Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ISLAMABAD15518
2005-10-15 08:59:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: SURVEY TRIP TO MUZZAFARABAD

Tags:  AEMR ASEC EAID MASS PGOV PREL PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 015518 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AEMR ASEC EAID MASS PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: SURVEY TRIP TO MUZZAFARABAD

REF: ISLAMABAD 15513

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 015518

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AEMR ASEC EAID MASS PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: SURVEY TRIP TO MUZZAFARABAD

REF: ISLAMABAD 15513


1. Summary: A USG survey team consisting of personnel from
State, USAID, and DOD visited Muzzafarabad and surrounding
areas of Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) from October 11-13. During
the visit, the team met with officials from the local and AJK
government, the Pakistani military, and relief workers to
assess needs and relief efforts in the aftermath of the
October 8 earthquake. All interlocuters believed that the
immediate need was shelter for the ensuing 3 to 4 months
followed by a permanent water supply. By the fourth day
following the earthquake, most of those with life-threatening
injuries had been evacuated. Medical personnel felt that
re-establishing electricity and running water was critical to
preventing and treating disease. Relief efforts by the
Pakistani military, local government, Pakistani population
and the international community were enormous, but
coordination could be drastically improved. Relief officials
believed that the major focus of disaster response efforts
should now shift to communities surrounding Muzzaffarabad.
End summary.

A Long Way to Normalcy
======================


2. The one thing that all interlocutors -- from senior
military generals to laborers who lost family -- agreed upon
was the need for tents to be used as semi-permanent shelter
for about 3 to 4 months. While most stressed winterized
units, a minority argued that securing any shelter was more
important than waiting for winterized tents. The latter
group added that affected populations were resilient and
needed only basic protection from the elements. The
Pakistani military, which was spearheading and directing most
relief operations, had yet to establish a long-term
reconstruction plan and was primarily focused on getting to
and stabilizing the injured.

Logistics Will Win the War
==========================


3. Much of the civilian leadership of AJK and Muzzafarabad
were killed or severely injured. The military was leading
relief efforts but found coordination with the central
command in Islamabad and with non-military relief efforts in
the city complicated. In many cases, private citizens were
simply hiring trucks to ship goods to Muzzafarabad and then
throwing the goods off the trucks while driving through the
city. Survivors heard of ad hoc collection and distribution
centers by word-of-mouth; these sites lacked security
elements to ensure orderly disbursement. Many main roads to
the city were passable, although cluttered with rocks and
debris. Several points along the road from Murree to
Muzzaffarabad were limited to a single lane of traffic.
These choke points were barely wide enough for a local
"jingle" truck to pass, causing traffic jams and delaying
needed relief supplies.

Getting out of the Big City
===========================


4. Most relief personnel considered the situation in
Muzzaffarabad to be stable and were encouraging relief
efforts to shift to smaller communities in AJK. Pakistani
military officers considered Chokoti, Jure, Sawan, Dhani and
Patika to be priority areas. Almost a week after the
disaster, these areas had yet to receive any assistance.

Comment
=======


5. Our team believed that the military, civilian officials,
and relief personnel in Muzzafarabad were doing a credible
job in attempting to deliver assistance in the face of this
overwhelming disaster. There was a strong recognition and
desire to do more both in Muzzafarabad and surrounding areas,
limited only by the logistical challenges in transporting
relief supplies and personnel. While coordination could
certainly be improved among those providing relief on the
ground and with central authorities in Islamabad, we believe
that such challenges will diminsh as the military and
civilian authorities regain firm control and communications
infrastructure recovers.
CROCKER