MANICALAND VISITORS SIGNAL POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001715

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC SOCI ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MANICALAND VISITORS SIGNAL POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF
POLITICAL ENERGY IN 2006

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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1. (C) In separate meetings at the Embassy on December 19,
the Mutare "bishops troika" and recently elected MDC Chairman
for Manicaland Roy Bennett laid out for the Ambassador their
separate efforts to rejuvenate "people power" in Zimbabwe,
especially in Manicaland. The bishops said church leaders
were planning to meet early in 2006 to discuss ways to
energize the populace with an eye toward a possible
"indaba"-style gathering on a new constitution. For his
part, Bennett said the MDC provincial congresses underway
were stimulating a genuine resurgence of grassroots energy
that was loyal to neither MDC faction but that was setting
the stage for renewed anti-regime activity next year. The
message from both meetings was that Zimbabweans were eager to
stand up to the regime given the right opportunity. End
Summary.

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Bishops: Possible "Indaba"; Need to Turn Out Numbers
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2. (C) The three Mutare bishops, Trevor Manhanga
(Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe) Patrick Mutume (Catholic
Church) and Sebastian Bakare (Anglican Church),stressed that
the new year would see a reinvigorated effort by the churches
to create momentum against the regime. A principal opening
in this regard was an approach to them before the Senate
elections by ZANU-PF Party Chairman John Nkomo and
Information Secretary Nathan Shamuyarira. According to the
bishops, Nkomo and Shamuyarira asked them to articulate a
proposal for bipartisan dialogue in the parliament to support
a new constitution. After the senate elections and the
opening of the MDC rift, the ZANU-PF "moderates" asked them
to expand it beyond the parliament to a broader stakeholder
"indaba", including strong GOZ critics such as Lovemore
Madhuku's National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). The
bishops were still deliberating on how to respond.


3. (C) The bishops acknowledged risks raised by the
Ambassador that ZANU-PF would be in a position to manipulate
such a diverse constitutional indaba to its own advantage.
Nonetheless, they maintained that while ZANU-PF had cynically
sought the "churches' vision" to exploit for its own
purposes, the churches would exploit the offer to create
their own momentum against the regime. The bishops said they
intended next year to "get the people out in numbers" -
numbers that the regime would have to respect.


4. (C) The bishops said that they intended to start by
getting church leaders together in the new year to discuss a
common constitutional agenda that was likely to revolve
around social and economic issues at the center of
Zimbabweans' concerns. They would consult with other
democratic forces. For now, the MDC was absorbed by
internecine struggles - the bishops said they consulted the
previous week with MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai, who said
the party would not be prepared for meaningful outside
engagement until after the Party Congress in February. The
bishops maintained that in any event, when the time came,
churches and all other stakeholders would be driven by the
imperative to limit executive power and assure that the
country would "never, never again" experience the centralized
autocracy of Mugabeism.

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Transition Underway; Make Them Feel the Heat
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5. (C) The bishops agreed with the Ambassador that a de
facto political transition was already underway as people
increasingly focused on the post-Mugabe era, and that the
nation's economic implosion was a liability from which the
ruling party could not escape. Everybody knew ZANU-PF had no
plan; Zimbabweans - including many in the ruling party - were
suffering and angry. Sanctions were useful in that they
imposed "economic accountability" on those who otherwise
enjoyed impunity. Moreover, the churches and others had
lists of the perpetrators of abuses who would one day have to
be called to account - whether by a truth commission or any
other number of options that might "give expression to
people's anger." The malefactors had to be made to feel the
heat; if they left the country before the accounting it would
be a less satisfactory outcome but still better than having
them remain politically active.

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Bennett: MDC Democracy Reinvigorating Party,s Grass Roots
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6. (C) In a subsequent meeting, Roy Bennett - energized by
his election the previous weekend as MDC Chairman for
Manicaland - offered the Ambassador an account of unexpected
turns underway in the party's provincial congresses.
According to Bennett, the party's grassroots were rejecting
factionalism in the party and asserting themselves against
the machinations of each faction's leaderships. In
Manicaland, for example, assuming that many in the province
were "pro-Senate", the Tsvangirai faction had dispatched
National Chairman Isaac Matongo and "thugs" to browbeat and
intimidate the membership into installing Tsvangirai's man.


