Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05HARARE251
2005-02-17 11:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

DINOSAURS AND DISSENTERS - TAKE TWO

Tags:  PGOV PREL ZI ZANU PF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000251 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: DINOSAURS AND DISSENTERS - TAKE TWO

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).

---------
Summary
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000251

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: DINOSAURS AND DISSENTERS - TAKE TWO

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).

--------------
Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador met February 14 with the Minister of
State for Indigenisation and Empowerment, J.T. Tungamirai, a
Politburo member and reputedly close to President Mugabe, as
well as separately with two of the ZANU-PF Members of
Parliament who lost in the party primaries two weeks ago.
The two meetings once more framed the debate within the
ruling party over the way forward. Tungamirai, though
advertised as a moderate, went to extreme lengths to defend
the party line. The discussion reached a low point when he
responded to the Ambassador,s criticism of President
Mugabe,s intemperate, racially offensive, remarks about the
Secretary with the remark that &she started it.8 By

SIPDIS
contrast, the two soon to be former MPs were open to
discussion, acknowledged mistakes on the part of the ruling
party and said the opposition could pull a surprise in the
elections given ZANU-PF,s failure to deliver stability and
prosperity. Both planned to remain loyal to ZANU-PF but both
were very critical of the party,s leadership, including
President Mugabe. End Summary.

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Tungamirai: ZANU Insider; ZANU Moderate?
--------------


2. (C) Tungamirai said he had fought in the liberation war
and that after independence he had had served in the Army for
a year and then switched to the Air Force, which he
ultimately headed with a rank of Air Marshal. He retired
from the military in 1992 and joined ZANU-PF,s
administrative structure. He headed the party,s youth wing
for a number of years. His election to Parliament last year
in a by-election in Gutu North, in Masvingo province, was his
first foray into electoral politics.

Minister with Small Portfolio
--------------


3. (C) Tungamirai said he was appointed as a Minister a year
ago and is reviving the Ministry. To date, he said he had
ten employees. The Ministry,s main purpose was to promote
&indigenous8 ownership. His near-term goal was to achieve
50 percent indigenous ownership in all areas of the economy
with an immediate priority on tourism, mining, manufacturing

and the petroleum sector. He said this was to be achieved
through &negotiation.8 The Ministry would try to find
willing buyers and willing sellers. The former would need to
demonstrate sufficient interest, have adequate capital, and a
socially conscious business plan. The Ministry had yet to
publish guidelines, which required passage of legislation in
Parliament. He hoped to be able to do so by the middle of
this year.

Politics as War
--------------


4. (C) Tungamirai said he would stand again this year and
anticipated no problems with his own re-election, despite
economic problems in his constituency, the foremost of which
was continuing drought. In that regard, he noted that the
party,s goal with respect to land reform was to increase
production. Tungamirai said ZANU-PF was committed to a
non-violent election. He acknowledged that there had been
violence in the past, especially in the 2002 Presidential
election. He predicted ZANU would win these elections
handily. The 2000 party program had been largely achieved
and the 2005 program would appeal to voters, especially in
the rural areas where the party was strongest. Asked about
ZANU-PF,s target for the election, he said he was a military
man, and that in politics as in war, the goal was to destroy
your opponent ) ZANU-PF,s goal was to win all 120 seats.
That said, he acknowledged that a more realistic result would
be a two-thirds majority.


5. (C) Tungamirai denied any significant turmoil within the
party, noting that periodically the party &sheds its skin8
to emerge stronger than ever. Tungamirai suggested
Information Minister Moyo and his adherents were trying to
split the party at the instigation of the West, but they
would be unsuccessful as others had been unsuccessful in the
past. The Ambassador asked whether the &anti-Blair8
campaign had any real resonance with the people. Tungamirai
acknowledged that most rural voters probably didn,t know who
Blair was, but these people would vote ZANU-PF anyway, and
the message would have resonance with educated urban voters.

Relations with the West
--------------


6. (C) Despite the anti-Blair campaign, Tungamirai denied
that ZANU-PF sought confrontation with the West. He
attributed the bad relations of the past few years to
Britain,s decision to renege on its Lancaster House
commitments to provide the funds to allow land redistribution
to go forward. Asserting that no colonial power wants its
colonies to succeed, he claimed the U.K. is intentionally
undermining Zimbabwe. In that regard, he criticized the
white Zimbabwean owner of the country,s largest fertilizer
company, Sable, for deliberately trying to destroy
Zimbabwe,s agricultural productivity. The Ambassador asked,
incredulously, if Tungamirai believed this individual, having
had his farm seized, was now deliberately destroying his
remaining business in order to get revenge. He,s a clever
man, responded Tungamirai. (N.B. In fact, we understand that
the owner of Sable is a Black Zimbabwean and that the GOZ has
a major interest in the company. Moreover, the primary cause
of fertilizer shortages is the l
ack of foreign exchange -- caused by misguided GOZ economic
policies -- as well as profiteering by well-connected
individuals able to obtain excessive amounts of fertilizer at
subsidized prices, which they can then sell for five times as
much on the street.)


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that every time relations between
the U.S. and Zimbabwe came up in discussions with the GOZ he
received a history lesson with a focus on land reform. The
U.S. understood the social justice argument. However, we
took issue with how land reform was managed and the
disastrous effect it had had on Zimbabwe,s economy. He
added that Zimbabwe was becoming a bad political example for
the region. Zambia and Malawi, for instance, were
considering an NGO bill of their own, a piece of legislation
we regarded as repressive and inspired by Information
Minister Jonathon Moyo,s extremism. The U.S. was more
interested in discussing Zimbabwe,s future than in endless
debates on its history and we remain committed to helping
Zimbabwe reverse the effects of its bad policy choices of the
past few years.


