Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05HANOI1394
2005-06-13 06:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

Tags:  PREL PHUM KIRF PREF ETRD VM PROV 
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130607Z Jun 05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 001394 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KIRF PREF ETRD VM PROV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT


Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine per 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 001394

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KIRF PREF ETRD VM PROV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT


Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine per 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's visit to the United
States will be the first by a Vietnamese Prime Minister since
1975, and will take place in the tenth anniversary year of
the normalization of bilateral relations. This historic
occasion will give us the opportunity to highlight a growing
and increasingly fruitful relationship while underscoring
that our two countries' shared history, while not forgotten,
is no longer an obstacle to the development of bilateral
ties. At the same, we will able to note at the highest level
our remaining concerns about a number of issues, such as
human rights, religious freedom and ethnic minorities.
Although the Prime Minister will be chary to engage on these
topics ) he will want his discussions to be positive and
future-oriented ) the Vietnamese nonetheless recognize that
these are important issues to us.


2. (C) We should use the visit to:

-- highlight our increasingly overlapping national interests
and move toward expanding our bilateral dialogue on a number
of global and regional issues of mutual concern;

-- express U.S. support for Vietnam's continued regional and
international integration, including WTO accession and
hosting APEC 2006;

-- make clear that success in Vietnam's efforts to stamp out
corruption, increase transparency, guarantee intellectual
property rights and promote rule of law is the best way to
attract U.S. investment;

-- welcome recent progress related to the issues of religious
freedom, human rights and ethnic minorities, but caution that
a slow-down or reversal of advances in these areas will
negatively impact bilateral relations;

-- highlight the critical importance of our joint efforts to
combat HIV/AIDS and to prevent or respond to an Avian
Influenza (AI) pandemic;

-- thank the GVN for cooperation in Fullest Possible
Accounting, including its recent commitment to allow access
to the Central Highlands for survey and recovery operations.

What the Visit Means for Vietnam
--------------


3. (C) Our Vietnamese interlocutors have told us that the

visit will be a milestone in the bilateral relationship akin
to the normalization of relations ten years ago. Indeed, the
Prime Minister's delegation, which will include one Deputy
Prime Ministers, five Ministers, ten Vice Ministers and 120
businesspersons (at last count),will be one of Vietnam's
largest ever. The Vietnamese have also reminded us on
several occasions about the importance of the visit's optics,
noting that the Vietnamese people will judge the state of
bilateral ties based on the reception the Prime Minister
receives. Reflective of the importance the GVN attaches to
this event, in an effort to "clear the decks" beforehand and
to create the most positive atmosphere possible, GVN
leadership has given the nod to try to conclude a number of
government-to-government agreements, covering agriculture,
maritime transportation, economic cooperation, scientific
assistance, adoptions and military education and training.
On the commercial front, Vietnam Airlines recently agreed to
purchase four 787 aircraft and will issue insurance licenses
to New York Life and ACE, success stories that will be
highlighted at a Department of Commerce event. A number of
other commercial deals have recently been concluded or are in
train.


4. (C) The decision to schedule the Prime Minister's visit
was a "high-level political one," according to our
interlocutors. In fact, the Prime Minister himself reviewed
the draft joint statement and attached his handwritten
comments. One of the reasons for this visit's importance is
how it plays into Vietnam's political calendar. In the
run-up to the Communist Party's quinquennial Congress in 2006
- the main theme of which is an evaluation of 20 years of
Vietnam's "doi moi" (renewal) policy ) the most important
debate will be between those who favor increasing the pace
and scope of openness and reform and those who would slow
down the process. Supporters of strengthened relations with
the United States (and who are wary of China's rise) are more
or less in the former camp, and those who prefer to cast
Vietnam's lot with China ) and are suspicious of U.S.
intentions - are generally in the latter. How the Prime
Minister's U.S. visit is evaluated back home will no doubt be
a factor in Party debate and discussions and will strengthen

the hands of some, while weakening others.


5. (C) Furthermore, Khai's visit is the capstone to a
five-year process of improving relations with the United
States based on a reformist-driven foreign policy decision
laid out in the last Party Congress and subsequent Plenums.
There is a growing conviction in some circles that, in
addition to being a vital source of financial and technical
assistance and a huge market for Vietnamese goods, the United
States represents an important force in the maintenance of a
stable Asian geopolitical environment in which even "small"
countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and
freedom of action. Finally, the visit is designed to
reciprocate President Clinton's 2000 visit to Vietnam and to
set the stage for a bilateral visit by President Bush in
connection with the 2006 APEC summit in Hanoi.

WTO/Economic Themes
--------------


6. (C) At the top of Vietnam's foreign policy agenda is its
desire to accede to the WTO. As in China, the Vietnamese
Communist Party's governing contract with the Vietnamese
people obligates it to deliver continued rapid growth and
economic opportunity. The Party has determined that regional
and international economic integration is an essential step
for Vietnam's economic development, and WTO entry is the top
manifestation of that. Senior leaders in the Party and the
Government will be evaluated by the Party Congress in terms
of whether they have met Vietnam's WTO goals.


