VIETNAM: IAEA Additional Protocol and Other Arms

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000835

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM ABUD VM AROC CWC CBW OPCW APEC
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: IAEA Additional Protocol and Other Arms
Control Issues

REF: A. STATE 58314; B. HANOI 364; C. STATE 63117


1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST for NP and EAP/EP. Please
see Paragraph 8.


2. (SBU) Summary and Comment: We met with our primary GVN
arms control and nonproliferation counterpart April 6 to
discuss a wide range of outstanding arms control/nonpro
issues and the constraints faced by the GVN. Vietnam is, on
the whole, supportive of global nonproliferation efforts.
Slowness in acceding to or implementing international
agreements and other initiatives is due to a lack of human
resources in Hanoi, not to any reluctance to participate.
The United States can assist by making it as easy as
possible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate
necessary GVN interagency efforts to generate consensus for
ratifying and implementing nonproliferation instruments, for
example by providing supporting documentation translated
into Vietnamese. The GVN is very concerned for the future
of the NPT due to what it sees as reluctance by some
countries to press for nonproliferation gains without
equivalent disarmament efforts by nuclear powers. End
Summary and Comment.

IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
--------------


3. (SBU) On April 6, Poloff met with MFA Arms Control expert
Vu Van Mien and delivered Ref A demarche on the IAEA
additional protocol. Mien admitted that Vietnam is "no
closer" to signing the Additional Protocol than it was when
the USG approached the MFA on the subject in mid-February
(ref B). "The additional protocol is still under study at
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment,"
Mien advised. "That agency is the professional focal point
for the Additional Protocol." Mien said that the GVN hopes
to host a national workshop on nonproliferation issues and
to create an interagency nonproliferation working group.
"Reviewing these potentially serious commitments takes
time," Mien cautioned. "I do not think, personally, that
Vietnam will meet the 2005 deadline set during the APEC
meetings. We are more likely to approve the Additional
Protocol in 2006."

CWC ARTICLE VII
--------------


4. (SBU) Regarding implementation of Article VII of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, Mien said that the implementing
decree "is in the final stages of drafting" and will soon be
complete. Vietnam will complete the implementing degree and
have it signed "before the next meeting of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)," he said.
This would occur in either the second or third quarter of

2005.

THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT
--------------


5. (SBU) Mien confessed that Vietnam is no closer to
ratifying the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). "This one is
the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense
(MND)," Mien said. "We can only encourage MND to address
the issue expeditiously." Unfortunately, Mien continued,
MND is unlikely to do anything about the HCOC until the MFA
provides a Vietnamese translation of the relevant documents,
including the Code of Conduct itself. Translators at the
MFA are so scarce, he went on, that it would be necessary
for him to do the translation himself. "I handle every
single arms control issue for the Ministry," Mien
complained, "and I do not even have a secretary or
assistant. I have to prepare all the papers, attend all the
meetings and make all the recommendations to my senior
officers on how to instruct our overseas Missions to vote.
This is a very important reason why it takes us so long to
implement all of these disarmament and nonproliferation
agreements and commitments. It is because I personally do
not have the time or resources to do it." (Note: Embassy
Hanoi subsequently provided an unofficial Vietnamese
translation of the HCOC to the MFA to help them move the
issue along. End note.)
PSI: VIETNAM STILL NOT COMFORTABLE
--------------


6. (SBU) Mien reported that the GVN is "still wondering
about the legal aspects" of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). In particular, Mien said, it is not clear
to the GVN whether it is possible to carry out PSI
activities while still complying with the International Law
of the Sea. Mien said that GVN would welcome any input the
United States would be willing to provide considering the
international law implications of PSI. Considering it
exclusively from a Vietnamese law perspective, Vietnam does
not need the PSI, Mien said, because Vietnamese law already
requires any ships carrying any weapons or dangerous
materials to declare that cargo before entering Vietnamese
waters. Ships carrying either are subject to boarding in
Vietnamese waters, regardless of how the GVN discovers those
weapons or materials, he added.