8. (C) Tungamirai responded that the GOZ was very concerned
about the Secretary,s recent &outpost of tyranny8
statement. Zimbabwe felt threatened by the U.S. and its
policy of ®ime change.8 The Ambassador said President
Mugabe,s vitriolic and insulting public comments about the
Secretary would only make things worse. Tungamirai responded

SIPDIS
that, &She started it.8 The Ambassador said it was
important to try to depersonalize our disagreements. He
added that the U.S. cares about the people of Zimbabwe, and
that was why we gave USD 20 million a year to fight HIV/AIDs
and why we had given USD 100 million in food aid over the
past few years, and why we would be prepared to help again if
need be. What concerned us most in Zimbabwe was that the
trend in this country was so radically in the wrong
direction. Once a positive model for Africa, Zimbabwe was
now a showcase for what not to do.

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ZANU &Losers:8 True Moderates
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador met the same day with two ZANU-PF MPS,
Victor Chitongo, MP for Murehwa in Mashonaland East, and
Gibson Munyoro, MP for Makoni West in Manicaland. Both had
lost internal ZANU-PF primaries for their seats, and both had
lost them to sitting Ministers: in Munyoro,s case,
Agriculture Minister Made; and in Chitongo,s case, Health
and Child Welfare Minister Parirenyatwa.

Electoral Prospects
--------------


10. (C) Chitongo said this was becoming a pattern in ZANU-PF,
replacing a popular sitting MP, especially an outspoken or
independent one, with a Minister or ZANU-PF insider who had
never before been elected to public office. And it was
putting the seats at risk and improving the opposition,s
chances of pulling off an upset. ZANU-PF was already in more
trouble than it realized because of the sad state of affairs
within the country. The Ambassador asked if that were the
case why ZANU-PF was running an &anti-Blair8 campaign
instead of focusing on ways to improve conditions for average
Zimbabweans. Munyoro agreed that this was a foolish approach
that would have little resonance with average voters, many of
whom, especially in rural areas, would have no idea who Blair
was.


11. (C) Chitongo told the Ambassador that for ZANU-PF success
in the elections would be winning 60 of the 120 contested
seats. In addition to the thirty MPs the President
appointed, this would give ZANU-PF the two-thirds majority it
needed to amend the constitution and allow President Mugabe
to dictate his succession. By contrast, for the MDC
&success8 would be winning 60 or more seats itself and thus
forcing ZANU-PF to negotiate constitutional changes with the
opposition.


12. (C) Chitongo predicted that if ZANU-PF won a two-thirds
majority, Mugabe would step into a &comfortable8 retirement
within the next two and a half years (i.e. before the 2008
presidential elections). However, if they failed to win 60
seats, he said there would be a major upheaval in the party.
He added that Mugabe &will not be a Chiluba8 referring to
the former president of Zambia who unsuccessfully attempted
to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third
term. Moreover, ZANU-PF would not consider another
referendum if it did not win two-thirds in Parliament because
of the risk of losing again.

Personal Plans
--------------


13. (C) Chitongo said he had many friends in the opposition
Movement for Democracy (MDC) but had given no consideration
to switching parties. He was loyal to ZANU-PF and would wait
for his turn to come around again. President Mugabe would
not last forever, he was in his 80s, and when he went so
would the clique of insiders that surrounded him. He added
that the party had hurt itself with the recent turmoil in its
ranks, and by dismissing Moyo. Moyo had been an extremely
effective Information Minister, a characterization that
Munyoro seconded. Moyo,s activities in Matabeleland had
done much to improve the party,s popularity in the MDC,s
strongest region. Munyoro thought that if Moyo ran as an
independent in Matabeleland he would stand a good chance of
being elected (N.B. He would need to declare by February 18).
For his part, Munyoro said he was done with electoral
politics and would go back to managing his NGO, which
disbursed micro credits in his native Manicaland.

&Outpost of Tyranny8
--------------


14. (C) Chitongo said he would like to see better relations
between Zimbabwe and the West. In that regard, he took issue
with the Secretary,s characterization of Zimbabwe as an
&outpost of oyranny8 and noted that many Zimbabweans had
concluded that the U.S. might be considering invading the
country. The Ambassador said this was not on the table but
that we were very concerned with the very negative trend in
Zimbabwe ) economic meltdown and political repression ) and
that we were also very concerned what effect this might have
on the region. Munyoro asked how the U.S. could criticize
Zimbabwe,s political situation when other countries in
Africa were far more repressive. The Ambassador stated that
Zimbabwe,s downward trend from initial success politically
and economically was what concerned the U.S. Zimbabwe was
both a source of instability, as evidenced by 3 million
emigrants, and a negative example in a part of the world
where freedom and democracy had been making headway.


15. (C) Chitongo blamed the economic meltdown on the West,s
reaction to land reform. If not for land reform, the West
and the IMF would be pouring investment dollars into
Zimbabwe. The Ambassador took issue with that, noting that
we recognized the legitimate social justice concerns behind
land reform but not how it was managed: not only was the
economy ruined but the land had not gone to agricultural
workers but instead to party insiders. Chitongo admitted
that &we8 got the land during land reform rather than the
people but nonetheless criticized commercial farmers for the
failures of land reform.

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Comment
--------------


16. (C) These two meetings further reinforced our growing
impression that ZANU-PF is starting to show deep cracks in
its formerly united faade and that the elections may not be
the cakewalk the ruling party expects. They also reinforced
the impression that there are moderates in ZANU-PF who may
one day take this party in a somewhat more democratic
direction if given a chance. However, they are not the ones
now calling the shots. Tungamirai had been advertised to us
as an independent-minded, straight-talking former military
officer and a relative moderate with whom the West could
work. In the event, he came across as a party hack and yet
another dinosaur that doesn,t know his days are numbered.
DELL