VIETNAM: DOE'S ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL SITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000951

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR DOE/NNSA, DOE/NNSA/DWYER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: DOE'S ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL SITE
SECURITY THREATS


Classified By: Jay T. Avecilla, Economic Officer, Reason 1.4 (e) and (g
)


1. (C) Summary: The Department of Energy,s (DOE) National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear and
International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Team met
with Vietnam nuclear technical experts and government
officials in Hanoi on April 18-22. The DOE team recommended
various security upgrades at several radiological holding
facilities in Hanoi to protect against the possible use of
the radiological sources as &dirty bombs.8 The DOE team
also met with Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) Vice
Minister Thang who supported the U.S.-led efforts to secure
Vietnam,s radiological facilities against possible security
threats. The Vice Minister expressed optimism that a Basic
Ordering Agreement between the DOE and Government of Vietnam
(GVN) could be reached following a thorough review of the
security proposal by relevant GVN ministries. A signed Basic
Ordering Agreement would allow DOE to transfer funds
officially to the GVN to perform any needed security upgrades
at their radiological holding facilities. End Summary.


2. (SBU) DOE,s IRTR undertakes worldwide initiatives to
reduce the threat of a Radiological Dispersion Device
Incident or &dirty bomb8 and provides funding to host
countries to upgrade facilities where radiological sources
are stored and used. DOE initially approached the Vietnam
Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety Control (VARANSAC),
Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) and MOST in 2004 to
schedule a trip to Vietnam so that it could identify and
secure high risk radiological materials. The five member DOE
IRTR team led by IRTR Project Manager Greg Dwyer met with
Vietnam nuclear technical experts and government officials in
Hanoi on April 18-22. Other members of the team included:
Walt Sansot, Material Control and Accountability Specialist;
Gary Stubblefied, Physical Protection Specialist; John
Haynie, Health Physicist and Hazmat Specialist, and Jay
Wertenberger, Senior Contracting Officer. The U.S. team was
accompanied at all of its meetings by Embassy S&T Officer.


3. (C) During its one week visit, the U.S. team,s main
interlocutors were Dr. Dang Thanh Luong, Deputy Director
General of VARANSAC and Mr. Le Quan Hiep, Director of
Department and Administration and Planning, VARANSAC.
VARANSAC hosted a seminar on April 19 where representatives
from VAEC, MOST, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of
Public Security, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health and
Vietnam,s General Agency of Customs discussed DOE,s IRTR
Program in detail. According to various GVN representatives,
the usage of radiological materials in Vietnam is primarily
focused on health care and food irradiation. VARANSAC,
however, admitted that it needed to improve the control and
security of radiological materials, but there is little or no
funding to do so.


4. (C) DOE assessed the security vulnerabilities of three
sites, including the Hanoi Irradiation Center, Hanoi &K8
Hospital and Hanoi Cancer Hospital. These radiological
facilities all had strong safety factors and no radiation
leakage, but lacked adequate security. The DOE Team
recommended that DOE provide funding for security upgrades
such as balanced magnetic switches, dual motion sensors,
keypads, panic buttons and alarms, and closed circuit
television cameras, as well as installation costs. VARANSAC
officials were very receptive of the security assessment but
lacked the authority to sign a Basic Ordering Agreement. A
signed Basic Ordering Agreement would allow DOE to transfer
funds officially to the GVN to perform any needed security
upgrades at their radiological holding facilities. The DOE
team was surprised to learn that most of Vietnam,s
radiological Cobalt sources