Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ISLAMABAD16577
2005-11-08 08:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: A VISIT TO BATTGRAM

Tags:  EAID MASS MOPS PGOV PK PTER ECON PREF ASEC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 016577 

SIPDIS

DEPT - PLEASE PASS TO USAID
KABUL -- PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: EAID MASS MOPS PGOV PK PTER ECON PREF ASEC
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: A VISIT TO BATTGRAM


Classified By: DCM Patricia A. Butenis, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 016577

SIPDIS

DEPT - PLEASE PASS TO USAID
KABUL -- PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: EAID MASS MOPS PGOV PK PTER ECON PREF ASEC
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: A VISIT TO BATTGRAM


Classified By: DCM Patricia A. Butenis, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Forward Operating Base Mansehra Officer-in-Charge
and Econoffs visited Battgram district on November 5.
Settlement patterns have complicated relief as damage is
spread across mountain villages with low population
densities. Interlocutors were concerned for villages in the
Allai tehsil, many of which have been established at high
elevations and would become isolated by winter snow beginning
in 15 to 20 days. The Pakistan military is encouraging the
relocation of these villages to a relief camp established at
Meira on November 2. Military officials aim to resettle
40,000 to 50,000 people. Around 2500 have arrived with
approximately 50 families (average size of 8-10 people)
coming to the camp daily. Uncertainty persists as to the
number who will eventually resettle in Meira, as many may
choose to remain in their mountain villages. Police and
military officials reported that some landlords were
instructing tenant farmers not to leave their allotted land
on threat of eviction. Approximately 30% of the mountain
population is estimated to be in this situation.


2. (C) The Pakistan military established the Meira camp
adjacent to an earlier facility constructed by the al-Rashid
Trust (a Department of Treasury designated person of interest
for sanctions purposes),a frequently observed pattern in
both Mansehra and Battgram districts. According to camp
supervisor LTC Farz, the military has informed al-Rashid that
it will be taking over the al-Rashid facility on November 6.
Al-Rashid has reportedly accepted the decision.


3. (SBU) Political parties and their affiliated relief
organizations were much in evidence. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)
through both its al-Khidmat charitable trust and its
student-wing Islami Jamaat Talaba (IJT) is the most visible.
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman's (JUI-F's) al-Khair trust
has a much smaller presence despite its reported domination
of the Battgram political scene. Local officials claimed
that neither the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) nor the Awami
National Party (ANP) were present in relief efforts.
Surprisingly, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM),which has
no political base in Battgram, had established one fairly
large relief camp in the district.


4. (C) Unlike in neighboring Mansehra District,
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD - the parent organization of the
designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba)
was not visibly present in Battgram. The Battgram city
police commander told OIC that he had strict orders to
prevent JUD or any banned organization from taking part in
relief efforts. His forces have already prevented JUD from
establishing an adjunct relief camp to their tent village
across the district border in Mansehra.


5. (SBU) The Battgram district administration was
criticized for failure to engage in relief operations. The
local police chief claimed the mayor, a wealthy landowner
elected with JUI-F and PML support had "fled" the district to
Islamabad after accusations of selling donated relief goods.
The military reported better coordination at the thesil and
union council level. Individual relief coordination
commissions for each thesil and union council had been formed
consisting of military officials, the elected union and
thesil nazims, and their defeated opponents from the 2007
election. The military reported excellent cooperation in
determining relief priorities and missions through this
system, which it intended to continue through reconstruction.



6. (C) Comment: The Balakot relief experience is clearly a
mixed bag. Uncertainty over villagers' intentions during the
upcoming winter have made comprehensive planning virtually
impossible. The district government's inability to engage on
relief operations has forced the military to develop a work
around involving other levels of local government. While
cumbersome in its operation, the e yse does eem to
involve local leaders in planning and could prove valuable in
reconstruction. JUD's exclusion from Battgram is welcome,
although the proliferation of relief camps to match the
dispersed nature of the population may well allow them to
operate without detection.


7. (U) Embassy Islamabad is transmitting this cable on
behalf of FOB Mansehra.



CROCKER