Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ISLAMABAD16474
2005-11-04 02:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE: USAID/DART SITUATION REPORT

Tags:  EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON KMDR KPAO OIIP OPRC PGOV PREL PK 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 ISLAMABAD 016474 

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, JBRAUSE
DCHA/OFDA KISAACS, GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, BDEEMER
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA
SOUTH ASIA RESPONSE MANAGEMENT TEAM
SOUTH ASIA EARTHQUAKE TASK FORCE
DCHA/FFP FOR LAUREN LANDIS
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER
ROME PASS FODAG
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH
NSC FOR JMELINE
EUCOM FOR POLA/J3/J4/J5
BRUSSELS FOR USAID PLERNER
NEW YORK FOR TMALY
SECDEF FOR SOLIC/PKHA, USDP/J3
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC FOR J3/J4/J5
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE FOR J3/J5


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON KMDR KPAO OIIP OPRC PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE: USAID/DART SITUATION REPORT
12: FIELD ASSESSMENT OF BATAGRAM


-------
Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 ISLAMABAD 016474

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, JBRAUSE
DCHA/OFDA KISAACS, GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, BDEEMER
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA
SOUTH ASIA RESPONSE MANAGEMENT TEAM
SOUTH ASIA EARTHQUAKE TASK FORCE
DCHA/FFP FOR LAUREN LANDIS
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER
ROME PASS FODAG
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH
NSC FOR JMELINE
EUCOM FOR POLA/J3/J4/J5
BRUSSELS FOR USAID PLERNER
NEW YORK FOR TMALY
SECDEF FOR SOLIC/PKHA, USDP/J3
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC FOR J3/J4/J5
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE FOR J3/J5


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON KMDR KPAO OIIP OPRC PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE: USAID/DART SITUATION REPORT
12: FIELD ASSESSMENT OF BATAGRAM


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. From October 30 to 31, the USAID Disaster Assistance
Response Team (USAID/DART) Economic and Livelihoods Advisor
(ELO),Program Officer (PO),Water and Sanitation Officer
(WSO),Shelter and Settlements Advisor (SSA),Earthquake
Expert (EE),Military Liaison Officer (MLO),Field Officer
(FO),and U.S. Army Engineer conducted a multi-sectoral
assessment in Batagram District to better understand
conditions and the response of the donor community. This
cable summarizes the results of their assessment and
analysis, and it provides recommendations for action.

--------------
Batagram District
--------------


2. In Batagram District, the USAID/DART performed building
assessments in order to devise an effective earthquake
mitigation strategy. The USAID/DART EE and SSA observed
that approximately 65 percent of the buildings are stone
masonry, 15 percent are reinforced concrete frame, 15
percent are brick masonry, and 5 percent are other types,
including adobe. Nearly one hundred percent of the building
stock is non-engineered, was built with poor quality

materials, and demonstrates poor workmanship. Most
buildings are two to three stories, but some are four
stories.


3. According to the USAID/DART EE and SSA, buildings in
Batagram District manifest a number of major deficiencies.
In general, buildings lack integrity between structural
elements; the wall-to-wall, wall-to-roof, and column-to-beam
connections are not structurally sound. Reinforcement
detailing such as splicing, 90-degree bends in stirrups,
large spacing of stirrups, and inadequate reinforcement bars
in columns and beams, is a major problem. Measures for
improving earthquake resistance are basic and simple, and
local masons, technicians, and engineers can learn such
methods.


4. The USAID/DART EE and SSA reported that some of the
families affected in the Allai Valley have traveled to other
settlements where they are temporarily living with relatives
in a hosting arrangement. Others have obtained shelter
materials (primarily tents) and returned to upland villages,
a small number have moved to informal camps, and some
affected people have moved into a newly-established
government of Pakistan (GOP) camp. An unknown portion of
those who remain will encounter difficulties obtaining
adequate food during the winter. It is uncertain whether
camp size will increase as winter sets in. In general,
people prefer to stay near their homes, especially when
their livestock and belongings remain in their home area.


5. The USAID/DART EE, SSA, and WSO paid a visit to the
Batagram office of the Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP).
Following the earthquake, SRSP began implementing relief
programming. SRSP has established 42 tented villages in the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP),including seven tented
villages in Batagram District. SRSP has not yet erected a
tented village in Allai Valley. Each of SRSP's tented
villages serves an average of 30 families. To date, SRSP
has served 9,000 people NWFP. SRSP works with World Vision
(WV),the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF),and Mercy Corps.
SRSP is distributing family kits, which include tents,
blankets, a tarpaulin, utensils, and other supplies,
provided by UNICEF. SRSP/Batagram employs one engineer and
six humanitarian aid workers.

