CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER RELENTS ON ELECTION BOYCOTT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000311

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI MDC
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER RELENTS ON ELECTION BOYCOTT,
LOOKS TO 2008

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador met February 18 with Lovemore Maduhku,
head of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). Madukhu
said his organization and other civil society groups regarded
the upcoming elections as a sham and had unsuccessfully tried
to convince the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) not to participate. That said, they no longer intended
to call for a boycott, which would have further damaged the
MDC,s chances. Madukhu said relations with the MDC were
complicated and that outside help and resources would be
needed to unite the opposition after the election. He agreed
with the Ambassador that the next big chance for change in
Zimbabwe would be the 2008 presidential elections. End
Summary.

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Election Boycott
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2. (C) Madukhu said that his preferred approach to the
upcoming parliamentary elections had been non-participation.
It was his belief that this would have underscored the
elections illegitimacy and the illegitimacy of the GOZ. His
organization and much of Zimbabwean civil society supported
such an approach but they had ultimately been unsuccessful in
convincing the MDC to go along.


3. (C) Maduhku said, however, that his organization would not
push for a boycott past March 8, at which time they would
issue a statement denouncing the legitimacy of the elections.
At the same time, the statement would not urge people to
boycott the elections, which he acknowledged could seriously
damage the MDC,s chances. The Ambassador suggested that the
statement should also be worded in such a way as to bolster
the MDC by offering moral support for its uphill struggle on
a tilted playing field. Madukhu seemed to agree.

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Relations with MDC
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4. (C) Madukhu said he and other civil society groups had
complicated and at times difficult relations with the MDC.
The MDC was unfair to these groups in that it expected them
to do its bidding. He said part of the reason the NCA would
wait until March 8 to issue its statement was to underscore
the organization,s independence from the MDC through the
apparent conflict over election participation.


5. (C) Madukhu said there was a lot of tension now, but that
would dissipate. He noted that the fundamental disagreement
with the MDC was how to effect change ) through electoral
politics or through mass-based actions and constitutional
reform ) not on the need for change or on the direction it
should take. He hoped that after the elections the MDC would
see the light and agree to support a mass action campaign of
civil disobedience. He added that both the MDC and civil
society groups needed to learn to accept differences as
normal and to avoid personalizing them.

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Post-Election Plans
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6. (C) The Ambassador said that unless the MDC could pull off
a miracle and win two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the
March elections would not, indeed could not result in any
fundamental change in Zimbabwe,s crisis of political
legitimacy. Barring unforeseen developments, such as the
sudden demise of Mugabe, it appeared that the next real
opportunity for fundamental change by democratic means would
come in 2008, when presidential elections were scheduled to
be held. Between now and then all the democratic forces of
Zimbabwe needed to work toward the goal of outing a democrat
in power and to be ready to apply the pressure of mass action
should ZANU-PF try to steal the elections.


7. (C) Madukhu agreed and said the key was to start building
momentum now by unifying the opposition around a common
platform. He said outside help would be important in that
regard, and he suggested the Embassy could play a key role
given that it was trusted by all elements of the opposition,
many of whom did not trust each other.


8. (C) The Ambassador said it was his impression that the
opposition needed to address the concerns of real people,
such as the failure of land reform and the resultant economic
collapse, rather than focusing exclusively on more esoteric
concerns such as constitutional reform. Maduhku responded
that it was important to link issues such as the need for
constitutional change to the day-to-day concerns of average
Zimbabweans. However, the opposition had to be careful not
to give the GOZ sound bites that could be spun against them.
For instance, on land reform, any hint that the opposition
opposed land reform would be trumpeted in the official press
as support for white farmers. Without access to the media,
the opposition would be unable to explain that its objection
was to land reform,s ineffectiveness.
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U.S. Trip
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9. (C) Madukhu said he had been encouraged by the degree to
which his interlocutors in the Department had understood that
the struggle in Zimbabwe had entered a new, longer-term,
phase. He had told them change would come to Zimbabwe but it
would take time and resources. He added that one of the
highlights of the visit had been his address at the Woodrow
Wilson Center, where he had found the audience remarkably
well-informed. He had been struck by the fact that the
official Zimbabwe press had felt the need to report on his
address, even though they had tried to spin what he had said
to the regime,s advantage.

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South Africa,s role
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10. (C) Madukhu said the SAG seemed to be bending over
backwards to ignore the bad news out of Zimbabwe and to play
up whatever signs of democratic space appeared. That said,
he thought President Mbeki was under increasing pressure to
promote democracy in Zimbabwe, of which the latest
manifestation was Obasanjo,s success in convincing Togo to
go forward with a presidential election.

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Comment
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11. (C) We were frankly relieved that Madukhu had already
decided on his own not to further undercut the MDC in the
upcoming elections. The MDC will have a tough enough fight
on its hands, the last thing it needed was to have its civil
society allies trying to organize a full-scale boycott of the
election.
DELL