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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA2753 2005-11-10 06:24:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002753 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
TELEMETRY ISSUES, NOVEMBER 8, 2005

REF: A. STATE 231077

B. JCIC-XXV-043 (03 GENEVA 3025)

C. JCIC-XXVI-038 (04 GENEVA 2967)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-044.



2. (U) Meeting Date: November 8, 2005
Time: 10:15 - 11:30 A.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) A working group meeting was held at the U.S. Mission
on November 8, 2005, to discuss Russian concerns with U.S.
telemetry information provided for a Peacekeeper (PK)
flight-test of March 12, 2003, and Trident flight-test
maneuvers. The Russian Delegation complained about the
inability of Russian telemetry experts to convert the digital
data from the U.S. PK flight-test into "video" code. The
Russians indicated they had a problem with the timing
references provided by the U.S. Additionally, the Russians
raised, once again, the U.S. practice of Trident II
flight-tests and their assertion that the U.S. is testing the
missile with more reentry vehicle (RV) dispensing operations
than the number of warheads attributed to it. The U.S.
Delegation responded that it had heard nothing new in today's
presentation and, as the U.S had stated in the past, the U.S.
is in full compliance with the Treaty, and has fulfilled all
its obligations.



--------------------------


PEACEKEEPER FLIGHT-
TEST OF MARCH 12, 2003,
TELEMETRY RECORDINGS


--------------------------





4. (S) At a working group meeting, held at the U.S. Mission
on November 8, 2005, Razumov began by raising the issue of
the U.S. PK ICBM flight-test of March 12, 2003. He stated
that the Russians were still unable to play back telemetric
data broadcast on frequency 2344.5 MHz recorded on tape 18.
Russia still believed that the U.S. had used a new method of
recording data, as stated in the Russian Non-Paper dated June
30, 2003 (REF A). He said that Russia understood the reason
for the U.S. failure to respond to the question during
JCIC-XXV because of the short notice in which the U.S. had
received the non-paper. Subsequently, during JCIC-XXVI, the
U.S. Delegation responded to the question, but only to state
that the U.S. was in complete compliance with the Treaty (REF
B). Razumov stated that Russia was not accusing the U.S. of
violating the Treaty, but that it just wanted clarification
on how to convert the digital data into "video" code so it
could assess the telemetric information in question. (Begin
comment: U.S. Delegation understood that Russia was
referring to conversion of data to "digital" data and the use
of the term video code was an error in translation. End
comment.) As previously stated by the Russian Delegation,
they still sought an answer to the question: "Does the
Russian Federation need new equipment in addition to the
Metrum 64 to read the information provided?" Razumov stated
he understood that the Treaty provided for the Parties to
determine their own recording practices, but said the other
side must be able to play back the recordings. He attempted
to discuss the definition of telemetric recording practices
as stipulated in the Treaty. He acknowledged the
long-standing differences in the Parties' interpretations of
what constitutes "playback." He added that Russia's experts
needed assistance in converting the digital data into what he
termed as "video" code.


5. (S) Mullins thanked Razumov for his comments and asked
whether there were any comments from the other Parties.
Shevtsov remarked that Russia was justified in their
concerns. He saw the need for a bilateral discussion on the
matter in an effort to resolve this situation. He recalled
how the Russian Federation assisted U.S. efforts to
understand the new recording media (compact discs) used by
Russia. He stated how Russia had provided everything the
United States needed for the new method of reading recorded
telemetric data.



6. (S) Mullins thanked Shevtsov for his comments, and asked
Razumov to clarify whether Russia had an issue with the
timing references provided by the United States. Razumov
replied yes, there was a problem. It had taken Russia over a
year to process the data provided, but it was still unable to
assess the telemetric information because it could not link
the telemetric information to the time reference, so there
must have been a problem with the timing reference. He
stated that, given the fact that Russian experts were unable
to fully play back the telemetry, the U.S. must have used a
new method to encode the timing reference. Mullins replied
that Russia had received a full recording, and that it was
everything that the United States also had. Razumov agreed,
but said Russian experts still could not read it.



7. (S) Mullins stated that he would need to take Russia's
concerns about timing data back to Washington. He also
acknowledged the requirement for the other Parties to be able
to play back the telemetric information, but the Treaty did
not require the Parties to provide analytical equipment.
Razumov, seeking further clarification asked, "What mode was
used -- was it pre-detection or post-detection? Do you
modulate the data or apply other algorithms to it? Does
Russia need additional equipment to process this
information?" Mullins replied, "Not for playback." Razumov
asked whether the U.S. had any plans to use this recording
method in the future. Mullins stated that it was possible,
and asked the reason for the question. "We need it to verify
the Treaty," replied Razumov.



--------------------------


TRIDENT II FLIGHT-
TEST PRACTICES


--------------------------





8. (S) Razumov discussed the U.S. practice of Trident II
flight-tests. He acknowledged that this topic had been
talked about in the past at length. To highlight Russia's
concerns, he showed Mullins a table of Russia's analysis of
dispensing maneuvers from Trident flight-tests which, he
said, showed that the U.S. engaged in more RV dispensing
operations than the number of warheads that are attributed to
the missile. (Begin comment: This table is an update to the
one previously provided in REF C, but includes additional
flight data information for tests between February 26, 2004,
and March 2, 2005. As the table cannot be put into a
readable format for this cable, it will be E-mailed to the
State Department separately for dissemination upon request.
End comment.) Razumov asked the U.S. to bring its practices
into compliance with the Treaty as the U.S. had done during
the flight-tests between 2004 and 2005. (Begin comment:
Russia has stated that it did not see any extra dispensing
operations than the attributed number of warheads to the
missile on the flight-tests conducted during this time. End
comment.) In response, Mullins stated that the U.S. was in
compliance and did not engage in the practice of testing
missiles with more RVs than the number of warheads attributed
to them.


9. (S) Shevtsov stated the importance and relevance of this
portion of the Treaty. Although the intent of the Treaty was
to permit verification of compliance, he understood that
advancements in technology could make it impossible to
distinguish dispensing operations from other maneuvers. He
associated this situation with that of the proposed plenary
statement of Trident II RVOSI procedures, saying that maybe
this issue was not so important, without prejudice to Treaty
provisions, of course. But, he said Ukraine supported the
Russian position regarding this issue. He stated that, in
his technical expert opinion, he did not see the need for nor
understand the U.S. requirement for accomplishing extra
procedures during flight-tests. He asked the U.S. to "just
not do it."



10. (S) Mullins responded that the U.S. had not changed its
testing practices, and was in complete compliance with the
Treaty. He directed Razumov back to the Treaty definition of
"procedures for dispensing RVs," which included a maneuver to
an aim point and a release command for one or more RVs,
whether or not an RV is actually released. He stated that,
as told to the Parties in the past, the U.S. practice of
conducting extra SCDM maneuvers was for range safety and test
observation purposes. Mullins noted the only new idea
presented was by Shevtsov's comment that the Treaty provision
seemed to have lost its practical importance given that
missile systems have become more sophisticated.



11. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Reference Data on the Number of Dispensing Maneuvers
during Launches of U.S. SLBMs for the Period 1995 - 2005,
dated November 8, 2005 (E-mailed to State/VCI)



12. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Maj Mitchner
Mr. Singer
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Col Razumov
Lt Col Novikov
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran
Mr. Dotsenko
MGEN Fedotov



13. (U) Taylor sends.
Cassel