7. (SBU) Among our other diplomatic colleagues, the Japanese
are the most active on PSI issues with the Vietnamese.
According to Japanese Poloff Yuji Tokita, Vietnam was
invited to the "Team Sunrise 4" PSI maritime exercise in
October 2004 in Tokyo Bay, but chose not to send anyone.
Most recently, Japan raised PSI with Vietnam in the context
of the Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP) in
Tokyo on February 9. (Other topics, he said, were North
Korea, weapons of mass destruction and the IAEA Additional
Protocol.) "As far as we have heard," Tokita said, "Vietnam
considers PSI very new and requiring a great deal of study."


8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: To move the Vietnamese on PSI, it
would be useful to have documentation of PSI's consistency
with (or inapplicability to) the International Law of the
Sea. To ensure that this information gets further than the
desk officer level at MFA, we also request the Department to
provide an unofficial Vietnamese translation of any
additional documents.

IAEA IN GENERAL AND THE NPT
--------------


9. (SBU) Mien also discussed Vietnam's tenure on the IAEA
Board of Governors, which ends in September 2005. The
experience had been "somewhat difficult" for Vietnam, he
acknowledged, but was a necessary obligation of membership
in the IAEA. "We will be happy to give the opportunity to
other states," he continued, "but will not shirk our duty
when it becomes our turn again." Serving on the BOG has
provided valuable experience to Vietnam in holding
multilateral leadership positions and given Vietnam a chance
to make a positive contribution to the debate on "meaningful
global issues." Vietnam is less strong in general on
technical matters, Mien conceded, but is nonetheless proud
of its ability to have positive input on global political
issues.


10. (SBU) Strengthening the IAEA is a hard question, he
continued. In Vietnam's view, before significant action is
taken to change the IAEA, the BOG should conduct a
comprehensive review and assessment of IAEA's
accomplishments and contributions. New mechanisms, such as
the Special Committee, are potentially a duplication of
effort that would weaken, not strengthen the IAEA. Why not
have the BOG do the work of the Special Committee directly,
he asked rhetorically.


11. (SBU) The NPT as a whole is in trouble, Mien opined.
With India, Pakistan and Israel outside the NPT altogether,
with Iran and North Korea causing political problems and
with the "have" countries blocking the "have not" countries'
desire to see stronger progress on disarmament, it seems
impossible that the NPT review conference (RevCon) will
succeed. "There is no agenda for the RevCon yet," Mien
said. "All we know is that there is a very, very small
chance of success."

12. (SBU) One reason for the weak state of the NPT, Mien
said, is the growing dissatisfaction of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) states (he also periodically used the term
"non-nuclear" states) with the pace and extent of
disarmament by the "have" states. "The `haves' won't talk
about disarmament and will not comply with Article 6 of the
NPT," Mien complained. "The 2000 review conference produced
a 13-step roadmap to disarmament that is not yet complete,
despite the fact that it passed by consensus five years
ago." Complicating the issue even further are the suspicion
and fear of smaller states resulting from the U.S. invasion
of Iraq. "Some countries now fear that incorporating the
Additional Protocol into the NPT would simply provide an
additional pretext or trigger for coercive action against
them," Mien said. "They see it as a potential excuse for
the bigger countries to interfere in their internal
affairs." Vietnam is not one of those countries, he
hastened to add. "Vietnam will ultimately support the
Additional Protocol," he said. "We intend to have nuclear
power in the future, and if we want to be able to acquire
the necessary technology and material, we have to sign."


13. (SBU) COMMENT: We have a good dialogue in place with the
GVN on nonproliferation issues, a fact attributable to our
basic mutual interest in advancing these issues. The
biggest obstacle to Vietnam's participation in global
nonproliferation efforts is a lack of human resources
capacity, a fact that may also drive the openness of their
discussion with us on these issues. The GVN wants us to
understand that their slowness in adopting the Additional
Protocol or implementing CWC Article VII is not due to any
desire to develop, possess or use WMD but instead to a lack
of capacity to do so.


14. (SBU) Comment continued: Taking them at their word on
this, we believe that we can help them move faster on these
issues by taking on some simple tasks for them, such as
providing Vietnamese translations of primary and all
necessary supporting documentation. We believe that
assistance of this sort will be effective in building
Vietnam's comfort level with nonproliferation, arms control
and other security-related issues relevant to APEC, a USG
goal as described in ref C. End Comment.

MARINE