DUNANT CENTRE FACILITATING PHILIPPINE-MNLF TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002767

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER RP MNLF
SUBJECT: DUNANT CENTRE FACILITATING PHILIPPINE-MNLF TALKS


Classified By: Humanitarian Counselor Piper Campbell, reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian
Dialogue briefed interested Missions November 2 on its
efforts to mediate final implementation of the 1996 peace
agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). The effort grew out of
concern that clashes on Sulu Island in February could
undermine the agreement. The parties will launch a "Peace
Working Group" November 17 to work on security arrangements.
A separate discussion of political issues is expected to
resume in January, possibly in Geneva. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
(formerly the Henri Dunant Centre, or HDC) briefed interested
Missions November 2 on its role in mediating talks aimed at
completing implementation of a 1996 peace agreement that
largely ended 30 years of fighting between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the once-powerful
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Mediation Advisor
David Gorman said HDC had become involved at GRP request
after battles on Sulu island in February between GRP security
forces and a group consisting largely of MNLF fighters left
up to 300 people dead and threatened to unravel the 1996
agreement.


3. (C) After extensive interviews with the parties involved,
Gorman said HDC concluded the February violence had disparate
causes. While clan disputes and a general lack of law and
order were contributing factors, MNLF grievances over its
perceived limited role in implementing the autonomy
arrangement provided for by the 19996 peace agreement and
over the continued detention of MNLF leader Nur Misuari
played an important role. Gorman said HDC's report on the
violence and recommendations to the GRP had led to four
rounds of direct talks so far this year between the GRP and
MNLF and to the formation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Working
Group, which will be formally launched on November 17.


4. (C) The GRP-MNLF Peace Working Group will include 5 MNLF
representatives as well as two representatives from local
government bodies and one representative each from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP),the Philippine National
Police (PNP),and the Social Welfare Department. Under HDC
mediation, its goal is to produce a regional security plan to
address, among other things, issues such as disarmament and
integration of MNLF fighters into government security forces.
This effort will take place in parallel with separate
discussions of political issues.


5. (C) Gorman said HDC expects to convene the next round of
political discussions in January, possibly in Geneva. The
meeting will have limited objectives, given HDC's hope to
include for the first time all five major factions of the
MNLF as well as a representative from the Organization of
Islamic Conferences (OIC). The goal will be to reach some
common understanding of what elements of the 1996 agreement
have in fact been implemented and what still needs to be
done. The meeting will not address the fate of Nur Misuari,
which Gorman said will be discussed in separate meetings in
Manila. Based on his meetings with Nur Misuari, GRP
officials and MNLF leaders, Gorman thought Nur Misuari's
eventual exile might be a mutually acceptable solution.


6. (C) Gorman outlined a number of possible pitfalls ahead,
including:

-- the challenge of ensuring consistency and parity with
whatever autonomy and other concessions the GRP eventuall
grants in its separate ongoing peace negotiations with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
-- the likelihood that the GRP will refuse to roll back
changes to the 1996 agreement that it unilaterally imposed
under Republic Act 9054, which is a major sore point for the
MNLF
-- the challenge of coordinating elements of the peace
agreements with proposed Philippine constitutional reforms
(charter change)
-- the problem of MNLF factionalism and the risk of further
MNLF splintering.


7. (C) Gorman saw some reason for optimism, nevertheless.
The MNLF is militarily a shadow of what it once was, with an
ageing command, a limited popular base, and the ability to
field at most a few thousand fighters. For its part, the GRP
is more concerned about the more powerful rebel groups that
have emerged, including the MILF, the Abu Sayaf Group, and
the New People's Army. Gorman suggested the GRP is motivated
to seek a lasting solution with the MNLF both so that it can
focus on these more threatening organizations and to gain
favor with the OIC, whose assistance Manila believes it needs
in managing relations with the Muslim south.
Cassel