PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE: UN PERFORMANCE SHOWS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 019100

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, JBRAUSE
DCHA/OFDA GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, BDEEMER
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA
SOUTH ASIA ACTION TEAM
SOUTH ASIA EARTHQUAKE TASK FORCE
DCHA/FFP FOR JONATHAN DWORKEN
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER
ROME PASS FODAG
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH
NSC FOR JMELINE
EUCOM FOR POLA/J3/J4/J5
BRUSSELS FOR USAID PLERNER
NEW YORK FOR TMALY
SECDEF FOR SOLIC/PKHA, USDP/J3
JOINT STAFF WASH DC FOR J3/J4/J5
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE FOR J3/J5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON KMDR KPAO OIIP OPRC PGOV PREL PK UN
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE: UN PERFORMANCE SHOWS
IMPROVEMENT BUT OVERALL LEADERSHIP STILL LACKING

REF: A) ISLAMABAD 17311 B) ISLAMABAD 17632

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SUMMARY
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1. More than two months into the earthquake relief effort,
the UN has made some improvements in response to early
criticisms of start-up delays and performance issues reported
in ref A. However, a lack of overall UN leadership, poor
coordination, and insufficient staff continues to undermine
the Pakistan earthquake response. Most urgently, the UN
should deploy a disaster expert to oversee the entire UN
humanitarian operation. End summary.

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Overview of the Response
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2. The humanitarian community marshaled massive resources to
respond to the devastating October 8 earthquake in Pakistan.
Overwhelming humanitarian needs, difficult terrain, and harsh
winter weather conditions make the response particularly
challenging. There were also a large number of stakeholders,
including numerous donors, humanitarian agencies, and GOP
officials.


3. Rather than deploying a disaster expert to supervise
multi-UN agency efforts at the start of the earthquake
response, the UN Resident Coordinator who was already
overseeing the UN Development Program,s portfolio in
Pakistan became the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (UNHC). The
deployment of OCHA,s Director for Coordination and Response
Kevin Kennedy was a welcome step to pull together the efforts
of UN agencies more effectively, but Mr. Kennedy,s tenure in
Pakistan was too brief.


4. The UN also piloted a &cluster lead8 system to replace
the &collaborative approach8 of informal sectoral working
groups that had been employed in previous emergencies. Under
the cluster system, agencies are appointed as leads to
represent the interests of and formally develop a strategy
for an entire sector. Therefore, the cluster response places
heavy demands on staff time for meetings and planning, taking
away from operations. Cluster leads are also failing to
communicate and coordinate among themselves, which is
hampering an integrated response. While it may be too late
to abandon the cluster approach in Pakistan, the UN needs
leadership to pull together the cluster leads to ensure more
information-sharing and cohesion among and across the
sectors.

--Coordination and Information Management--


5. Undermining UN coordination and information sharing is the
inadequate staffing of the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In particular, OCHA,s
Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) has insufficient staff
to manage and respond to large-scale information needs.
According to its mandate, the HIC serves as the primary
information collection point and gathers information
submitted voluntarily by NGOs, other UN agencies, and the
GOP. Cluster leads are responsible for submitting sector
information to the HIC; however, they have not yet developed
standardized reporting formats. Without enough HIC staff,
there is no comprehensive information management system, and
competing and often contradictory information streams have
emerged.


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Progress of Individual UN Agencies
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--Relief commodities--


7. There were significant early logistical problems managing
air cargo shipments arriving at Islamabad Airport (Ref A).
These have receded with improved inventory of incoming goods,
and the slowdown in the number of airlifts arriving. One
remaining concern is that current UNJLC procedures do not
identify transportation missions according to urgency of need
but by location and access. As a result, transportation is
logical and efficient, but may fail to consider time
sensitivity.


8. A UN Operational Data Management Team is now being formed
to collect information systematically about the commodities
pipeline. The arrival of a new UNJLC head on December 13 may
also improve information collection and dissemination.

--WFP Food Assistance--


9. WFP has made progress since ref A and the food aid
pipeline is healthy. WFP field staff is dedicated and
knowledgeable; in general, WFP and its cooperating partners
are doing a competent and sometimes innovative job. One
concern is that WFP may have too quickly passed its
responsibility to the GOP in Mansehra. NGOs there are
frustrated with the closure of WFP,s office, which has
temporarily left the logistics, food and nutrition, and
information technology clusters without leadership.

--Essential Services--


10. UNICEF staff have demonstrated strong technical skills in
the water and sanitation sector. Some UNICEF staff have
shown more initiative than others, but have generally
coordinated well with local government officials and the
overall effort has been satisfactory to very good. One
concern is that UNICEF field staff are overstretched and
unable to monitor closely projects in such a large coverage
area. To augment UNICEF efforts, the USAID/DART provided
technical assistance to repair the damaged well at Mehra
camp. USAID also funded two staff positions through an NGO
partner to provide surge capacity and oversight of water and
sanitation activities.


11. The Camp Management Cluster lead, UNHCR, has doubled its
camp management budget and increased the number of personnel
and teams in the field per ref B. To date, UNHCR has
received USD 30 million in contributions, which is sufficient
to cover camp management through March 2006, when the FRC and
UNHCR plan to close camps.
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Comment and Recommendations
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12. Overall, UN agencies have made progress since the early
days of the response. The deployment of experienced staff
including Kevin Kennedy, and WFP Chief of Logistics Service,
Amer Daoudi, led to significant improvements in UN
operations. The UN Secretary General, as well as directors
from UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO traveled to Pakistan
in the past two months, helped to rally agencies, efforts.
Post also welcomes the announcement of former President Bush
as Special Envoy for the South Asia Earthquake Disaster to
pressure donors to honor pledges made in Geneva and
Islamabad.


13. Although most individual agencies have shown improvement
since ref A, the lack of sufficient staff and poor overall
coordination continue to undermine the earthquake response.
Post recommends the following:

a) The UN should immediately deploy a disaster expert to
assume the role of the UNHC and oversee the entire UN
operation. Post recommends conveying this recommendation to
the UN Secretary General, possibly through former President
Bush. At present, there is no leadership to hold the cluster
leads accountable and ensure that information is shared
between the field to headquarters and across different
clusters. The UNHC also needs special authorities for
procurement and staffing.

b) Introduction of the cluster system concept was
inappropriate for this major disaster response. At this
stage, it is too late to abandon the cluster approach, but
the situation would improve by deploying UN staff with
disaster experience and improving decision making authority
for cluster leads.
c) The HIC lacks sufficient staff to manage and disseminate
incoming data. Competing systems must be streamlined to
better prioritize immediate interventions, identify gaps, and
avoid duplication of efforts.
CROCKER