POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM DISASTER RESPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 015463

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV EAID MASS PK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM DISASTER RESPONSE

REF: ISLAMABAD 15316

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, d


1. (C) Summary: The GOP and the Pakistan military have faced
substantial media and public criticism, much of it
unjustified, for their perceived ineffectiveness in
earthquake response. Musharraf's public address on October
12, a damage control exercise, was overshadowed by continued
media images, interviews, and commentary on victims who are
still without meaningful assistance. The opposition parties,
sensing a vulnerability, have joined the attacks and sought
to portray themselves as constructive players in national
relief efforts. With damage concentrated in Azad Kashmir and
North West Frontier Province (NWFP),there is a near term
possibility that resentment at the central government may
fuel the Kashmiri independence movement and Pashtun
nationalist calls for increased provincial autonomy. Over
the medium-term, however, if reconstruction efforts are
adequately funded and executed in these areas, government
authority and credibility may be enhanced. End Summary.


2. (C) International aid agencies and NGOs believe that the
GOP and the Pakistan military have conducted a largely
credible relief operation despite significant logistical
challenges and infrastructure limitations. This assessment
is not widely shared in the Pakistani public or media.
Images and stories of victims in dire need continue to flood
the pages and television screens of an increasingly skeptical
public. Reported verbal abuse of Pakistani military and
government personnel arriving in affected villages, coupled
with stories and images of desparate survivors looting relief
convoys and distribution points, adds to the perception of
government paralysis. The media has been demonstrating that
it is completely free, but less than fully responsible. For
example, local journalists stationed at Chaklala Airbase in
Islamabad report a chaotic scene, with the Pakistani military
unable to prioritize assistance missions for timely delivery
of aid and no visible decisionmaking chain-of-command. In
fact, the whole operation at Chaklala is running well, as the
international media seems to be portraying today. The
absence of an effective media/public relations strategy
within the GOP, coupled with the military's long-standing
reluctance to provide operational information to journalists,
plays into the hands of critics. The Ambassador joined the
Pakistan Army's air chief at Chaklala this morning for a
Pakistan TV interview to set the record straight.


3. (C) To blunt criticism of GOP relief operations, President
Musharraf addressed the nation on October 13. While the
speech contained some detail on military relief operations
and praised international donor assistance, most commentators
remained unmoved. Media analysts charged that Musharraf came
across as defensive when he articulated logistical challenges
in aid delivery and appeared to open the military to
additional criticism when he stated that 72-hours had been
necessary to arrange for full mobilization.


4. (C) Nevertheless, Musharraf himself has been generally
viewed in a favorable light during the crisis. He continues
to project an aura of leadership in meetings with foreign
officials and relief workers and during well-publicized tours
of the earthquake zone. His astute political decision to
create, in relatively short order, military and civilian
relief cells that answer to others in the GOP, may allow him
to shift future blame to other institutions, particularly the
Prime Minister's Office and the military command.


5. (C) Prime Minister Aziz's image has suffered, despite
tours of the earthquake zone and significant personal
monetary donations. Aziz lacks the leadership persona of
Musharraf and has frequently seemed overwhelmed. The Prime
Minister is not helped by a bureaucracy that has done little
other than designing numerous organigrams for relief
operations and establishing multiple cabinet-level relief
committees, few of which have delivered results. The public
perception has been of a Prime Minister (and government)
involved in endless meetings while victims suffer. Aziz, who
has faced opposition within his party and government almost
from the day he assumed office, may well end up as the
government's scapegoat.


6. (C) The public welcomed the decision to appoint the
military as lead agency for disaster response, but had
unrealistic expectations of its capabilities. (Note: The
military has always enjoyed a much higher level of trust than
the civilian bureaucracy.) The slow pace of relief delivery,
an inevitable result of the scope of the disaster and the
inaccessability of the terrain, undermined confidence.
Military personnel in the disaster zone have been verbally
abused, and commanders are under constant media scrutiny.
General Farooq, the military's Disaster Relief Coordinator
has explained publicly and privately that the area of
devestation coincided with the area of the army's deployment
in Kashmir leading to significant military casualties that
hindered its rapid response capability.


7. (C) The media has carried positive stories of the
opposition (both secular and Islamist) dispatching relief
supplies and assistance teams to the affected areas. The
decision to conduct relief efforts independently through the
parties' existing charitable foundations arguably sacrifices
efficiency in an effort to gain political advantage. In
contrast, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League's decision to
focus its efforts on the President's Relief Fund has
inextricably linked its efforts with the GOP. The
opposition's decision to refrain from vocal criticism of GOP
efforts has allowed its leadership to appear constructive
players. NWFP Chief Minister Durrani's decision to attend,
for the first time, the National Security Council meeting on
October 12 to discuss earthquake relief allowed parties to
seem above partisan squabbling.


8. (C) Comment: The most severely earthquake-impacted areas,
Kashmir and the NWFP, viewed themselves as isolated from the
central government prior to this tragedy. The GOP has
steadfastly maintained the fiction of an autonomous Azad
Kashmir government and in the NWFP calls for increased
political autonomy are a well-established tradition. In the
near-term, public unhappiness over the relief effort could
fuel both Pashtun and Kashmiri nationalist movements and give
additional platforms to their principal advocates the Awami
National Party (ANP),the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman,
and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front. However, over the
medium term, if reconstruction efforts are adequately funded
and executed, the GOP is likely to weather the storm and may
come out ahead. Indeed, a massive, GOP-led reconstruction
effort could ultimately help bind both regions more tightly
to Pakistan. End Comment.
CROCKER