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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA2750 2005-11-10 04:03:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) RUSSIAN-HOSTED RECEPTION,

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002750 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) RUSSIAN-HOSTED RECEPTION,
NOVEMBER 8, AND NEXT SESSION DISCUSSION AT CLOSING PLENARY
MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2749 (JCIC-XXVII-046)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-033.



2. (U) Meeting Date: November 8, 2005
Event: Russian-Hosted Reception
Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

AND

Meeting Date: November 9, 2005
Event: Closing Plenary Meeting
Time: 9:30 - 10:30 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) During a Russian-hosted reception on November 8,
2005, U.S. JCIC Delegation members engaged the other Parties'
Delegation members on various topics under discussion in the
JCIC. Topics included: potential dates for the next
inspections at U.S. Navy sites; Tridents in containers; the
possibility of a Minuteman III demo; SS-25 first stage rocket
motors at the Bershet' C or E facility; SS-25
launch-associated support vehicles; RSM-56 attribution;
Ukrainian CTR issues; Belarusian comments on U.S. voting at
UN First Committee meeting; and thoughts on timing for the
next JCIC session. Specific conversations are reported below.



4. (S) At the conclusion of the closing plenary meeting on
November 9, 2005, the delegations also briefly discussed
timing for the next session of the JCIC, also reported below.
The Ukrainians suggested the session should be no shorter
than two weeks and held in May. Belarus indicated that May
was problematic. The U.S. said timing and duration should be
discussed in diplomatic channels. Russia indicated that
timing and duration should be based on substance and
prospects for resolution of issues.



--------------------------


NEXT NAVY FACILITY VISITS?


--------------------------





5. (S) Feliciano asked Fedorchenko when the Navy should
expect a visit now that the Trident II RVOSI issue has been
resolved. Fedorchenko stated that he personally plans to
visit Silverdale in one week. (Begin comment: This implies
the week of November 14, 2005, or possibly November 21, 2005.
End comment.) Fedorchenko also stated his deputy, Captain
Kuzmin, or an associate would visit Kings Bay shortly
thereafter suggesting "then we can all start the new year
with a clear mind."



--------------------------


TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS


--------------------------





6. (S) Feliciano asked Fedorchenko what, in his mind, would
make him happy with respect to the Trident II Loading Tubes.
Feliciano also asked whether Fedorchenko really wanted to be
able to request the removal of a Trident I and Trident II
from the containers within the same Treaty year. Fedorchenko
stated "as I've told you before, if the U.S. would just make
a statement in the agreement to the effect that Trident I is
in the process of being decommissioned and the U.S. would
like to focus on Trident II, then we would be fine with it."
Fedorchenko emphasized, "we know darn well that the U.S. will
no longer deploy Trident I and we know it will take some time
to eliminate all of them. So the U.S. should make a similar
statement as it did with the Trident II RVOSI issue. That is
to say, the U.S. wanted to focus on the Trident II RVOSI
because the Trident I was no longer being deployed."


--------------------------


MINUTEMAN III DEMO?


--------------------------





7. (S) Fedorchenko mentioned to Deihl and Feliciano that
Russia was still not happy with Minuteman III RVOSI
procedures, in that Russian inspectors remained concerned
that they cannot confirm that there are no RVs under the
"skirt" area of the missile during viewing. He stated that a
demonstration should be conducted similar to Trident to ease
Russian concerns. He further stated that the verification
could be done more effectively if the front section was
positioned horizontally so inspectors could see all the way
around it. Fedorchenko did not state that Russia would make
this an issue in the future.