7. (C) Bennett said the party membership had forcefully
rejected Tsvangirai's candidate for provincial chair and
instead elected him, as well as a provincial council that was
loyal to neither MDC faction. Bennett said the membership in
Manicaland didn't understand the senate debate and was
appalled by the "Top Six's" inability to put party interests
above personal concerns. They were further alienated by the
machinations of each faction's leadership to manipulate or
override the will of the masses to their advantage. Both
factions were paying a price as the membership was standing
up to each at party congresses. Bennett reported that
similar episodes of grassroots independence had taken place
at the Masvingo and Harare congresses, and he expected the
remaining provinces to proceed likewise.

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New Leadership?
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8. (C) The impact of the membership's sense of "betrayal" on
the party's future leadership was potentially profound,
according to Bennett. A core of party leaders was emerging
to give the party new direction behind the scenes. Among the
like-minded figures who were reflecting and tapping into
anti-factional sentiment, Bennett counted National Youth
Chair and Information Secretary Nelson Chamisa, Economic
Affairs Secretary Tendai Biti, Legal Affairs Secretary David
Coltart, Foreign Affairs Secretary Moses Mzila-Ndlovu, and MP
Abednigo Bhebhe.


9. (C) Bennett said most party luminaries recognized that
Tsvangirai was their only chance in the next presidential

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elections and would have to remain atop the party for now.
He would likely be re-elected President at the Party Congress
for another five year term. Nonetheless, Biti was taking the
lead in redrafting the party constitution to clarify the
president's subordination to an enhanced and enlarged
national executive. Bennett also noted quiet efforts by some
(himself included) to bring into the party hierarchy
respected civil society leaders, such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers
for Human Rights' Arnold Tsunga and the Zimbabwe Election
Support Network's Reginald Matchaba-Hove, which he maintained
would enhance the party's capacity and stature. Bennett
affirmed that he would back Tsvangirai for now but criticized
him sharply for "listening to too many voices" and for
surrounding himself with bad advisors, including those
associated with violence.

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Next Year the Year?
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10. (C) Bennett emphasized how eager Zimbabweans were to
confront the regime; all they lacked was organization and
inspirational leadership. Bennett maintained that the party
did not lack people to effectively mobilize the masses; he
expected them to get to work soon after the party congress.
The party would forcefully renew its outreach to churches and
civil society. Bennett said his close contact with the
people convinced him that ZANU-PF had already lost most of
its traditional supporters; only those at the top of the
patronage system remained on board - more out of fear than
conviction. Importantly, the security forces were growing
increasingly disaffected and the MDC was engaged in a "tricky
and slow" process to reach out to key security elements.
Bennett concluded that the democratic forces' mobilization of
grassroots, ZANU-PF's loss of traditional constituencies, and
the alienation of key security elements were ingredients that
could topple Mugabe next year - via negotiation or otherwise.



11. (C) Bennett stressed the importance of continued
international pressure to convince regime principals of the
inevitability of change. He said he had worked quietly with
elements of the South African Security Service to arrange an
initial discreet bipartisan exchange at an international
event at Gore Island earlier this year. Dumiso Dabengwa had
shown up for ZANU-PF while MDC Deputy Secretary General Gift
Chimanikire had demurred at the last minute, evidencing his
secret agenda against the MDC, Bennett maintained. While few

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if any ZANU-PF principals could be convinced to jump ship
given the party culture and history, many sensed the end of
days near and could be persuaded to come to the negotiating
table. Bennett said the key circle around Mugabe included
retired General Solomon Mujuru, retired General Vitalis
Zvinavashe, Defense Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, Armed Forces
Head Constatine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner Augustine
Chihuri, and Prisons Commissioner Paradzayi Zimonde - and
even some of them might be ready to talk. The key was to
keep the heat on them and leave them no other option. In
this regard, Bennett characterized the Ambassador's Mutare
speech as an important example for regime critics that ruling
party bullies would stand down when stood up to.

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Comment
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12. (C) The Zimbabwean public has never been as
economically desperate as it is now and the regime has never
been as unpopular as it is now. Whether a constitutional
indaba or rejuvenated MDC will prove to be springboards to
meaningful change is uncertain, but the country's continued
course into political and economic terra incognita promise to
make the status quo here ever shakier in 2006.
DELL