--------------
Jessul
--------------


6. After the office visit, the SRSP staff joined the
USAID/DART EE, SSA, and WSO on a visit to the tent village
in Jessul, which SRSP has developed for 25 families. The
USAID/DART EE and SSA observed damaged houses and other
building structures and met with people affected by the
earthquake. Affected people in Jessul stated that their
first priority is finding a job and their second is
repairing and rebuilding their houses. Currently, the tents
in Jessul are pitched in the upland agricultural land.
People are using the same traditional water sources that
they were using prior to the earthquake, and they are using
drainage ditches next to fields for sanitation. These
practices, coupled with the small number of households
occupying tents in the village, minimize the need for water
and sanitation interventions. Beginning in March, the
affected population will need the land on which the tents
are pitched for sowing crops. Therefore, it is imperative
to facilitate seismic-resistant construction training
immediately to ensure that imminent repair and rebuilding
activities do not reflect past building practices. This
could be achieved through a cash-for-training (CFT) program
that would rapidly expand knowledge of seismic-resistance
construction among local masons, carpenters, and building
professionals.


7. Cognizant of the need to commence with agricultural
activities at the outset of spring, people are beginning to
repair and rebuild their houses, to the extent possible, in
hopes of beginning full reconstruction in the spring. Those
interviewed remarked that they were waiting for aftershocks
to subside before beginning to rebuild their homes. They
expressed the hope that the GOP would help them reconstruct
through loans, compensation, or other mechanisms. They plan
to begin repair activities in approximately two weeks.

--------------
Mehra
--------------


8. The USAID/DART MLO and the U.S. Army Engineer traveled
with representatives from the U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) to the Mehra site, approximately 40
kilometers (km) northwest of Batagram, on the banks of the
Indus River and just off the Karakorum highway. At this
site, the GOP military proposes to build a tented camp to
house 40,000 to 50,000 people. The USAID/DART team observed
very little earthquake-related damage along the Karakorum
highway, with the exception of one small village, about half
of which had slid down a slope. Survivors from this village
are living in tents in their fields along the river. Road
damage to Karakorum highway is minimal.


9. At Mehra, the team spoke with the Pakistani colonel
responsible for establishing the tented camp. He stated
that the GOP intends for people living at higher elevations
to move to the camp, which is well below the snow line,
before winter begins. Although the slope of the tent site
is not too steep, and the camp has access to water, the site
is not large enough to meet Sphere Project Guidelines (SPG)
for the projected population. Currently, 1,000 people are
at the site and are receiving support from local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The OCHA representative
stated that up to 70 percent of the total local population
of 140,000 to 190,000 people may move down from the
mountains. Representatives of local NGOs, however, believe
that many of these people will likely stay with relatives or
in other villages.


10. GOP military representatives at Mehra told the
USAID/DART that the GOP military has a few hundred tents but
needs 6,000 to 7,000 tents for this tent city. The GOP
military plans to divide the camp into six to eight sectors,
to correspond with existing villages, and proposes to build
a helipad to facilitate movement of supplies to the camp.
The OCHA representative stated that OCHA plans to remain
closely involved in the planning process, providing the GOP
military with advice and coordination with NGO partners as
needed. GOP military representatives at Mehra are aware of
their knowledge gaps, and appear willing to work with OCHA
on camp establishment and management.

--------------
Technical Considerations
--------------


11. The site for the proposed 40,000-person GOP camp near
the Allai Valley is significantly smaller than SPG would
suggest. A 40,000-person camp requires 1.8 million square
meters of space, whereas the current useable camp area may
be less than 100,000 square meters, according to a
representative of OCHA. Many people leaving the valley are
staying with family and friends, or they are obtaining
shelter materials and then returning to upland villages.
Others would remain in a lowland shelter of some kind only
until aftershocks subside. [Comment. At this time,
aftershocks continue. End comment.] Most people
interviewed suggested that social and cultural concerns
would undermine occupancy in a camp setting, indicating that
people will probably not remain in the GOP camp through the
winter.