--------------------------


SS-25 FIRST STAGE
ROCKET MOTORS AT BERSHET'
C OR E FACILITY


--------------------------





8. (S) Kuehne and Buttrick thanked Fedorchenko for the
clarifications provided by the Russian Delegation on the
issues resulting from the August 2005 data update inspection
at the Bershet' Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Facility.
Fedorchenko stated that Russia was still working on how to
resolve the issue related to permitting U.S. inspectors to
view and measure the containers for SS-25 first-stage rocket
motors that were stored within the boundaries of the Bershet'
C or E Facility while awaiting propellant removal. Kuehne
and Buttrick suggested, that if Russia could remove the SS-25
first-stage containers from within the boundary of the site
diagram, the problem would be solved. Kuehne said that,
since the SS-25 first stages were attributed to the Votkinsk
C or E Facility, the Treaty permits these SS-25 first-stage
motors to be outside the boundaries of a declared facility
because the stages would be at an allowed location, other
than the C or E Facility, awaiting propellant removal.
Fedorchenko said that he understood, but since there are a
limited number of secure and safe buildings to store rocket
motors at Bershet', they must also store the SS-25 ICBM
containers in the same buildings with SS-24 ICBMs that are
attributed to Bershet'. Fedorchenko said that if the United
States could provide funds for a new building, Kuehne and
Buttrick's suggestion would work, but Russia has limited
funds. Therefore, Russia must find alternative solutions to
address this problem during future data update inspections at
Bershet'.



--------------------------


SS-25 LAUNCH ASSOCIATED
SUPPORT VEHICLES


--------------------------





9. (S) Buttrick stated to Fedorchenko that he personally
hoped that Russia would reconsider withdrawing its proposal
for placing a distinguishing mark on declared SS-25
launch-associated support vehicles (LASVs). Buttrick said
that the U.S. and Russian Delegations had worked hard on the
issue for several years and that it was his view that this
issue was worth pursuing further. Buttrick said that there
were some positive outcomes as a result of Russia's proposal;
Russia now declares LASVs during pre-inspection briefings.
Fedorchenko agreed, but stated that U.S. inspector comments
during recent data update inspections had given reason for
Russia's leadership to reconsider the utility of continuing
to place marks on LASVs, if U.S. inspectors continued to make
the same comments in inspection reports that all SS-25 LASVs
were not being declared at the bases. Fedorchenko stated
emphatically that Russia was declaring all of the SS-25 LASVs
during inspections. He said that Russia could not understand
why the U.S. did not believe that all SS-25 LASVs were being
declared since they had placed the distinguishing mark on all
of those vehicles that provide direct support for ICBM
launches. Buttrick said he had discussed this issue with
other members of the U.S. Delegation and that the Delegation
plans to review this issue in Washington as soon as it
returns. In the meantime, Buttrick said that he hoped the
Parties could continue to work the issue, and that it was
premature to "start over" on this issue. Fedorchenko said
that he had also discussed this issue with the Russian
Delegation. As a result of the discussion, they had sent a
letter back to Moscow informing the Russian leadership that
the United States was willing to continue to work the
proposal. Fedorchenko stated that he was confident that
Russia would continue to place the distinguishing marks on
the LASVs, but it was incumbent upon the United States to
address the issue by informing its inspectors not to make the
same write-up in the inspection reports. Buttrick asked
Fedorchenko, if the U.S. were to accept the approach to the
LASVs, would Russia replace the paper distinguishing marks on
the LASVs with a mark that would be more permanent.
Fedorchenko said that it was Russia's intention to make the
marks more permanent, but the next steps and the decision for
Russia to move forward would be based on a positive U.S.
response to the approach.



--------------------------


RYZHKOV COMMENTS ON TRIDENT
ISSUES,RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND
RUSSIA'S SS-25 DEMO PROPOSAL


--------------------------





10. (S) Taylor welcomed Ryzhkov to the work of the JCIC,
saying it seemed that when he arrived solutions to problems
were not far behind. Ryzhkov demurred, saying that the
ground work had been laid and he happened on the scene by
chance. He said it had been a protracted struggle in the
Russian interagency coming to closure on the Trident RVOSI
and Trident in Containers issues and reason had won out on
the RVOSI issue. As for the container issue, it was his hope
that it could be resolved at the next session. When
questioned about the attribution and throw-weight data for
the RSM-56 SLBM, Ryzhkov said that the necessary information
was available but it too was caught up in an interagency
struggle. However, he felt certain that the necessary data
would be provided by Christmas. Taylor said that the RVOSI
proposal by Russia was well-received by the U.S. Delegation
and he hoped that a formal response on Russia's proposal
would be forthcoming soon. Ryzhkov said that the proposal
was a radical one and one that many in the Russian
interagency had objected too. It was based on the work done
by the United States for the Trident RVOSI and, remembering
Dr. Look's comment that sometimes the Parties must look at
problems from many viewpoints and in relation to other
issues, Russia had adopted this concept. Ryzhkov said he was
glad the two Parties were beginning to work more
cooperatively and perhaps the U.S. could focus on ways to
resolve Russia's concerns for MM III RVOSIs next.



