Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05HARARE868
2005-06-22 15:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

MDC HEAD PREVIEWS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR FRAZER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221524Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000868 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/Z NEWMAN/DAS WOODS
OVP FOR NULAND
NSC FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE
USAID FOR M. COPSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC HEAD PREVIEWS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR FRAZER


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000868

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/Z NEWMAN/DAS WOODS
OVP FOR NULAND
NSC FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE
USAID FOR M. COPSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC HEAD PREVIEWS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR FRAZER


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. MDC President Morgan Tsavngirai met with CDA June 21 to
discuss his June 22-24 trip to South Africa and his meeting
with Ambassador Frazier. Tsvangirai said the purpose of the
trip was to meet with IRI,s communications expert and
discuss the party,s message in the wake of another stolen
election. He had decided to take advantage of the trip to
meet the Ambassador and make an appeal for continued U.S.
support. He planned to outline the MDC,s plans to confront
the regime with non-violent acts of disobedience, beginning
in July. Tsvangirai said he had no plans to meet with SAG
representatives while in South Africa, but would meet with
COSATU and SACP. End Summary.

--------------
Pretoria Trip
--------------


2. (C) Tsvangirai said he was going to Pretoria to meet with
IRI,s communications expert to discuss the party,s message
and communications strategy in the wake of the stolen March
31 parliamentary elections and Operation Restore Order. He
had decided to take advantage of the trip to meet Ambassador
Frazier, given the published reports that she would be
returning to Washington later this year in a senior AF
position. He felt it was important to justify continued U.S.
support, without which the political opposition in Zimbabwe
would be severely hampered. He also said he planned to
emphasize that despite recent setbacks, democracy in Zimbabwe
remained attainable in the near-term.


3. (C) The CDA said that Tsvangirai should be prepared to
explain to the Ambassador and other USG interlocutors what
the MDC was preparing to do and why it had delayed taking
action for so long following the elections and especially
following the onset of Operation Restore Order. He added
that U.S. support remained firm for the restoration of
democracy in Zimbabwe, especially given the recent heinous
behavior of the GOZ toward its own citizens. That said, the

MDC would receive a more favorable U.S. reception in
Washington D.C. and elsewhere once it had concrete actions it
could point to.

--------------
MDC &Ready to Act8
--------------


4. (C) Tsvangirai said the &delay8 in the MDC response had
allowed the party to regroup and plot the way forward. The
MDC,s &false subservience8 of the past three months would
work to the party,s advantage by having lulled the
government into a sense of complacency. Moreover, any loss
of credibility with the populace would be quickly made up
once the party was seen to be taking action. That said, he
did acknowledge that the MDC had initially misunderstood the
scope and severity of Operation Restore Order, believing it
would be confined to attacks on the informal economy, and had
failed to respond to it appropriately.


5. (C) Tsvangirai said the MDC had now settled on an initial
six-month plan of action, to begin in early July and modeled
on the successful revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine. The MDC
would gradually raise the pressure on the regime through
non-violent acts of civil disobedience. Should this be met
with violence, the MDC would nonetheless continue non-violent
protests. This plan would put into effect the ¶digm
shift8 -- to a democratic resistance movement -- that the
party had decided was needed following the election. The MDC
would continue to openly contest elections but would use
covert acts to force the GOZ to allow the elections to be
free and fair. These actions would focus on the food and
fuel shortages and would also seek to spark opposition to the
government over other &trigger8 issues such as the proposed
changes to the constitution.


6. (C) Tsvangirai said the MDC would lead the &Broad
Alliance8 of democratic forces in these actions. The MDC
had been debating internally how to respond to the elections.
The debate had been largely over what role the MDC should
play within the alliance. However, the failure of the recent
stay-away had underscored the central role the MDC had to
play if the populace were to respond. Tsavngirai
acknowledged that not everyone in the party,s leadership was
prepared to sacrifice on the people,s behalf, courting
arrest and torture or worse. However, for this campaign to
succeed the party,s leaders would have to be seen to be
taking risks upfront.

--------------
International Role
--------------


7. (C) The CDA asked what role the MDC saw for the
international community in its plans. Tsvangirai responded
that U.S. support was critical not just in providing
resources but in maintaining the government,s continued
isolation. He feared that many countries were in favor of a
softer approach toward the GOZ and ZANU-PF and were prepared
to reengage. The CDA said that may have been the case
immediately after the election but was no longer the case
with Operation Restore Order having done serious damage to
the GOZ,s international reputation.


8. (C) In response to the CDA,s question, Tsvangirai said he
had no plans to meet with SAG representatives while in
Pretoria but would meet with COSATU and SACP representatives.
The CDA noted that the outgoing SAG Ambassador had
criticized Operation Restore Order (septel) and that
Tsvangirai and the MDC might at least find parts of the SAG

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receptive to a renewed MDC approach.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Beyond a start date, there was little new in
Tsvangirai,s description of the MDC,s plans for civil

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disobedience, most of which he had briefed us on during our
last meeting in late May. However, what was new was a
growing realization on his part that the lack of MDC
activity, and especially its preoccupation with its internal
politics, had cost the party credibility not just with
Zimbabweans, but with the international community as well and
with us in particular. In addition, we would note that in
citing Serbia and Ukraine as examples, Tsvangirai overlooks
that in both cases flawed elections were the key trigger
event. We would argue that Operation Restore Order might
also have served such a purpose in Zimbabwe. By contrast, we
find it difficult to imagine tens of thousands taking to the
streets in protest over constitutional changes. The MDC may
very well have already missed their best chances to inspire
widespread popular discontent.
SCHULTZ