POOR MAIZE HARVEST EXPECTED IN ZIMBABWE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000425

SIPDIS

DCHA/FFP FOR LANDIS, WELLER, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN
DCHA/OFDA FOR GOTTLIEB, PRATT, MENGHETTI, MARX
AFR/SA FOR FLEURET, LOKEN, COPSON, HIRSCH
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON, HESS, MCGAHUEY,
GILL, RUSHIN-BELL, HURDUS
STATE/AF FOR NEULING, MOZENA
GABORONE FOR CASHION, BROWN, ST.CYR, KLINE
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER, GRIFFITHS
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS, THOMPSON
MASERU FOR ALBRECHT
MBABANE FOR DORSEY
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, NDIRANGO, PUTNAM
PRETORIA FOR DISKIN, HALE, REYNOLDS
ROME FOR FODAG FOR GAST

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREL US ZI
SUBJECT: POOR MAIZE HARVEST EXPECTED IN ZIMBABWE

REFS: (A) HARARE 01636; (B) HARARE 00162; (C) SECSTATE
46766

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAS 3 AND 16

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Zimbabwe's maize (corn) harvest this year will
likely be less than last year's due to late planting,
limited access to fertilizer and other inputs, and poor
rainfall in many areas. Although official information on
cereal planting, production and stocks is closely guarded
by the GOZ, recent articles in the state-run press, field
visits from USAID staff, FEWSNET reports, and other
sources, point to the likelihood of an abysmal 2005 cereal
harvest.


2. (SBU) Last year, the GOZ publicly announced that no
food aid was needed because of a "supposed" bumper harvest
of 2.4 million metric tons (MTs),despite most independent
observers believing the harvest to have been no more than
1.0 million MTs, against a national need of about 1.8
million MTs. (Note: This is far below pre-land reform
harvest levels which often exceeded 2.0 million MTs. End
Note.) It remains to be seen whether the GOZ, following
the March 31 parliamentary elections, will be more
forthcoming with realistic estimates of area planted,
production and food aid needs.


3. (U) In addition to the bad harvest, the ability of
most poor households to access food through markets is
expected to worsen due to continuing restrictions on
trade, forex constraints, and progressively eroding
household purchasing power. The result will be continuing
widespread food insecurity. Mission therefore urges USAID
Food for Peace to plan for a substantial food assistance
program in Zimbabwe for the coming year. It is hoped that
details on the levels of this need will become more
apparent following the Vulnerability Assessment Committee
(VAC) assessment expected to be carried out in April/May.
End Summary.

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GREAT EXPECTATIONS
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4. (U) This year the GOZ launched a campaign to raise
maize production to 4 million MTs. If achieved, this
would have been almost 50% above the highest production
ever recorded in Zimbabwe (2.8 million MTs in 1981). To
achieve this objective, the GOZ projected a need to plant
4 million hectares in maize, which would have required
about 100,000 MTs of maize seed. Reports from seed
companies indicate that the GOZ was not able to access
this much seed, but probably bought more than 60,000 MTs,
nearly double the quantity usually planted (see ref A).
In-country experts estimate that up to 67,000 MT of maize
seed was available for planting from all sources: the GOZ,
farmers' retained seeds, and NGOs. If correct, this would
have been enough to plant 2.7 million hectares, almost 70%
above the largest area ever planted to maize in Zimbabwe
(1.6 million hectares in 1996/97). But it is clear that
these expectations have not been realized.

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HARSH REALITY
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5. (U) These great expectations have now given way to a
harsh reality. Poor rainfall and inadequate access to
inputs have led to reduced planting and poor expected
yields in the majority of the country. Hardest-hit by
failed rains have been the southernmost provinces of
Masvingo and Matabeleland South where the rainy season,
normally starting by early November, started more than 40
days late in most areas, with some areas still having no
rain by the end of January. Thus, most maize planted in
these provinces was planted very late, and some farmers
did not plant at all. In addition, dry spells have
continued to plague these areas into February and March.
A long-term observer commented that the rains in the south
have been nearly as poor as he remembers from the 1991-92
drought period, perhaps Zimbabwe's worst drought.


6. (U) The rainy season started out better in the
central, northern and eastern parts of the country, and
total rainfall in these areas has been generally between
80-100% of normal. But temporal distribution of the rain
has been poor, as early heavy rains gave way to prolonged
dry spells in January and February in many areas. These
dry spells adversely affected much of the maize crop at
the critical tassling and grain-filling stages. Worst-
affected have been crops planted relatively later in the
season (December and January) which account for most of
the planted area, in large part because bureaucratic
delays meant maize seed was not distributed until after
the rainy season had already begun.


7. (SBU) While the GOZ has not released official data on
this year's planting and harvest prospects, unofficial
estimates have been provided by staff within the GOZ's
Agriculture Research and Extension Service (AREX).
According to these estimates, less than 1.0 million
hectares of crops had been plowed as of December 23, of
which only about 33% had actually been planted to maize.
An AREX source also reported that by January 21, the area
planted to all cereals (maize, sorghum and millet) was 86%
of the area planted to these crops last agricultural
season. (Note: Mission is not sure of the credibility of
these numbers. End Note.) In addition, several sources
have indicated that only a small percentage of the area on
resettled former commercial farms was planted with maize.


8. (U) This late and relatively low level of maize
planting was primarily due to the lack of animals and
tractors for plowing, the high costs of fuel and machine
tilling equipment, the late availability of maize seed,
and of course, the late rains.


9. (U) Even in good rainfall years, late planting of the
maize crop has an adverse effect on yields. The optimum
planting date for maize in Zimbabwe, given adequate
moisture, is up to November 15 at the latest. The rainy
season usually ends in March, which means that maize
planted in January and beyond may not have sufficient
moisture to mature. Last year, however, some of the maize
planted in January did well because the rains continued
into April. But even if this year's rains do continue
that long, the day length and average temperatures will
drop significantly in March and April, thus reducing yield
potential.


10. (U) Yield potential has also been adversely affected
by fertilizer shortages. Only about 80,000 MTs of
compound fertilizer and 20,000 MTs of ammonium nitrate
were sold this year, compared with an annual fertilizer
requirement of 500,000 MTs. A local chemical company that
produces the majority of the country's ammonium nitrate
shut down for three months because it was not economical
for it to operate given pricing and foreign exchange
constraints. The plant opened again in October, but this
was too late to have ammonium nitrate available on time.
The fertilizer shortage led to parallel market selling by
those who had access to the limited stocks at the GOZ's
controlled price. 50-Kg bags of ammonium nitrate that
were supposed to cost ZW$60,000 (about US$10 at the
official auction rate) were being sold in a high-density
market of Harare for as much as ZW$250,000 (about US$40).

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TO APPEAL OR NOT TO APPEAL
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11. (U) What remains unanswered is what the GOZ response
will be to this harsh reality. It is unclear if or when
the GOZ will be more forthcoming about the true state of
agricultural production. It is also unclear how much food
the GOZ itself may be willing or able to import over the
coming year or whether it might allow private sector
imports. There is speculation that the GOZ may feel
secure enough after the March 31 parliamentary elections
to launch an appeal for emergency food assistance. There
is also speculation that the GOZ may be more inclined to
adopt market-friendly economic policies after the
elections that could begin to reverse the decline in
agricultural productivity.


12. (SBU) In any event, we need to be prepared to assist
regardless of what the GOZ does or does not do. Given the
growing food insecurity and the impending poor harvest,
Post urges the USAID Office of Food for Peace to plan for
another substantial food assistance program in Zimbabwe
for the coming year.



SCHULTZ