Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05HANOI247
2005-01-28 10:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

(C) CHINESE MISSTEPS IN VIETNAM ARE A U.S.

Tags:  PREL ETRD ENRG VM CVR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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 ------------------AC0DBA 281101Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6406
NSC WASHDC
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000247 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR MICHAEL GREEN, DOD FOR OSD/ISA/AP
LEW STERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL ETRD ENRG VM CVR
SUBJECT: (C) CHINESE MISSTEPS IN VIETNAM ARE A U.S.
OPPORTUNITY

REF: A. IIR 6 950 0016 05

B. BEIJING 1504

C. 04 HANOI 2745

D. 04 HANOI 2857

E. HANOI 0042

F. 04 HANOIQ42

Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine, reason 1.5 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000247

SIPDIS


NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR MICHAEL GREEN, DOD FOR OSD/ISA/AP
LEW STERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL ETRD ENRG VM CVR
SUBJECT: (C) CHINESE MISSTEPS IN VIETNAM ARE A U.S.
OPPORTUNITY

REF: A. IIR 6 950 0016 05

B. BEIJING 1504

C. 04 HANOI 2745

D. 04 HANOI 2857

E. HANOI 0042

F. 04 HANOIQ42

Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine, reason 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: A series of low-grade conflicts in the Gulf
of Tonkin and the Spratly Islands since the summer of 2004
that have received significant media attention in Vietnam has
corroded Vietnam-China relations. In all of these incidents,
Vietnamese press reports have depicted China as a "bullying
older brother." The China-Vietnam relationship has
historically had its ups and downs, and, the October 2004
visit of Premier Wen Jiabao notwithstanding, we are currently
in a "down" period. The upcoming visit of NSC Sr. Director
for Asian Affairs Green is well-timed to remind the GVN
leadership of the benefits of a healthy relationship with the
United States and of the utility of a continued strong U.S.
presence in Southeast Asia. End Summary.

ARMED CLASH WITH CHINESE SEA POLICE KILLS NINE FISHERMEN
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The most recent problematic incident between China and
Vietnam occurred January 8 just south of an island roughly
halfway between Hainan Island and the Vietnamese port city of
Haiphong. While the precipitating factors of the incident
are in dispute, the outcome is not: Chinese Maritime Police
fired on Vietnamese vessels, killing nine Vietnamese
fishermen, wounding "many" and arresting eight others. The
Chinese claim the Vietnamese were pirates, and, in
conversations with DAO, cited "multiple" previous incidents
where the Vietnamese boats robbed Chinese fishermen in the
vicinity (ref A). The Chinese military attache also said
that the Vietnamese "fishermen" were carrying automatic
weapons and were trained in how to use them. Other
Vietnamese interlocutors have told us that rammings and other
incidents between Chinese and Vietnamese are a frequent
occurrence in that section of the Gulf of Tonkin, which was
only recently opened up to joint fishing as a result of the
signing of a demarcation agreement in June 2004. However,
the January 8 incident was unique in its level of violence.



3. (U) Following the incident, the Chinese and Vietnamese
exchanged diplomatic notes protesting the other side,s
actions in the clash. The GVN used unusually harsh language
to criticize the Chinese side, saying in a public statement
that "Chinese on-duty vessels opened fire, killing and
injuring many Vietnamese fishermen in the western side of the
delimitation line of Tonkin Gulf in the common fishing area,
violating the Tonkin Gulf Delimitation Agreement and the
Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement." An MFA
spokesman raised the temperature further in a press event
January 16, saying "those Vietnamese attacked, killed,
injured and captured by the Chinese naval patrol police are
honest fishermen, who were fishing in the western side of the
Tonkin Gulf delimitation line in the common fishing area. . .
The use of weapons by Chinese naval patrol police to kill
innocent Vietnamese is a serious violation of international
laws, the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf,
the Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement and
agreements by high-level leaders of the two countries,
hurting the friendship between peoples of the two countries."


4. (C) The spokesman went on to demand an investigation of
the incident, punishment for the guilty, compensation for the
families of those killed and the immediate release of the
detained fishermen, followed by a meeting of the Joint
Commission on Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf to
discuss measures to stabilize the situation. According to
the MFA,s China Desk, as of January 27, neither party had
been able to "coordinate scheduling" and so a meeting of the
Commission has not yet been set. Embassy contacts in the
press and in the GVN characterized the Chinese actions (and
subsequent response) as "bullying" behavior, though the
Vietnamese and Chinese governments have been careful to say
that the incident will not affect relations (ref B).