--------------------------


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
ON RUSSIA'S SS-25
DEMONSTRATION PROPOSAL


--------------------------





11. (S) Venevtsov asked Taylor whether there was anything in
the SS-25 RVOSI proposal that the U.S. had questions about.
Taylor said that the U.S. Delegation was pleased with the
initiative Russia had shown in the proposal and would work to
get a U.S. response as quickly as possible once he returned
to Washington. Questions that the Delegation had raised
involved how the measurements taken during the demonstration
would be applied to later RVOSIs. Additionally, measurements
of the rings, their placement during the demonstration, and
measurements of the positions of the rings were all
important. Taylor asked Boryak whether he had witnessed the
demonstration. Boryak said that he had not, since the demo
was a virtual demonstration at this point. Details of the
procedures were still being worked out. Taylor asked how
long it would take before the demo was ready to be conducted.
Boryak said that, after the U.S. indicated it would accept
the offer to attend the demo, it would be approximately 30
days.



--------------------------


UKRAINIAN ISSUES REVISITED


--------------------------





12. (S) Shevtsov said that he appreciated the opportunity to
hold bilateral discussions and hoped that Buttrick would
relay the information from the meeting held that afternoon
(REFTEL). Taylor acknowledged that indeed Buttrick had
informed him of the meeting. Taylor emphasized that he
appreciated Ukraine's concerns, however, the JCIC was not the
appropriate forum for discussion of the CTR issues that
Shevtsov had raised. However, the U.S. Delegation would see
that the information was provided to the Department of
Defense and the CTR office. Shevtsov said he felt that the
Commission should return to the old way of doing business,
with having two sessions a year rather than two parts to a
session. They should be longer so that the Parties could
have an effective dialogue on the issues. With the short
sessions, Ukraine could only present its proposal on
Pavlograd and the United States did not have an opportunity
to respond. Taylor reminded Shevtsov that, when the Parties
use the intersessional period to the maximum, Parties were
prepared to respond. As for the issue that Ukraine had
placed on the agenda, there had been no such communication as
to the proposal nor to the details of the issue. Thus, the
U.S. could not be expected to respond this session.



--------------------------


MASTERKOV ASKS
ABOUT JCIC-XXVIII


--------------------------





13. (S) Masterkov asked Taylor when he thought the next
session should be held. Taylor said that Washington had not
considered any dates at this point. The work of the
just-concluded session would first be analyzed and then
discussions during the intersession would dictate the timing,
agenda and duration of the next session.



--------------------------


BELARUS DISSATISFACTION
WITH U.S.VOTING AT UN
FIRST COMMITTEE MEETING


--------------------------




14. (S) Baichorov stated to Mitchner and Deihl that he had
just returned from New York where he attended the UN First
Committee (Disarmament and International Security) meetings.
He mentioned that Conference on Disarmament (CD) Ambassador
Sanders was the U.S. representative. He expressed
frustration with the United States, noting that, with the
exception of the United States, all countries, including the
United States' "very best allies England and France,"
approved a Belarus proposal to ban all new types of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems. Deihl asked
why he felt the United States did not support the agreement.
He replied that Sanders had stated that the United States had
no information on any development of new systems or types of
WMD at this time and that this type of agreement was
unnecessary.



--------------------------


CLOSING PLENARY DISCUSSION
OF DATES FOR NEXT SESSION


--------------------------





15. (S) At the conclusion of the closing plenary meeting on
November 9, 2005, the delegations briefly discussed plans for
the next session of the JCIC. Shevtsov proposed that the
Parties return to two sessions per year, two weeks each in
May and October. Baichorov responded that next May does not
appear to be a good month for the JCIC, as there are already
other negotiations planned for that time that will require
the presence of some of the Parties' delegation members,
including heads of delegation. Baychorov suggested April may
be better. Taylor stated that the timing, duration and
agenda of future sessions is an issue more appropriate for
the intersessional dialogue. Boryak then concluded that
questions of timing and duration should be based on the
substance of the issues to be addressed and the prospects for
resolution of outstanding issues. He agreed that the Parties
should consider these questions during the intersession and
communicate through diplomatic channels.



16. (U) Taylor sends.
Cassel