Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GUATEMALA2466
2005-10-27 21:09:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Guatemala
Cable title:  

GUATEMALAN LEGAL REFORM: CREATION OF A CIVILIAN

Tags:  SNAR KJUS KCRM PTER ASEC PINS PGOV PHUM GT 
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272109Z Oct 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 002466 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR KJUS KCRM PTER ASEC PINS PGOV PHUM GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALAN LEGAL REFORM: CREATION OF A CIVILIAN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 002466

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR KJUS KCRM PTER ASEC PINS PGOV PHUM GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALAN LEGAL REFORM: CREATION OF A CIVILIAN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



1. (SBU) Summary: The Guatemalan Congress approved a law
creating a civilian intelligence agency, including an
initially controversial provision to permit wiretapping in
restricted circumstances. Inclusion of the wiretapping
provision in the bill augurs well for passage of what the
Embassy has been advocating: expanded wiretapping
authorities that will enable the GOG to pursue organized
crime and narcotics trafficking. With legal hurdles
surmounted, the GOG now faces the challenge of creating a
professional and apolitical corps of civilian intelligence
officials. End Summary.

--------------
Functions and Organization
--------------


2. (U) Guatemala's new civilian intelligence agency - the
General Directorate of Civilian Intelligence (DIGICI) will be
located in the Ministry of Government (Interior). Its
prescribed functions are:
-- collecting and analyzing information to create
intelligence;
-- evaluating and disseminating intelligence in order to
protect the Guatemalan state's political, economic, social,
industrial, commercial, technological, and strategic
interests from the threat of organized crime and delinquency.
-- providing intelligence advice to the Ministry of
Government;
-- centralizing Ministry of Government information and
distributing it to other GOG intelligence agencies as
necessary;
-- requesting the help of government officials and private
citizens to obtain useful information;
-- obtaining cooperation agreements with foreign intelligence
agencies;
-- handling information and files under its control in a
manner that safeguards citizen security and the
accomplishment of its mission; and,
-- guaranteeing the security and protection of its human
resources, material, and information.


3. (U) A Director General and Vice Director General will
head the new intelligence agency. DIGICI divisions will
include offices of Administration, Internal Affairs,
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Planning, Logistics, Legal
and Technical Assistance, and Information Technology. Active

duty military officers are specifically prohibited from
serving as Director General or Vice Director General. One of
the Vice Ministers of Government will monitor and supervise
DIGICI activities, and the bill calls for creation of a
Congressional committee to oversee intelligence activities.

--------------
The Wiretapping Provision
--------------


4. (U) The final version of the wiretapping provision
(Article 4) states: "In cases where there are indications of
organized crime activity, with emphasis on drug trafficking
and common delinquency, in which there is a threat against
the life, physical integrity, liberty, or property of certain
persons, the Public Ministry (i.e. prosecutors) can request,
as an urgent measure, the authorization of an Appellate Court
for the temporary interception of telephone, radio,
electronic and similar communications; the request will be
evaluated on its merits, be decided within 24 hours, can not
be admitted as evidence in a court of law, and be held in
absolute confidence. None of the obtained information, if
unrelated to the purposes of the intervention, can be used as
proof against any person. Authorization is not necessary in
cases where the account owner, or his legal representative,
asks for intervention of his own telephone or communications
system for reasons noted in this article."


5. (SBU) Per the recommendation of the Myrna Mack
Foundation, a prominent local human rights group, the final
bill shifted approving authority for wiretap requests from an
investigative judge (First Instance Court) to an appellate
court judge. The final bill did not include an additional
Mack Foundation recommendation of a long list of
prerequisites in each wiretap request. The Mack Foundation
and other human rights groups did not oppose the wiretapping
provision per se, but some in the NGO community have begun to
express unease following passage of the bill.

--------------
Comment
--------------


6. (SBU) Although two prominent Guatemalan Congressmen have
told us that the addition of organized crime and drug
trafficking language to the wiretapping provision in the
DIGICI bill will provide sufficient authority to pursue
investigations against drug trafficking and other organized
crime groups, a Guatemalan judge may easily refuse to
authorize wiretaps except in life-threatening situations
(such as kidnapping). Interior Minister Vielmann told the
Ambassador that this wiretap authority would provide the GOG
a huge operational advantage. Chief Prosecutor Florido,
however, told the Ambassador he was disappointed that this
legislation made the wiretap intelligence inadmissible in
court.


7. (SBU) An organized crime bill currently under
consideration by Congress has much less restrictive language
on wiretapping and also includes provisions for undercover
operations and controlled deliveries. We will report on the
organized crime bill via septel; the bill sponsor is
predicting its passage in mid-November but that is unlikely,
given that the Congress must approve a government budget and
take care of other matters before going into recess November

30. The lack of strong opposition to the wiretapping
provision in the DIGICI bill does bode well for passage of
broader wiretapping authority in the organized crime bill.


8. (SBU) The DIGICI bill provides the legal basis for the
GOG to create a civilian operational intelligence capability,
a long-standing deficiency in the Guatemalan national
security architecture. However, the GOG faces some
significant challenges in achieving this capability. The
senior levels of the Ministry of Government are staffed by
well-meaning but inexperienced political appointees who have
been recruited from the private sector. None of these
officials appear to have any experience in intelligence
issues. Furthermore, there has been a history of extremely
high personnel turnover and politicization in the Strategic
Analysis Secretariat (SAE),the only existing civilian
intelligence agency (an analysis, not collection, agency).
Although improving in the Berger Administration, personnel
turbulence has been a characteristic of the SAE dating back
to the SAE's unofficial creation during the De Leon
Administration in 1994. This history illustrates the
challenges that face the new DIGICI agency.
DERHAM