Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GUATEMALA1897
2005-08-05 15:01:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Guatemala
Cable title:  

LETTER FROM GUATEMALA (9)

Tags:  PGOV ASEC MASS PHUM EAID KJUS GT 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001897 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ASEC MASS PHUM EAID KJUS GT
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GUATEMALA (9)

REF: GUATEMALA 1204 AND PREVIOUS

Merger of Defense and Government Ministries - Not Likely
--------------------------------------------- -----------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001897

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ASEC MASS PHUM EAID KJUS GT
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GUATEMALA (9)

REF: GUATEMALA 1204 AND PREVIOUS

Merger of Defense and Government Ministries - Not Likely
-------------- --------------


1. (SBU) Late June and early July saw a spate of media
reports of GOG interest in merging the Defense and Government
(Interior) Ministries. According to media and GOG sources,
Minister of Government Vielmann generated the proposal,
presumably as part of his continuing efforts to get control
of Guatemala's public security crisis. At first glance, a
merger would appear to solve the Civilian National Police
(PNC) lack of manpower, as a National Guard would presumably
have an end strength of 35,500 personnel (15,500 military and
20,000 police). The budget would similarly grow to 2,570
million quetzales (approximately 340 million dollars) by
combining the 780 million quetzal Defense Ministry and 1,790
million quetzal Government Ministry budgets. Another
unspoken but likely consideration among some GOG officials
was that a merger would resolve the issue of dealing with a
military institution that engenders ambivalence and
indifference in the private sector-oriented Berger
Administration.


2. (SBU) Not surprisingly, the Guatemalan military is
opposed to a merger for various professional, ideological,
and emotional reasons. Burned badly in its last (1960-1996)
involvement in internal security, the military prefers to
focus on international peacekeeping, combating transnational
threats such as drug trafficking, and disaster relief. After
almost a decade in its "temporary" mission of supporting the
police with joint patrols, the military remains ambivalent
about working with a police force that it views as corrupt
and incompetent, and is preoccupied with being accused of
human rights abuses should any of its personnel resort to
deadly force. And, the military is dismayed by the use of
its scarce Operations and Maintenance (O & M) funds to
support joint patrols at the expense of other military
priorities such as counternarcotics interdiction or unit
training.


3. (SBU) Human rights groups have generally not made up
their minds about a National Guard. Some opposed the idea,
arguing that a merger would lead to a militarization of the

public security force since the military members of the force
would dominate the police members. Other human rights groups
have been less critical. While PNC officials have avoided
comment on the issue, some may fear being sidelined by the
military given the police force's weak institutional history
and lack of strong leadership. A couple of pundits falsely
traced the proposal's origins to Washington. Other
commentators have noted that such a merger would require
extensive constitutional changes, a dubious prospect as the
last attempt to amend the constitution on military issues (to
allow, among other things, a civilian Defense Minister) went
down to defeat in a 1999 referendum.


4. (SBU) President Berger and MOD Aldana responded to the
media interest by noting that the merger proposal was worthy
of analysis but was not actively being studied. The
president's chief of strategic analysis told us privately --
and flatly -- that the proposal was not being studied. With
only thirty months left in its term, it is highly unlikely
that the Berger Administration would take any action on such
a controversial issue. Given the almost decade-long track
record of failure in creating a professional police force,
the GOG should have reservations about attempting to create a
new security force.

The Justice System Wanders into Kafka Territory
-------------- --


5. (SBU) In a justice system that enjoys only a 2 to 5
percent indictment rate for reported crimes, and where
prosecutors face a huge backlog of cases pending
investigation, a recent court decision showed a rare example
of perseverance by the justice system. Unfortunately, this
particular case only demonstrates the absurd nature of
justice in Guatemala. In this July 15 decision, a court
sentenced former Defense Minister Major General Mario Barrios
Celada to two and one half years in prison for defamation of
character. The aggrieved party in this case was Javier
Cacacho, a former Army Captain who was expelled from the
military by then-Defense Minister Barrios (1997-99) after
being caught in possession of a kilo of cocaine in his
personal vehicle. For reasons that remain unclear, Cacacho
was not prosecuted after his discharge. Acting on a
complaint from Cacacho, prosecutors obtained a conviction of
General Barrios for defamation of character. After the
conviction was overturned on appeal, prosecutors again
brought charges against Barrios, resulting in the latest
conviction. Ironically, Cacacho, who reportedly continued to
engage in criminal activities, was murdered in early 2005
under suspicious circumstances.


6. (SBU) Guatemalan law does not provide liability
protection to officials acting under the cover of official
duties, hence the lawsuit against Barrios. Late last year,
then-Defense Minister Mendez Pinelo refused to release
Defense Ministry documents to a judge until he had obtained a
legal ruling from the Attorney General. Human rights groups
cried foul and accused the military of obstruction; military
sources cited the Barrios case and claimed that Mendez Pinelo
was worried about being sued by retired military officers who
were defendants in an embezzlement case. The Barrios
precedent will serve as a disincentive to transparency and
strengthen caution and evasion of responsibility by
government officials.
WHARTON