ACEH: FINNISH INTERMEDIARY MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT

S E C R E T HELSINKI 000185

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EAP/IET, INR/EAP, AND EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS ID FI EAID
SUBJECT: ACEH: FINNISH INTERMEDIARY MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT
PROSPECTS FOR HELSINKI TALKS

REF: STOCKHOLM 00246 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POLOFF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)


1. (S) DCM Weisberg met with Juha Christensen on February
11 to discuss the Aceh talks in Helsinki. Christensen is the
Finnish businessman who facilitated the introduction of
former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as a mediator
between the GoI and GAM. Christensen was decidedly more
pessimistic about the prospects for successful negotiations
than he was when the DCM spoke with him last week.
Christensen said that he believed there was only a 50-50
chance that the GAM leadership in Stockholm would agree to
participate in a second round of talks in Helsinki
(tentatively proposed for February 24). He attributed this
to the dissatisfaction of GAM field commanders with the
Stockholm group's handling of the first round of talks; in
particular, Christensen said that the GAM field commander in
Thailand was unhappy with the talks and believed the GAM's
Stockholm leadership was "selling out" to the GoI by
suggesting a negotiated settlement short of independence was
acceptable. Christensen said that this negative feedback
from the field was responsible for the public criticism of
Ahtisaari (i.e., that he had pressured the GAM too much on
the GoI's behalf) and the hardening of the GAM's position
over the past few days.


2. (S) Christensen opined to Weisberg that the Tokyo talks
several years ago had broken down because of GAM insistence
on independence as the sine qua non of any comprehensive
settlement, and that he feared this might happen again. He
said that the GAM leaders "just don't get it" as regards the
lack of international support for Acehnese independence, and
that Ahtisaari's frank advice that they should give up their
insistence on independence and use the negotiations to get as
much as possible out of a "special autonomy" status appeared
to have upset some of them. When the DCM asked Christensen
if there was any disagreement among the GAM leaders in
Stockholm about how to proceed, Christensen replied that
"Prime Minister" Malik Mahmud was the "most approachable" and
seemed to have the most realistic expectations about the GAM
could achieve; others, however, were more influenced by the
views of the field commanders that a harder line should be
maintained on independence.


3. (S) Christensen also told Weisberg that two
representatives from the Henri Dunant Center in Switzerland
(Mark Griffiths and Tom Korman) had visited the GAM leaders
in Stockholm on February 10 to urge them to accept
Ahtisaari's proposal for a second round of talks.
Christensen said that if the GAM leaders "will listen to
anyone, it will be the Henri Dunant (representatives)."
Christensen went on to say that he understood a meeting had
occurred at Indonesian Vice President Kalla's home on
February 10 to discuss the GoI's strategy for the next round
of talks; however, he did not provide any further details of
this meeting.


4. (S) Finally, Christensen told the DCM that his
(Christensen's) impression was that if a referendum on
special autonomy was held in Aceh, 70-85% of Acehnese would
support the concept as a permanent solution to the situation.
Christensen used this assertion to illustrate how out of
touch he believed the GAM's leaders and field commanders to
be with actual popular sentiment in Aceh, especially in the
wake of the tsunami. Christensen said that after many years
of living and working in the region, the impression he got
from most Aceh residents was that they couldn't voice their
opinion about autonomy; if they voiced support for
independence, the TNI