7. (C) The GVN has committed to extremely ambitious national
economic policy changes to accommodate the demands of its
bilateral WTO negotiation partners; implementing those
changes will require significant work in drafting and passing
new legislation. However, Vietnam is running out of time to
make these necessary legislative changes, and the
high-powered team it is sending to Washington this week to
&be available8 during the next round of bilateral talks )
including five Vice Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister Vu
Khoan ) reflects the seriousness with which Hanoi views this
issue.


8. (C) Our Vietnamese interlocutors often note that U.S.
investment in Vietnam is "too low" and not "meeting the
potential of the bilateral economic relationship," and the
Prime Minister probably will make this point. Although the
level of investment appears low, in reality it is three times
higher because the GVN's figures do not reflect investment
funneled through third countries. That said, the level of
U.S. investment is still relatively low. In large measure,
this is because many American investors are waiting to see
how Vietnam's economic reform efforts play out, whether the
Bilateral Trade Agreement is respected by both sides and to
what extent Vietnam's WTO aspirations move forward to create
conditions more attractive for foreign investors. A point we
often underline is that, because Vietnam is competing with
its neighbors for U.S. investment dollars, it has to create
an economic environment in which corruption is stamped out,
rule of law is the order of the day and transparency can be
relied on.

Increasing Overlap of National Interests: China...
-------------- --------------


9. (C) In addition to Vietnam's economic and trade agenda,
the recognition by Vietnam's leadership that our two
countries increasingly share a number of regional and global
interests isalso spurring on bilateral ties. First among
thse is the shared interest in ensuring that China rses
peacefully and is nt allowed to dominate the region or
regional orgnizations. Although the subject of China may
no come up directly, the Prime Minister will likely ote
that Vietnam welcomes the role of the UnitedStates in the
region and urge us to strengthen ou relations with ASEAN.
Despite recent efforts topatch relations, Vietnam's
relationship with Chia has seen better days, and this may
provide us ith an opening to suggest expanding and elevating
our bilateral dialogue to discuss issues of mutual concern.

...Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement...
--------------


10. (C) The Prime Minister may refer to our two countries'
shared interest in combating terrorism, narcotics,
trafficking-in-persons and international organized crime.
Although we are pursuing modest efforts in these areas, they
are nowhere close to meeting their potential. The reluctance
of security and other officials suspicious of U.S. intentions
has stymied our attempts to pursue operational law
enforcement cooperation and more effective information

exchanges. It would be useful to underline the importance
the United States also attaches to these issues, while
stressing that the promise of our cooperative efforts at the
operational level remains largely unfulfilled.

...HIV/AIDS, Avian Influenza and Humanitarian Assistance
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Our cooperative efforts in the fight against HIV/AIDS
represent a success story that we never hesitate to
highlight. Since the June 2004 Presidential designation of
Vietnam as the fifteenth focus country in his Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief, U.S. Emergency Plan funding for Vietnam has
sought to build a sustainable, comprehensive national
HIV/AIDS control program based on the Vietnam National
Strategy and with a focus in the areas of HIV prevention,
care and treatment.


12. (C) We have repeatedly urged the GVN to address a problem
of lack of capacity in the Ministry of Health (MoH) and its
lack of authority to manage adequately the national HIV/AIDS
program. We believe that overall responsibility should be
vested in an inter-ministerial coordinating body, with
representatives from the Labor, Public Security and Defense
Ministries, and with clear lines of authority from the
central government. Similarly MoH management and capacity
problems hinder rapid GVN preparations for a possible Avian
Influenza (AI) pandemic in Vietnam. This detracts from
excellent performances by many elements in the MoH and
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD).

Outstanding Issues: Religious Freedom...
--------------


13. (C) In the area of religious freedom, the Prime
Minister's Instruction on Protestantism, the implementing
Decree for the Ordinance on Religion and the decision to
release a number of high-profile religious and political
prisoners represent welcome and substantial progress. These
actions, and our two countries' recent religious freedom
agreement, represent good progress in responding to our need
to see Vietnam: ban forced renunciations and punish those
who violate this; re-open shuttered churches; release
religious prisoners; and ensure that religious believers are
allowed to practice their faith in peace.


14. (C) One of the driving forces behind recent improvements
in the religious freedom situation was the desire to remove a
potential obstacle to arranging the PM's visit. Indeed, the
Prime Minister probably would prefer that the issue not come
up at all save to win approval of the steps Vietnam has taken
so far and be told that Vietnam is well on the path to being
removed from the list of Countries of Particular Concern.
While it is worth noting that the USG welcomes the steps
Vietnam has taken to date, we nonetheless need to see
effective, consistent implementation of Vietnam's new
religious freedom-related laws and regulations, particularly
in traditionally problematic regions such as the Central and
Northwest Highlands.

