OPPOSITION LEADER UPBEAT IN ELECTION STRETCH DRIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000469

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AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER UPBEAT IN ELECTION STRETCH DRIVE


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a dinner at the Residence on March
24, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai confidently predicted to
the Ambassador and a visiting Congressional staff delegation
that his party would win a majority of the contested seats in
the March 31 parliamentary election. Tsvangirai said ZANU-PF
was flagrantly manipulating local chiefs and the food issue.
Nonetheless, under pressure from abroad the ruling party had
opened up some space for his party, which they had used to
seize the momentum, even in rural areas. Tsvangirai expected
the ruling party to be receptive to negotiations in the wake
of its weak showing and asserted that the MDC would be ready
to discuss everything except a government of national unity,
which he said would be "political suicide" for himself and
the MDC. He promised to coordinate closely with the USG
after the election. END SUMMARY.

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ZANU-PF Will Cheat
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2. (C) Tsvangirai said that although the campaign had been
largely non-violent to date, ZANU-PF was still attempting to
win the election by intimidating the electorate. In rural
areas, the ruling party was for instance co-opting
traditional chiefs and using them to pressure voters. It
was also cynically exploiting distribution of the country's
meager remaining food reserves. ZANU-PF operatives
frequently disrupted MDC rallies by distributing maize at
adjacent locations. The police and CIO were being widely
deployed in plainclothes to play an intimidating, though to
date largely non-violent role and were continuing to harass
candidates and activists. MDC MP Trudy Stephenson had been
arrested (and quickly released) in the past week for handing
out flyers at an intersection. Finally, he noted that the
voter rolls were fraught with problems, which he thought
would cause particular problems in areas of
resettled/displaced populations.

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But the MDC Will Still Win
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3. (C) Tsvangirai said ZANU-PF cheating would not be enough
to win this election. The MDC was training its supporters to
"defend the vote" and would deploy four polling agents to
each of the nation's 8,000-plus polling stations to guard
against election-day fraud. However, more important was the
snowballing enthusiasm for the MDC. A contagion of hope was
rapidly denting the electoral apathy of just months ago.
Large and animated MDC rallies throughout the country had
convinced him that the party was on the verge of a
significant national victory.


4. (C) Tsvagirai said people across the country were stunned
to see these huge crowds cheering him and other MDC speakers
at rallies in former &no-go8 areas, such as Mutoko and
Guruve in the heart of Mashonaland. Party leaders such as
Secretary for Economic Affairs Tendai Biti were impressing

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the electorate in unprecedented media exposure, and ZANU-PF
was doing little to counteract the MDC's public message.
Tsvangirai said economic decline and ZANU-PF factionalism

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continued to sap ruling party support. Evidencing the
election's shifting tide, Tsvangirai noted that 900 of 1,000
ebullient MDC supporters at a recent rally in Beitbridge (for
a seat held by the incumbent Home Affairs Minister) admitted
to voting ZANU-PF in 2000.


5. (C) Tsvagirai said that despite the MDC,s momentum, he
did not expect a spike in violence in the election,s last
week. He suspected that Mugabe was not fully aware of the
MDC's sudden rise in fortunes, and had thus not deployed
sufficient government and party machinery to assure ZANU-PF
victory. In any event, the deployment of security forces to
assure a ZANU-PF victory at this late date would be easily
exposed and would thoroughly undermine ZANU-PF's strategy of
using ostensible implementation of SADC election principles
to legitimize its rule. Moreover, the police were not as
disruptive as in the past, in part because police
sympathizers were feeding MDC campaign staff information.
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Previewing the Election and its Aftermath
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6. (C) Tsvangirai said winning 80-85 seats was the MDC's
best-case scenario, and that taking only 61 (a majority of
120 contested seats, not including the 30 seats appointed by
Mugabe) would represent a "total fraud." However, the lesser
figure still would undermine the government's legitimacy by
any definition of democracy even if the Constitution gave
Mugabe's party control of the government. A total of 76
would give the MDC the power to thwart any legislation and
effectively produce a "constitutional crisis." He predicted
that the ruling party would be ready to negotiate in either
event.


7. (C) Tsvangirai offered no timeline for such negotiations
but said "much work" had already been done on constitutional
amendments, which would be a good departure point. In that
regard, he dismissed Mugabe's recent proposal for a senate,
and predicted agreement on a new parliament built on a
combination of proportional representation and
"first-past-the-post" seats, with abolition of the 30
presidentially-appointed seats.


