SIX WEEKS AFTER PAKISTAN'S EARTHQUAKE: ASSESSING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 017311

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ECON PHUM PK AORC UN
SUBJECT: SIX WEEKS AFTER PAKISTAN'S EARTHQUAKE: ASSESSING
THE UN'S PERFORMANCE


Summary
--------------



1. With few exceptions, UN agencies were inadequate to the
task in the weeks immediately following Pakistan's
earthquake. In some cases they remain so. Certainly the
challenges have been great, involving overwhelming needs,
difficult terrain, multiple donors and the need to work
closely with Pakistani leaders and agencies that were
initially uncertain and uncoordinated. That said, some UN
agencies have been remarkably slow to adapt, despite the
obvious urgency as winter conditions set in. Because these
agencies are responsible for coordinating donor activities in
their sectors, these shortcomings have had a cascading impact
on the effectiveness of other relief operations operating in
affected sectors. NGOs working in the field have been
frustrated by sometimes interminable discussions on minutiae
and have pushed hard for better UN leadership.

Overall Assessment
--------------


2. This cable is based on observations in Islamabad and the
field by Embassy staff and USAID Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) and reflects numerous meetings with UN
representatives and NGO implementing partners.


3. The UN was late in appreciating that a second disaster
was looming after the initial search and rescue phase --
specifically that hundreds of thousands, if not millions
would require shelter assistance to survive the harsh
Himalayan winter. In contrast to many NGOs, the UN was slow
to provide funding and deploy qualified personnel and assets
in response this threat. One UN employee characterized the
UN response to date as a "disgusting operation" and a
"pathetic show." His view, almost one month after the
earthquake, was that UN agencies did not generally send their
best people. The UN also had initial difficulties in dealing
with Pakistani authorities, though coordination improved
after the GOP established the Federal Relief Commission (FRC)
as the coordination entity for disaster response. While the
performance of UN agencies improved over time, their failures
in the early weeks suggest they are not equipped to deal with
crises like this one, where lives depend on a rapid response.



4. The UN and its defenders assert that UN agencies were
inadequately funded and that performance improved as funds
came in. There is some truth to this, but we note that on
October 12 (four days after the earthquake) the U.S.
disbursed two million dollars each to UNICEF and WHO, three
million to IOM and almost four million to WFP ($3.5 million
for air operations and $300,000 for the Joint Logistics
Center). U.S. NGOs that were provided similar sums a few
days later have much more to show for their efforts in terms
of impact on the ground. (Though in fairness, these NGOs
were able to focus more exclusively on relief delivery and in
some cases had more latent in-country capacity.)


5. Beginning at para 10 below, we rank the key UN agencies
on their performance over the first month following the
disaster, with the strongest performers first and the weakest
last. We acknowledge an inherent degree of unfairness in
this ranking as UN agencies are not funded equally; it is
probably no coincidence that WHO and UNICEF, the best funded
agencies, get the best marks. Moreover, the varying sectors
in which UN agencies operate also vary in complexity.

Donor Coordination
--------------


6. The UN was quick to assume leadership of Islamabad-based
"clusters" that seek to coordinate emergency response in
various sectors. However, in most sectors there have been
too few qualified UN personnel on the ground to provide
effective leadership, and little vertical coordination
between the clusters in Islamabad and corresponding ones in
the field. As such, the overall effectiveness of the UN,
both in field operations and in providing technical advice to
NGOs and the GOP, has been limited. There has been a general
disconnect between Pakistani Government and NGO activities,
and while the UN is not entirely responsible, more effective
UN coordination could have helped considerably. USAID NGO
implementing partners are fairly unanimous in their concern
with the poor performance (and in some cases, total absence)
of the UN in humanitarian relief efforts.


7. The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) has been heading donor coordination meetings
in Islamabad since the day after the earthquake. In early
November (following guidance provided by US and UK reps) OCHA
dispatched a Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Kevin Kennedy, to
more effectively pull together the efforts of different
agencies. Kennedy, a former U.S. Marine officer with
extensive disaster coordination experience, has been a
welcome addition, and recognizes the leading role the
Pakistani military must play. His initial assessment was
that coordination in Islamabad lagged well behind
coordination in the field and indications are that he has
already reduced the disparity in the weeks since he arrived.