...Human Rights and Democracy...
--------------


15. (C) Vietnam is without question a freer and more open
society than it was as few as five years ago. People are now
more or less free to choose the kind of life they would like
for themselves, including where to live, what kind of job to
take and what kind of lifestyle to lead. The press and the
National Assembly are also increasingly able to take on
formerly sensitive subjects, such as corruption, fraud and
bad policymaking. Modest efforts are also underway to
devolve power away from the central government and increase
public accountability, particularly in budget decisions at
lowest levels of local administration.


16. (C) However, Vietnam is still an authoritarian, one-party
State in which criticism of the Communist Party and the
"system" is not tolerated, and efforts to challenge the
Communist Party's rule are dealt with severely. While a
number of political and religious prisoners have been freed
over the past several months, dozens remain in prison.
Although Vietnam has shown a willingness to address specific
issues of concern to us ) and has agreed in principle to
restarting our Human Rights Dialogue ) in the short- to
medium-term, there are no prospects for fundamental changes
in one-Party, authoritarian rule.

...Central Highlands...
--------------


17. (C) A continuing source of friction in our ties is the

Central Highlands. A volatile historical mix of ethnic
divisions, separatist aspirations, economic disparity and a
rapid growth in the number of Protestant faithful has led the
GVN to pursue policies that have swung between promoting
social and economic development and cracking down harshly on
religious and other "unauthorized gatherings." Organizations
and individuals exist inside and outside of Vietnam that seek
a separate state for certain ethnic minority groups. Clashes
between ethnic minorities and security forces in 2001 and
2004 offered proof to the Vietnamese authorities that a
separatist movement is a threat; these clashes also proved
for those critical of the regime that Vietnam is a harsh
oppressor of religious believers and ethnic minorities.


18. (C) Neither side is completely right or wrong. The GVN
has expressed gratitude for our assurances that the United
States supports the territorial integrity of Vietnam and
condemns violent opposition to the GVN, a point that is
included in the draft joint statement. Convincing the GVN )
particularly its more conservative elements in the Party, the
MPS, and the Army ) that the United States represents no
threat to Vietnam's sovereignty or territorial integrity has
been crucial in developing the concept of shared global and
regional interests. We continue to stress to the GVN that
problems in the Central Highlands attract international
attention and must be handled with maximum care. We also
make the point that pursuing equitable social and economic
development policies towards ethnic minority populations and
allowing international organizations to verify improving
conditions is essential to dispel the impression that the GVN
is engaged in repression in the Central Highlands.


19. (C) Of immediate concern to us is our "follow-to-join"
program for the family members of ethnic minority refugees
whom we resettled in the United States. A number of family
members continue to face harassment and cannot receive or
even apply for passports and our repeated efforts to deal
with this issue at the local and central Government levels
have been disappointing. A related concern is for the fate
of ethnic minorities who voluntarily returned to Vietnam
after crossing illegally into Cambodia. A UNHCR
representative has been able to travel to the region to look
into the situation facing the returnees, but we need to see
more regularized access and monitoring.

...and Agent ORANGE
--------------


20. (C) The Prime Minister may raise "legacies of the war,"
code for Agent ORANGE (AO). In fact, the GVN hopes to
include a reference to this issue in the draft joint
statement currently being worked by our two sides. AO has
long been a contentious issue in our bilateral relations,
with intense media attention in the past few months in
reaction to the dismissed lawsuit against Dow Chemical and
other manufacturers by the Vietnamese Association for Victims
of Agent ORANGE. In February, the U.S. National Institute
for Environmental Health Studies announced it would cancel a
joint project to study the effects of Agent ORANGE/dioxin due
to the lack of cooperation from the GVN. You may wish to
emphasize that further research is needed to get to the
scientific truth of this issue, and that the USG has provided
$35 million worth of assistance to the disabled in Vietnam
since 1991, regardless of the cause.

Fullest Possible Accounting
--------------


21. (C) We continue to have good cooperation with the
Vietnamese in the fullest possible accounting of our
personnel missing from the war. During Assistant Secretary
of Defense Peter Rodman's June 7-8 visit to Hanoi, the
Vietnamese pledged to address four issues of concern for us,
namely access to the Central Highlands for investigation and
recovery operations, underwater recovery operations, better
archival access and more unilateral efforts by Vietnam.
These are positive steps worth noting, but we will need to
see follow-through in the months ahead.


22. (C) To sum up, this historic visit offers us the
opportunity to strengthen the foundation of our bilateral
relationship by confirming our shared interests in relevant
regional and global issues, reassuring the Vietnamese about
their highest priority issues and expressing at the highest
level our thoughts on remaining issues of concern between the
United States and Vietnam.
Marine


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