3. (u) Following the initial euphoric reaction to the
decision, we engaged a range of contacts for their views.
Despite some qualifying language in the text of the decision
and ongoing debate in academic circles, those we spoke with
by and large accepted the December 17 decision as a victory
for Turkey and the AKP government. Even those who voted
against AKP in the November 2002 elections admitted that they
never would have imagined that AKP could deliver on their EU
promises. Cigdem Nas, a professor at the EU Institute of
Marmara University, told poloff that the decision was not a
surprise, but merely the latest step in a process that has
lasted over 40 years and left most Turks with "EU fatigue."
Exasperated by the process, Turks here nevertheless feel
relieved and proud that Turkey is finally on the verge of
beginning negotiations. They have suspected for years that
the EU has been leading them on and raising the bar; many
believed that this day would never come. Despite the
decision, in fact, suspicion remains. Many are still
convinced the EU will use Cyprus, negotiatin delays, or some
other means to prevent Turkey fom ever joining the EU.

A Pyrrhic Victory of ou Minds?


4. (u) Such suspicions continue to fueldebate amongst more
informed observers over wheter the decision was a victory at
all. Noting that he was saddened by the inappropriate
"carnival" atmosphere that greeted the decision and deeply
worried about some of the qualifying language and conditions
(particularly on Cyprus),former ANAP FM Bozer told a Kadir
Has University audience that "it was a victory of our minds,
but not our hearts." Can Baydaroglu, former VP of the
Turkey-Europe Foundation, echoed Bozer's concerns,
specifically singling out the onerous new requirements that
the 31 EU chapters be negotiated sequentially (rather than
simultaneously) and that the EU Council separately approve
the closing of each chapter. Although the government has
promised to restart the Cyprus negotiations, few here are
hopeful that a solution can be found before Turkey is due to
begin negotiations in October 2005. An NTV journalist summed
up a widely-shared view when she remarked that "what little
leverage there was on the Greek Cypriots was lost when the EU
accepted them as a candidate at the 2002 Copenhagen Summit."
Opinions differ, however, on whether Turkey should sign the
Ankara Protocol (thereby implicitly recognizing Cyprus) in
the absence of an agreement, even if failure to do so would
jeopardize Turkey's EU prospects.

Preparing for the Tough Slog Ahead


5. (sbu) Even as Ankara puts together its negotiating team,
several Istanbul universities and NGOs are planning
conferences and public awareness campaigns to prepare Turkish
public opinion for the negotiation process. Former Finance
Minister and Turkey-Europe Foundation President Ziya
Muezzinoglu admitted to poloff that the negotiations will be
difficult and that several groups in Turkey will suffer as a
result. While Muezzinoglu and others have argued to us that
Turkey has a head-start given its participation in the EU
Customs Union, most admit that Turkey will have difficulty in
negotiations on several chapters, especially agriculture,
finance, environment, and free movement of people. Cigdem
Nas remarked that the EU is also likely to become a scapegoat
on a range of subjects, even though many of the reforms would
have been necessary in any case. Nationalists and other
groups opposed to EU membership have already indicated to us
that they will take advantage of this difficult transitional
period to push for a "Eurasian" or Middle East alternative.
Yusuf Cevahir, VP of the MUSIAD business association and
Chairman of the Cevahir Group, for example, lamented to
poloff the economic opportunities that Turkey would forego by
choosing the EU over expanded ties with the Middle East.

Are We Worthy?


6. (u) Oddly, even as Turks here take pride in finally
getting a negotiation date, there is a strong sense among
some Istanbul Turks of all social classes that Turkey does
not actually "deserve" to be in the EU. Few would admit it
openly to foreigners, but amongst themselves many Turks here
strongly doubt whether their country will ever develop to the
level of EU norms. They constantly cite excessive traffic,
the poor state of roads, petty corruption, sub-standard
public services, even bad manners and a penchant for doing
things at the last minute as examples of how Turkey is not
ready to join the EU. "How are we ever going to be in Europe
with this?" has become a common refrain for frustrated Turks
throughout Istanbul. We overheard a taxi driver remark
recently, "Look at this (traffic)! If they let us in, we'll
just screw up the whole EU."


7. (sbu) Comment: As the initial euphoria wears off, there is
a growing sense here that December 17 was not the finish
line, but merely another (albeit large) obstacle on the long
road to EU membership. Cyprus still looms large as a
potential deal-breaker if a comprehensive, or at least
face-saving solution, can't be found by next October. Many
here continue to suspect, moreover, that the EU will forever
dangle membership as an unattainable "carrot" to motivate
Turkish good behavior. Nevertheless, Turks here have now
begun to focus on the difficult negotiations ahead and the
equally difficult task of managing the Turkish public's
expectations during the process.
ARNETT