8. In the field, UN Disaster Assistance Coordination (UNDAC)
teams were sent to coordinate the initial donor response.
The U.S. Forward Operating Base in Mansehra gives UNDAC good
marks for its work in the NWFP. OCHA is now assuming this
coordination function from UNDAC and the transition seems to
be proceeding smoothly. However, while the UN's coordination
efforts in the field under UNDAC and OCHA seem to be
reasonably strong, they have not succeeded in improving the
implementation record of other UN agencies.


9. Soon after the operation began, the UN established a HIC
(Humanitarian Information Center),collocated with OCHA at
the UNICEF building in Islamabad. The HIC has provided some
useful maps and contact information, but has generally been
in a passive mode, receiving information from clusters and
NGOs rather than proactively seeking information on
concentrations of vulnerable people and field conditions.
HIC staff in Pakistan were largely trained in an operations
model for working in slow-onset, complex humanitarian
disaster and have not yet adjusted to the need to work in the
compressed time scale of a natural disaster.

WHO
---


10. The World Health Organization (WHO) could have done more
to promptly address dangerously unsanitary conditions in
Muzzafarabad camps, but overall it gets good marks, both in
coordinating the health cluster and in addressing needs on
the ground. WHO continues to provide disease surveillance
through 29 reporting sites, diligently quashing unconfirmed
rumors of epidemic outbreaks while continuing to monitor for
important indicative diseases such as cholera. It has helped
restart health facilities that were damaged by the
earthquake, through provision of tents, mobile units,
medicines and medical supplies, and conducted with UNICEF a
mass measles vaccination campaign for those between 6 months
to 15 years old. No massive outbreak has broken out in any
of the camps or settlements, indicating that the vaccination
has been generally successful.


11. WHO was the first and only UN agency to deploy to
hard-hit Balakot, where it has been a continuing presence for
over two weeks now, coordinating with the NGOs and monitoring
health trends in the area. Under WHO leadership, the health
cluster group in Mansehra is working well together to cover
health needs and gaps in assistance for the affected
population, and is trying to increase collaboration between
emergency care and medical practitioners who will eventually
take over the long-term care for these patients.

UNICEF
--------------


12. NGO representatives throughout the affected area say
UNICEF is performing reasonably well as the lead agency for
water and sanitation, protection, education and nutrition.
UNICEF has done an adequate job in the water and sanitation
area, developing a comprehensive relief strategy involving
four major interventions, including hygiene kits for rural
populations, basic interventions for residents of spontaneous
camps in urban areas (chlorine tablets, simple pit latrines,
hygiene kits, rudimentary waste collection),interventions in
planned camps (potable water sources on site, pour flush
latrines, washing areas, hygiene kits, waste collection),and
standard hygiene education programs for all affected
populations. In Muzaffarabad, UNICEF has been aggressive in
addressing the shortage of latrine slabs, purchasing plywood
for the U.S. Navy Seabees projects, procuring locally
manufactured sheet metal slabs, obtaining plastic slabs from
Dubai, and arranging for local production of plywood slabs.
The story is not as favorable in the NWFP, where its
sanitation efforts have lagged. (In Shangla District's Mehra
camp, which houses 6,200 people, UNICEF has built only 20 pit
latrines.) It has been less effective in coordinating the
work of other NGOs in the field, which has led to a
duplication of effort in several camps. A lack of UNICEF
leadership has also sometimes allowed Pakistan's Department
of Water and Sanitation to steer donor funding toward a
wishlist of long-standing water projects at the expense of
crucial hygiene and sanitation efforts.


13. UNICEF seems to be doing better in coordinating and
implementing protection, education and nutrition programs It
has helped restart schools that were damaged by the
earthquake by providing large tents and school supplies and
working with NGOs to set up child-friendly spaces in camps.
It has also offered psychological support to those
traumatized by the disaster and disseminated health messages
throughout the communities. In addition, UNICEF working with
WFP has distributed high energy biscuits to some 25,000
children through the school system, and has completed a
nutrition survey training this month. Assessments from the
field suggest that UNICEF logistics personnel have been
effective and energetic.