8. (C) Tsvangirai said that "everything" except a government
of national unity would be on the table from the MDC's
perspective in inter-party negotiations. He suspected that
the South African Government favored a GNU, but given the
historical example of ZAPU's absorption by ZANU-PF in the
1980s and current domestic political dynamics, a GNU would be
"political suicide" for Tsvangirai and his party. Charting a
course for Mugabe's departure, presumably with a "soft
landing", would likely be a key MDC negotiating objective.
In that regard, Tsvangirai anticipated Mugabe's strategy
would revolve around "giving Vice-President Joyce Mujuru
space", i.e., effectively passing the reins to her for an
extended period during which the Zezuru clan faction within
ZANU-PF could further consolidate its control of the party.

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Need for Coordination
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9. (C) The opposition leader said his party was still
working on a "Plan B" should the election results prove
completely fraudulent but offered no details. The Ambassador
stressed the need to coordinate on press statements and other
measures in the wake of the election in any event.
Tsvangirai agreed that it would be useful to have a USG

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statement as soon as possible after the announcement of
election results so as to set the terms of evaluation by
other key players who might be inclined to blessing a flawed
election, most notably South Africa and some in the EU.

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On ZANU-PF,s Future
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10. (C) If the election went badly enough for ZANU-PF,
Tsvangirai said Mugabe could face calls from within his own

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party to step aside. The party had no leader strong enough
to unite its membership without Mugabe. Eventually, the
party would fragment sufficiently to become no more than a
political vehicle for Mashonaland areas where ethnic Zezurus
predominated. Former Mugabe heir apparent and Parliamentary
Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa was a "spent force", and the
alienation of his wide network of influential allies was
contributing to the MDC's rapid rise. The demoted Karanga
clique leader could yet marshal "a third force" - but not for
now.

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On the Military
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11. (C) On the Ambassador's inquiry, Tsvangirai asserted
that the military would not stand in the way of an MDC
victory. The military leadership appreciated that the
election was a potential step toward needed change and not an
event that would change the government by itself. Further,
he speculated that retired General Solomon Mujuru, ascendant
in the dominant Old Guard ethnic Zezuru faction, would be
inclined to support inter-party negotiations after the
election.

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On South Africa ...
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12. (C) As for the South African Government, Tsvangirai said
it was seeing that the story on the ground was not as ZANU-PF
had depicted it. He expressed concern that the SAG
nonetheless was intent on blessing what was a flawed process
but noted that the SAG and SADC observer missions had diverse
compositions. He thought that the SAG would be most
satisfied with an election that gave the MDC a significant
presence but did not give it power. It had supported
dialogue in the context of constitutional negotiations and
could be expected to continue to do so. Mbeki would have a
potentially important role in facilitating post-election
inter-party dialogue.

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... And Labor
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13. (C) Tsvangirai observed that Zimbabwe's labor movement,
over which he presided before the MDC was formed, was
absorbed with its own problems. Although the dominant
Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was largely
supportive of the MDC, the movement was "confused" in
addressing its difficult political situation. Some in the
leadership worried about the consequences of being portrayed
as "too MDC" and so sometimes pushed the movement into
accommodating positions with the GOZ. It had been further
decimated by economic conditions. Nonetheless, labor
remained very important to the MDC and an MDC victory would
significantly strengthen its hand.

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Comment
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14. (C) Even 51 seats would be an extraordinary achievement
for the MDC given this steeply tilted playing field and five
years of relentless pressure from a Mugabe determined to
eliminate it from Zimbabwean politics. This outcome would
give the opposition representation sufficient to block
ZANU-PF's high priority plans for a new constitution. We are
not as confident as Tsvangirai that ZANU-PF will be prepared
to negotiate meaningfully after elections in any event nor
can we fully share his optimism on the outcome. While there
is little doubt that Tsvangirai is reading the public mood
correctly, even he may understimate ZANU-PF's willingness to
resort to fraud to skew the results, and Tsvangirai has a
history of excessive optimism about his party's prospects.
That said, we agree with him that broad, resolute
international pressure will be the key to helping Zimbabwe
make the most of this potential opportunity to jump start the
beginning of the end-game for R. G. Mugabe.
Dell