CHINA HUMILIATES VIETNAM WITH DEPLOYMENT OF DRILLING RIG
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The fishing incident came on the heels of another
diplomatic confrontation November 19 between China and
Vietnam over the Chinese deployment of the Kantan 3 oil
drilling platform in the same area. The GVN claims that the
platform was located at Latitude 17 degrees 26 minutes 42
seconds North and Longitude 108 degrees 19 minutes 05 seconds


East, which would put it 63 miles from the Vietnamese coast
and 67 miles from the Hainan coast, on the Vietnamese side of
the Gulf of Tonkin demarcation line. The GVN publicly called
on China to desist, stating "this area lies entirely within
the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf of Vietnam.
That China puts its oil drilling rig into operation in this
area is a serious violation against the sovereign rights and
national jurisdiction of Vietnam." According to the China
Studies Institute, a think tank in Hanoi, the Chinese
withdrew the Kantan 3 to the Chinese side of the Gulf "only
after it had finished its work."

CHINA-RP OIL DEAL IN SPRATLYS ANGERS VIETNAM
--------------


5. (C) Two months prior to the Kantan 3 incident, Vietnam
reacted angrily to the announcement by the Chinese and
Philippine governments that they had signed an agreement to
do joint research on oil exploration in the Spratly Islands.
China invited Vietnam to participate in the research, but
Vietnam refused, saying that to participate would violate the
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vice Foreign
Minister Nguyen Phu Binh told the Ambassador that Vietnam did
not want to be seen "making side deals" on the Spratly
Islands when all parties were supposed to be committed to a
solution that involved all claimants. The issue came up in
the October 2004 meeting between Vietnamese PM Phan Van Khai
and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the margins of the ASEM 5
summit in Hanoi (ref D). Khai asked Wen to commit to China's
not implementing the project. Wen refused with the bland
reply that that China's joint exploration agreement with the
Philippines does not contravene the Declaration of Conduct
and "does not affect the national interests of Vietnam."

WEN VISIT: CHINA EXTRACTS WTO PROMISES, GIVES NONE IN RETURN
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Among Vietnam,s most pressing priorities at the
moment is its accession to the WTO, and this was at the top
of the agenda during Wen,s October visit (refs C and D).
China limited its endorsement of this initiative, saying only
that China "supported" Vietnam's WTO bid. Even this tepid
statement was expensive for the Vietnamese: they had to agree
to a side protocol with China, promising not to exercise WTO
provisions regarding anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and
safeguards on textile imports from China, according to the
Chinese Embassy in Hanoi. The Vietnamese had hoped that the
Wen visit would be the catalyst for China to set a target
deadline for the conclusion of WTO talks, but were
disappointed. The GVN also failed to extract a commitment
from China to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade at the
provincial level, barriers that the GVN believes block
Vietnamese agricultural exports and exacerbate Vietnam,s
trade deficit with China, the China Institute said. In
addition to advancing its trade priorities, Vietnam had hoped
to schedule a visit to Vietnam of new Chinese President Hu
Jintao, but Premier Wen did not promise a Hu visit, much less
commit to a date.

VIETNAM RELUCTANT TO CHALLENGE DIRECTLY
--------------


7. (C) Despite what Vietnam feels is China,s "bullying"
attitude and the series of bilateral setbacks, Vietnam
remains unwilling to challenge Chinese interests directly.
The issue of the East Asia Summit makes this clear. Vietnam
does not support the East Asia Summit (EAS) or the East Asia
Community at this time, believing that it is an effort by
China to remold the ASEAN 3 mechanism without the solidarity
of ASEAN (refs E and F). According to the Singapore Embassy
here, the Vietnamese had intended to join Indonesia in
recommending "further study" for the EAS concept when it came
up for discussion at the November 2004 ASEAN summit in
Vientiane, in effect killing it for at least another year.
When the Indonesians unexpectedly changed their position,
Vietnam also dropped its opposition. "Vientiane is friendly
territory for the Chinese," the Singaporeans said, "and
Vietnam remains afraid of China,s reaction if it were to
lead an effort to thwart one of China,s diplomatic
priorities." According to Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang,
in a recent conversation with American scholars, "it only
took the Chinese one day" to change the Indonesians'
position.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) We hear regularly from senior MFA officials that the
United States should do more to "counter" China,s efforts to
"dominate" Southeast Asia (they are particularly agitated


over U.S. actions against Burma, which they feel is giving
China a free pass into ASEAN),but it is not clear to what
degree the MFA view is shared among the members of the
Politburo and in the Prime Minister,s office. Some,
including Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh,
believe that the interests of Vietnam and the Party are
better served by staying close to China at the United
States, expense. Ultimately, of course, Vietnam values its
independence and freedom of action more than any linkage or
alliance. For this reason, the recent string of incidents,
combined with the arrogant and dismissive Chinese responses,
creates a window in which the GVN (and possibly the
leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam) will be more
receptive than usual to our suggestions that, strategically,
it is in Vietnam,s interest to support a continuing, dynamic
role for the United States in Southeast Asia. As we begin
preparing the groundwork for the possible visit of Prime
Minister Phan Van Khai to Washington in mid-2005, including
the related trip by NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs
Green next week to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan
and senior officials from the Office of the Government and
the External Relations Commission of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party (as well as the MFA),we will be in a
position to push this agenda item.
Marine


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