|05GENEVA2751||2005-11-10 05:49:00||SECRET||US Mission Geneva|
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002751
1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-043.
2. (U) Meeting Date: November 7, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 5:40 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting, followed by a
Working Group meeting, were held at the Russian Mission on
November 7, 2005 to discuss the U.S. and Russian proposals
for Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI)
procedures (REF A), Peacekeeper (PK) Elimination, Castor 120
Stages, the attribution of silo launchers to the Vandenberg
Space Launch Facility, and the Russian proposal for
inspections of Trident SLBMs in Containers (REF B).
4. (S) The discussions on the two Trident issues were a
follow-on to the morning discussions (REF B). The Parties
agreed that the Trident in Containers issue was close to
resolution, but there was still a major difference regarding
the number of SLBMs to be removed from their container each
year under the policy arrangement. Therefore, the Parties
agreed to continue to work the issue during the intersession.
5. (S) The discussions on Trident RVOSI reached substantive
agreement with modified language over the measurement
procedures used with the Trident RVOSI measurement device to
the Russian-proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement (CPS).
The Parties agreed to provide Joint Draft Text (JDT) of the
CPS at the next meeting based on the understandings of
6. (S) In the discussions of PK ICBMs, Russia de-linked the
Peacekeeper elimination issue from the Castor 120 issue, and
took Peacekeeper off the table for the time being. Russia
said it reserved the right to raise the issue later. The
U.S. Delegation stated that the United States has no plans in
the future to eliminate Peacekeeper ICBMs.
7. (S) With regard to Castor 120 Stages, the Russian
Delegation noted that the issue was close to resolution and
the issue boiled down to two remaining points: not locating
Castor 120 at ICBM bases; and the U.S. providing the number
and location of Castor 120 stages produced.
8. (S) On Vandenberg Silo attribution, the Russian
Delegation reasserted its position that the U.S. action
contradicts the fundamental provisions of the Treaty. The
Russian Delegation declared that the U.S.-proposed visit to
the silos attributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility
(SLF) would not be feasible or useful.
COULD IT BE END-GAME
ON TRIDENT II RVOSI?
9. (S) Boryak opened the HOD meeting by welcoming the two
heads of delegation from Ukraine and Belarus, who had arrived
for the JCIC session that day. After opening remarks, Taylor
said he was pleased by the progress made in the working group
regarding Trident RVOSI procedures and that the Parties were
close to resolving the issue. He noted that the
Russian-proposed option allowing for both groups of
inspectors to take one measurement each, then averaging the
two measurements for the official measurement, was acceptable
to the United States. Taylor said there were a few
non-substantive changes within the Russian-proposed wording
that needed to be made. He handed over the following
U.S.-proposed text, which was a U.S.-proposed version of the
paper the Russian Delegation provided at the morning meeting.
November 7, 2005
Each group will then separately observe as facility
personnel take one measurement to determine the distance from
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the
SLBM third-stage motor, as was done during the demonstration.
If the result of each measurement differs by no more
than three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, the
two measurements are averaged to determine the distance from
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the
SLBM third-stage motor.
If the result of either measurement differs by more than
three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, additional
measurements are taken in the presence of the group observing
the measurement, until a measurement is obtained that differs
from the benchmark measurement by no more than three
centimeters. The two measurements are averaged to determine
the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the
upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor.
The measurement taken for each group and the average
obtained for the distance from the upper point of the hard
cover to the upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor are
recorded in the inspection report.
10. (S) Taylor said that if the revision was acceptable to
the Parties, the U.S. Delegation would consider this issue
resolved and would provide a U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text.
11. (S) Boryak provided the U.S.-suggested language on a
portion of the CPS to his experts to review and provide a
response later in the meeting. Boryak moved on to the PK and
Castor 120 issues.
12. (S) Boryak began the discussion of PK eliminations
stating that the Parties had worked hard for resolution of
the issue. He said that, should the U.S. Delegation provide
assurances that it had no plans to eliminate PK ICBMs, the
Russian Delegation could consider the matter removed from the
table and further consideration during JCIC. Boryak said the
U.S. Delegatiion had not made a steadfast statement in JCIC
stating its absence of elimination plans. Taylor responded,
unequivocally, that the U.S. has no plans to eliminate PK
ICBMs at this time.
CASTOR-120, HERE WE GO AGAIN
13. (S) Boryak noted that the Parties were not far apart on
Castor 120, as of JCIC-XXVI, and that this issue could be
resolved if there was sufficient goodwill. He said the issue
boiled down to two remaining points: a U.S. statement that
it would not locate Castor 120 at ICBM bases; and the U.S.
providing information on the number and location of Castor
120 stages produced.
