Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ISLAMABAD17384
2005-11-25 08:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: THE SITUATION IN KOHISTAN

Tags:  EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON PGOV PREL PK 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 017384 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: THE SITUATION IN KOHISTAN


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 017384

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: THE SITUATION IN KOHISTAN



1. Summary: Southern Kohistan fared somewhat better than
neighboring provinces during the October 8 earthquake with
only two subdistricts affected and comparatively less damage.
In terms of assistance, however, the 50-55% of the affected
areas, population left homeless have fared far worse. Only
limited assistance has reached the area and corruption at the
local and provincial government level has diverted needed
resources. International and national NGOs are entirely
absent in the district,s Pattan subdistrict, and even the
Islamist parties, which enjoy broad support in the district,
have not initiated relief camps. The Pakistan army is
cognizant of the lack of aid, and has promised to divert
additional resources, particularly shelter, to the area.
Officials, however, stress that their impact will be limited
without additional support from the UN and international
NGOs. End Summary.


2. OIC, Emboff, and A/RSO visited the Pattan subdistrict in
southern Kohistan on November 15 to review damage and assess
relief and recovery operations in the area. The earthquake
in southern Kohistan was relatively less severe than in other
areas of NWFP. Most damage that we observed was caused by
landslides that were triggered by the initial quake as
opposed to the outright collapse of buildings that we have
witnessed elsewhere. While deaths were reportedly minimal
(locals who are familiar with landslides took evasive action
in the minutes after the quake which probably saved lives),
injuries, particularly broken bones and contusions from
falling rock were frequently observed. Between 25,000 and
30,000 people (50-55% of the populations) were left homeless
by the earthquake/landslide and significant damage was caused
to the limited road network and electricity/communication
infrastructure.


3. Locals in Pattan subdistrict identified shelter as their
priority need. Absent assistance, they claimed that it will
be impossible for many to survive the upcoming winter. In
their view, between 4000 and 5000 winterized tents or

alternative shelters would be necessary to meet the need in
this area. Only a few hundred tents had arrived in the
subdistrict. Locals expressed a willingness to build
alternative shelter if provided with needed tools, but were
very concerned that it would be impossible to complete such
shelters before significant snowfall began in the area.


4. The equitable distribution of the limited available
supplies within Kohistan was a significant concern. Military
relief flights have been turning over all goods to the local
governments for distribution (in contrast to other areas
where direct distribution by the military is the norm).
Local military commanders attributed this decision to a lack
of personnel to handle distributions unilaterally. According
to locals, the district, subdistrict, and union council
nazims have been distributing supplies based on political and
family affiliation rather than need. For example, close
relatives of the district nazim had been provided with
several roles of plastic sheeting despite having suffered no
damage to their houses. That sheeting was now for sale in
the local market. In addition, locals claimed that the
Provincial Revenue Minister had been channeling all
provincial (and to the extent that he could) federal relief
goods towards Palas subdistrict (his home constituency).
They adamantly maintained that conditions
in that subdistrict were far better than in theirs (due to
time constraints, OIC could not visit Palas).


5. Despite their concerns over distribution, locals were
effusive in their praise for relief flights organized by the
Pakistani and American militaries ) their only source of
assistance to date. In contrast, they were dismissive of UN
entities and NGOs who they maintained had not been seen in
the region. OIC observed that northern Shangla and Kohistan
were virtually devoid of the presence of any NGOs and IOs (in
contrast to other areas where they are much in evidence).
Similarly, locals were disappointed by the absence of relief
efforts from Islamist parties in the district. Neither JI
nor JUI-F had relief camps in the Pattan subdistrict despite
steadfast political support for these parties from locals.
Locals claimed to be reevaluating whether these parties
merited their support in future.


6. The Pakistan military was aware of the serious deficit in
relief supplies reaching southern Kohistan. OIC spoke with
NWFP Chief of Relief Operations, Maj. Gen. Shakil who was
visiting the district by helicopter on the same day. Shakil
admitted that supplies had been inadequate, largely because
the military had not previously obtained a clear picture of
need in the area. Shakil instructed his officers to send six
relief flights per day to Pattan over the following week.
Military officials in Mansehra claimed that a portion of
those were sent but that they included largely food and NFIs
not shelter. Shakil stressed that absent an IO/NGO presence
in the district, the army would be hard-pressed to meet the
significant needs in the area.


7. Comment: Due to the comparatively less damage in
Kohistan, NGOs and IOs have yet to focus on this area. While
we agree that needs are unquestionably greater in other areas
of the NWFP, complete neglect of this area is of significant
concern, especially given the typically harsh winters and a
lack of viable alternatives for most of the population. The
Pakistan military seems genuine in its desire to assist, but
is also cognizant that its resources are limited and cannot
meet the needs without outside assistance. Nepotism has
certainly complicated relief efforts in the area, but is
likely an outgrowth of limited resources and may well
evaporate with significant relief supplies. We believe that
additional focus on Kohistan needs to be a priority for the
international community. End Comment.


8. Embassy Islamabad is transmitting this cable on behalf of
FOB Mansehra.
CROCKER