12. Many people suggested that as an alternative to tents,
which people are willing to accept in lieu of alternative
shelter options, they could utilize corrugated galvanized
iron (CGI) sheets and a small package of tools and household
items in order to create a habitable space from salvaged
building materials, and cover it with a solid, weatherproof
roof. Of note, all people interviewed preferred CGI sheets
over tents, stating that they could re-use the CGI sheets as
part of a more permanent shelter solution in the spring.
This finding suggests the need for the design of
transitional shelter packages featuring CGI sheets, which
can bridge the gap between relief and reconstruction
activities. These packages could be supplemented with
straightforward information on seismic-resistant
construction measures that could be featured in the CFT
program discussed above. Such an effort would promote the
broader objective of quote Building Back Better, Safer, and
Faster end quote.

--------------
Save the Children Food Distribution
--------------


13. The USAID/DART FO and ELO visited a Save the Children
(SC) distribution activity. The distribution included
sleeping bags, tents, and a one-week supply of food rations
for one family. Using effective local community organizers,
SC distributed these baskets at a location approximately 45
minutes outside the town boundary. The USAID/DART witnessed
a well-organized distribution at which needy families, who
were previously identified and provided with a coupon by
local leaders, came to redeem the coupon for the relief
package. The USAID/DART heard reports that the recipients
appreciated this orderly system, and the system allowed SC
to systematically and efficiently cover their target area.


14. This system of distribution gives SC strong relations
with their beneficiaries and a solid network of capable
leaders. It therefore provides them with a solid platform
on which they can carry out the rest of the USAID/OFDA grant
in shelter, cash-for-work (CFW),education, and
psychological and social work with youth. SC proposes to
carry out these activities in Batagram and in Bana village
in the Allai valley. Though SC is still in the beginning
stages of implementation of this grant, the USAID/DART was
impressed with the plans and preparations for the execution
of grant activities.

--------------
USAID/DART Meeting With OCHA Representative
--------------


15. Upon the arrival of the USAID/DART, Edward Pearn of the
OCHA Field Camp briefed the team. On October 30, the U.N.
had begun holding general donor coordination meetings, and
recently the U.N. began holding health cluster meetings with
the NGOs and other humanitarian relief agencies operating in
Batagram District. The USAID/DART attended the general
donor coordination meeting and listened to progress reports
from organizations working in various sectors, including
organizations involved in the camp initiated by the GOP
military at Mehra.


16. [Comment: Regarding U.N. coordination efforts, the
USAID/DART noted that nearly one month after the earthquake,
the U.N. is just beginning to coordinate relief efforts in
this area. At present, only three U.N. representatives work
in this camp. In addition, local and international NGOs
have stated that establishing camps as proposed by the GOP
may not be the best approach to address the shelter crisis
for those in the Allai valley who reportedly prefer to stay
in their home areas. Many international agencies recognize
that the establishment of centralized camps should be used
as a back-up to other shelter options. In summary, to date,
the U.N. has not effectively carried out its responsibility
of coordinating the relief efforts, and the U.N. may be
supporting a potentially ineffective shelter solution. End
comment.]

--------------
Conclusions and Recommendations
--------------


17. Based on its assessment, the USAID/DART concluded the
following:

-- The U.N. is slow in starting its task of coordinating
relief activities in Batagram District.

-- SC appears to be doing well distributing commodities
provided by the U.S. military. SC appears to be on track
for effective implementation of its USAID/OFDA grant.

-- NGOs question the priority of establishing temporary
camps.

-- The camp proposed at Mehra could not house as large a
population as proposed and comply with SPG. The tent
village at Jessul that was spontaneously established does
not currently comply with SPG, although there are no major
water and sanitation problems now.


18. Based on its conclusions, the USAID/DART recommends the
following:

-- CFW and CFT programs should be implemented in villages
similar to Jessul. Villages like Jessul are ideal settings
for these types of programs.

-- Under the umbrella management of local organizations such
as Rural Support Program Network (RSPN),SRSP would be an
effective implementing partner for CFW or CFT programs and
shelter activities.

-- Relief programs should address the need to enhance the
knowledge and capacity of those engaged in construction of
earthquake-resistant structures. This type of program
should begin immediately, as people are attempting to repair
and rebuild houses.

-- As a complement to CFT programs to build capacity to
engage in seismic-resistant construction practices, USAID-
funded programs should raise earthquake awareness among the
general population through public information campaigns.

CROCKER