14. (S) Boryak said that the U.S. Delegation had previously
stated that it did not currently locate Castor 120 stages at
ICBM bases. He asked a rhetorical question, if Castor 120s
were not used as ICBM stages, why not state that they would
not be located at ICBM bases? He said that it was hard for
Russia to imagine that the United States Government could not
control the production and movement of strategic arms such as
the Castor 120 stage and provide reports on its movement in
compliance with the 19th Agreed Statement. He wanted the
U.S. to provide more details on how the 19th Agreed Statement
applied to Castor 120. Boryak said that Russia found it hard
to believe that the Castor 120 was produced by a private
company for commercial use, since it was produced with the
same equipment as the PK.
15. (S) Regarding Castor 120, Taylor said that the United
States rejects any linkage of PK ICBMs with Castorv 120. He
noted that the Parties were aware of the U.S. position on
this issue and that it had not changed. He said that he
appreciated Russia's presentation and would report Russia's
comments back to Washington for consideration.
THEN THERE'S VANDENBERG
16. (S) Boryak commented on the Vandenberg silo attribution
issue by stating that the Russian position presented in
detail during Part I of JCIC-XXVII had not changed. The
Russian Delegation believed the U.S. action contradicted the
fundamental provisions of the Treaty. Boryak declared that
the U.S. offer to allow the Parties to visit the Vandenberg
SLF before June 1, 2006 would not lift Russia's concerns
about activities at the Vandenberg "Test Range." (Begin
comment: The term "test range" was interpreted. End
comment.) He concluded that Russia did not see the visit as
useful, but reserved the right to re-open this issue.
17. (S) Taylor asked whether Russia intended to keep the
visit offer on the agenda. Boryak reiterated the rejection
for such a visit as it would not be feasible or useful in
resolving their concerns.
18. (S) Shevtsov commented that certain Treaty provisions
may no longer correspond with reality, but most issues could
be resolved in the JCIC. Shevtsov suggested the offered
visit may prove useful and recommended it be studied.
19. (S) Taylor concluded by reasserting two points made
during Part I of JCIC XXVII: 1) The use of the attributed
silos to launch non-accountable items is not prohibited by
the Treaty and is, therefore, compliant; and 2) The
attributed silos have been modified, not converted per the
Treaty, and remain accountable. Boryak responded that Russia
did not interpret the Treaty on the principle "whatever is
not prohibited is allowed," and the attributed silos could be
used only for the space launch of ICBMs and SLBMs.
TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS
20. (S) Taylor raised the TIC issue by commending the
working group on its steady progress. He said he was
confident that this issue would soon be resolved and that the
Parties were leaving the session in a positive direction.
21. (S) Boryak agreed with Taylor's assessment and added
that the Parties found common ground for resolution and the
JCIC discussions clarified points not identified before.
Boryak closed the HOD portion of the meeting by reviewing the
schedule for the next day. He called for a short break
before the working group portion of the meeting convened.
RUSSIA RESPONDS TO U.S.-
PROPOSED TRIDENT RVOSI TEXT
22. (S) Fedorchenko began the working group discussions with
comments by the Russian Delegation to the U.S.-proposed
revised text provided earlier in the meeting. The Russians
removed the reference to the benchmark measurement in the
23. (S) After a short break, Mullins said that the U.S.
Delegation had narrowed down the problem to the language on
what to do if measurements differ from the benchmark by more
than 3 centimeters.
24. (S) Fedorchenko said that, hypothetically, there was a
potential to continue measuring forever if the correct
measurements were not obtained.
BUTTRICK SAVES THE DAY!
25. (S) Buttrick suggested deleting the specific language on
what to do if measurements were not within tolerance, since
the United States was confident that the inspecting Party
would not obtain two measurements that would differ by more
than 3 centimeters from the benchmark measurement. Mullins
added that the Parties should allow the inspectors and
escorts the flexibility to work out any problems.
26. (S) Fedorchenko agreed with this new proposal and
offered a change to the language in the CPS to bring it in
line with the new proposal. The Parties agreed that the U.S.
would provide a joint draft text.
27. (U) Documents exchanged.
-- U.S.-Proposed Language for the Draft Coordinated
Plenary Statement on Trident RVOSI, dated November 7, 2005.
28. (U) Participants:
Lt Col Deihl
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Fokin (Int)
29. (U) Taylor sends.