WFP
---


14. The World Food Program (WFP),which chairs the logistics
and food/transportation clusters, has a poor, but improving
record. On the logistics front, its initial efforts were
weak but improved dramatically after the arrival of one of
its most able people, Amer Daoudi, Chief of its Logistics
Service in Rome. WFP's role in this cluster is complex, in
that it can directly task the UN Humanitarian Air Service
(UNHAS) which operates the helicopters leased by the UN, but
not the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC),an interagency
body funded by separate contributions that oversees schedules
and coordinates all modes of transport (ground, fixed wing
aircraft, and helicopters).


15. Field assessments of WFP's performance in the food
cluster do not paint a favorable picture. It has been slow
in gathering information on where the NGOs are working and
areas that are not being served. NGOs have bitterly
complained about the lack of coordination resulting in
duplication of food distributions and competition for food
supplies among NGOS. While some of this can be blamed on
NGOs, strong WFP leadership would certainly have led to a
more effective and timely distribution of food resources.

UNJLC
--------------


16. The performance of the UN Joint Logistics Center in
coordinating transportation has been mixed. Early in the
operation there were a significant logistical problems in
managing air cargoes arriving at Islamabad Airport. These
problems have receded somewhat with improved inventorying of
incoming goods. The most complex challenges in the logistics
field have related to use of helicopter assets where UNJLC is
not yet up to the task of coping with the numerous actors
involved. UNJLC is tasking not only the UNHAS helicopters,
but also British helicopters, while the U.S. military is
receiving helicopter taskings from the Pakistani military.
As a result, too many missions have been flown to sites that
were accessible by road, resulting in longer wait times for
some NGO cargo that did actually need to move by air. In some
cases UN pilots did not have proper maps or grid coordinates
and were hampered by limited English language facility.


17. The WFP's Amer Daoudi was instrumental in the recent
establishment of a Joint Air Operations Center, in which the
Pakistani military, UN, US, and other militaries would divide
up necessary helicopter missions to avoid duplication and
ensure all areas are reached.

UNHCR
--------------


18. UNHCR is responsible for the camp management cluster,
and of all the UN agencies, it has probably been the weakest
performer. In part this is because it conceives its role as
planning and training -- equipping others to administer
camps. It has not adjusted easily to the existing emergency
situation where lives are at stake and there is no time to
train others to do the work. (By the third week UNHCR had
over 20 people working on earthquake relief in the NWFP, but
the affected area in the NWFP is very large.) In addition,
UNHCR has been hampered by a lack of qualified personnel,
effective leadership and limited resources on the ground.
During a number of visits to the field, DART personnel
encountered no UNHCR presence whatsoever, including in major
tented camps. Pakistani military representatives made
reference to UNHCR driving through their areas of operation,
talking briefly with them, and then leaving with no follow-up
visits. One DART field officer had a discussion with a
UNHCR representative who was, nearly a month into the
operation, unsure of the exact mandate of his agency, and the
degree to which it should be involved in camp design and
management. Other UN representatives pointed out the need to
push UNHCR to take a more active role in this area.


19. In fairness, part of the difficulty was that UNHCR had
to wait until the army and the government's Federal Relief
Commission (FRC) provided sites. The very rugged terrain of
the affected area offers few flat areas, and some suitable
sites are not available. Once sites were identified, the army
often pitched tents without consulting anyone, making it
necessary for UNHCR to work with the military to reconfigure
the camp to make it meet appropriate standards for displaced
people. As with other UN agencies, UNHCR's early
performance suffered because no government entity was
speaking authoritatively for the GOP on relief plans. The UN
also had to adjust when the FRC made major changes to the
shelter plan. (Performance has improved recently as UNHCR
has fielded additional staff, allowing it to dispatch quick
impact teams to fix water, sanitation and other problems in
camps.)

IOM
---

20. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has
failed to offer effective leadership for the critical shelter
cluster. It has adopted a facilitative, rather than a
leadership role and was slow to establish effective avenues
of cooperation with the GOP. IOM has devoted considerable
time and human and financial resources to field operations
focused on the movement of supplies, which has diverted
attention from the important task of strategically managing
the Shelter Cluster. NGOs in the NWFP complain that IOM
employees are ineffectual and spend too much time collating
databases instead of addressing urgent needs.



CROCKER