Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05HELSINKI228
2005-02-23 09:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Helsinki
Cable title:  

ACEH TALKS: FINNISH MEDIATORS POSITIVE AFTER DAY 2

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ASEC ID FI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000228 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/IET, EUR/NB AND INR/EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ASEC ID FI
SUBJECT: ACEH TALKS: FINNISH MEDIATORS POSITIVE AFTER DAY 2

REF: A. STATE 28557

B. JAKARTA 02068

C. HELSINKI 0185

D. JAKARTA 01596

E. HELSINKI 0127

F. STOCKHOLM 086

G. JAKARTA 0564

H. JAKARTA 0414

I. STATE 05915

J. JAKARTA 0380

Classified By: ACTING POL CHIEF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (
B AND D)

A Possible Breakthrough
------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000228

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/IET, EUR/NB AND INR/EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ASEC ID FI
SUBJECT: ACEH TALKS: FINNISH MEDIATORS POSITIVE AFTER DAY 2

REF: A. STATE 28557

B. JAKARTA 02068

C. HELSINKI 0185

D. JAKARTA 01596

E. HELSINKI 0127

F. STOCKHOLM 086

G. JAKARTA 0564

H. JAKARTA 0414

I. STATE 05915

J. JAKARTA 0380

Classified By: ACTING POL CHIEF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (
B AND D)

A Possible Breakthrough
--------------

1. (C) Poloff spoke with Meri-Maria Jaarva of the Crisis
Management Initiative (CMI) on the night of February 22.
Jaarva is the chief assistant of former Finnish President
Martti Ahtisaari for the Aceh talks. Jaarva said that there
had been an "enormous change" in the demeanor and attitude of
the GAM representatives from Monday (Day 1) to Tuesday (Day
2). She said that the GAM's position was so hardline on
Monday that she and Ahtisaari were unsure if the GAM
representatives would actually show up Tuesday morning or if
they would break off the talks. She had gone so far as to
begin preparing contingency points for the press in the event
of a break down. However, the GAM representatives arrived
Tuesday prepared to immediately discuss substantive issues
and details about what a comprehensive settlement in Aceh
might look like. They were prepared to drop (in effect)
their demand for eventual independence as well as their
insistence on negotiating a series of staged or tranched
measures (beginning with a cease-fire) rather than discussing
a comprehensive settlement all at once. Jaarva said that she
did not know what had happened during the night of Feb. 21-22
to account for the dramatic shift; she speculated that the
GAM negotiators may have received the approval or support of
field commanders to move forward, but was unsure.


2. (C) The most important development was agreement between
the GAM and the GoI on the semantics of autonomy. Jaarva

said that the GAM representatives told the GoI side that the
phrase "special autonomy" was pejorative for their supporters
and a non-starter; it would be impossible to sell an
agreement based on "special autonomy" to certain key GAM
figures outside the talks. After some discussion, the
alternative formulation of "self-government inside Indonesia"
was agreed on. The GoI's initial "special autonomy package"
would still be the starting point for negotiations, but the
new semantics would be used henceforth. Jaarva said that she
believed this would allow the GAM negotiators to claim to
their supporters that they had not sacrificed "independence"
for "autonomy." Jaarva expressed surprise with media reports
that GAM "Prime Minister" Malik had publicly stated the GAM
was dropping its demand for independence; she said that she
did not believe the GAM representatives in Helsinki would
want such reports reaching their supporters at this stage.


Areas of Discussion
--------------

3. (C) Jaarva said that the negotiations had then moved on
to short but substantive discussions of a number of key areas
that would have to be resolved as part of any comprehensive
settlement.

-- Political Parties: The GoI did not want to change its
electoral system to allow "separatist" political parties to
legally operate, but recognized that some way would have to
be found for the GAM to form a party(ies) and participate in
municipal and provincial elections and politics. There were
a number of ideas on both sides about how this might be
achieved.

-- Timing of Elections

-- Amnesty for GAM leaders and fighters

-- Economy and Taxation: The two sides discussed how
revenues would be shared, and what type of auditing system
could be put in place to verify equitable distribution and
prevent malfeasance.

-- Reintegration of fighters into Indonesian society

-- Security: Disarmament and "decommissioning" of GAM
military formations.

-- Human Rights Issues: Jaarva said that there was an
extensive discussion of various human rights issues, as well
as some discussion of ongoing humanitarian relief efforts in
the wake of the tsunami.

-- Monitoring of Agreement: Both sides agreed that there
would have to be an external monitoring body put in place for
an extended period. Both sides were unenthusiastic about the
UN being the basis for such a monitoring body. There seemed
to be a consensus that a regional organization or "something
with the Australians and Americans" would be preferable to
the UN.

Next Steps: Tentative agreement was reached to hold a third
round of talks in Helsinki from April 12-17 (Note: Jaarva was
unsure that she had the exact date range correct). She said
that the longer gap was necessary to allow both sides to
prepare position papers on the various issues, to consult
with legal and political advisors, and, in the case of the
GAM, to win acceptance from key GAM commanders for the
concept of a settlement.


Outside Influence?
--------------

4. (C) Jaarva told Poloff that the American Aceh activist
Neeson was not/not present in Helsinki because he had become
ill at the last moment and canceled his trip. However, she
said that Kingsbury and "another Aussie woman (sic)" were
with the GAM representatives as political advisors. The two
Australians did not participate in the negotiation sessions,
but appeared to play an active role in the intra-GAM
deliberations. Jaarva said that she did not know if the role
they were playing was benign or malign as far as facilitating
agreement, or if they played any role in either the hardline
stance the GAM took on Monday or the overnight change that
subsequently took place. Jaarva also said that there were
two other foreign advisors, a German and a Swede, that
unexpectedly appeared with the GAM representatives. Jaarva
said that Ahtisaari thought it impolitic to refuse them
admission into the estate where the talks were being held,
and that although they were "poking around" the site, they
did not insinuate themselves into the talks and appeared
"harmless."



Christensen Upbeat
--------------

5. (C) DCM Weisberg also received a late call from Juha
Christensen, the Finnish businessman who originally brought
Ahtisaari into the process as a mediator. Christensen has
been present during the talks and actually participated in at
least some of the negotiation sessions. Christensen told the
DCM that he was optimistic after Day 2 and cited the same
change in the GAM's demeanor that Jaarva had. Christensen
opined that he believed a breakthrough might indeed have been
achieved. Christensen declined to go into further details
over the phone, but agreed to meet with the DCM later this
week to discuss his impressions.


Day 3
--------------

6. (C) CMI mediators indicated that the talks on Wednesday
(Day 3) would focus on preparing the agenda for the April
round. Ahtisaari plans to give a press conference at 3:00pm
local time (8:00am EST) on Wednesday. Ahtisaari's official
statement on the talks will be posted to the CMI website
(www.cmi.fi) at some point on February 23.



WEISBERG