Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA2738
2005-11-09 09:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S.

Tags:  PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002738 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO/N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S.
CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2735 (JCIC-XXVII-049)

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002738

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO/N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S.
CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2735 (JCIC-XXVII-049)


1. This is JCIC-XXVII-047.


2. At paragraph 3 is the text of the Unclassified Attachment
to the U.S. closing plenary statement -- Coordinated Plenary
Statement on Reentry Vehicle Inspections of Trident II SLBMs
-- that was made at the closing plenary meeting of the
Twenty-seventh Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission (JCIC),held at the Russian Mission
on November 9, 2005. Translations of statements made by the
other Parties will be sent Septel.


3. Begin text:

UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT
U.S. CLOSING PLENARY
JCIC-XXVII

November 9, 2005

Coordinated Plenary Statement on Reentry Vehicle
Inspections of Trident II SLBMs

The United States of America reaffirms that the front
sections of Trident II SLBMs belonging to the United States
of America are equipped with no more than eight reentry
vehicles and that the United States of America will not equip
them with more than eight reentry vehicles during the term of
the START Treaty.

The United States of America notes that in order to
resolve concerns regarding confirmation that the Trident II
SLBM is not deployed with more reentry vehicles than its
attributed number of warheads, the United States of America
conducted a demonstration in connection with reentry vehicle
inspections of Trident II missiles at the submarine base,
Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia, on
February 7-9, 2005 (hereinafter - the demonstration).

The United States of America will supplement existing
procedures for conducting Trident II reentry vehicle
inspections with procedures for using the measuring device
demonstrated. These procedures are designed to confirm that

the cover used during Trident II reentry vehicle inspections
is installed on the front section of the missile contained in
the SLBM launcher in the same manner as was observed during
the demonstration:


1. After all of the inspectors complete their 15
minutes of viewing of the installed cover used during Trident
II reentry vehicle inspections, the Inspection Team Leader,
at the request of the Escort Team Leader, designates from
among the inspection team members two measurement groups
consisting of two inspectors each. When requested by the
in-country escort, each group in turn moves to the temporary
structure specially intended for preparing the front section
for the viewing of the SLBM launcher, where it is given the
opportunity to examine the measuring device used during
Trident II reentry vehicle inspections. Each group in turn
observes as facility personnel take one measurement per group
to determine the distance from the upper point of the hard
cover to the upper point of the SLBM third stage motor, as
was done during the demonstration.


2. If each of the two measurements differs by no more
than three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, the
two measurements are averaged to determine the distance from
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the
SLBM third stage motor. In this regard, as stated by the
United States of America during the demonstration, the
benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A SLBM
configuration is 23 centimeters, and the benchmark
measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM configuration is 24
centimeters.


3. The measurements taken and the average obtained for
the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the
upper point of the SLBM third stage motor are recorded in the
Inspection Report.
Provided that the average value for the distance from
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the
SLBM third stage motor, obtained on the basis of the
measurements taken using the aforementioned device, does not
differ from the benchmark measurement by more than three
centimeters, the inspecting Party will:


1. Insert an asterisk ("*") as a note instead of a
number in Section II of the Inspection Report, in the column
"Confirmed by inspecting Party" and indicate on that page
that the asterisk refers to the relevant note in Section IV
of the Inspection Report.


2. Include the following as a note in Section IV of the
Inspection Report:

"In addition to the reentry vehicle inspection
procedures, the inspected Party used the measuring device
demonstrated earlier during the demonstration on February
7-9, 2005, at the Kings Bay submarine base, Georgia. The
measurement results specified in this report show that the
cover used during the inspection was installed on the missile
front section in the same manner as was observed during the
demonstration.

"Thus, it has been indirectly confirmed, with the
assistance of the measuring device demonstrated during the
February 7-9, 2005, demonstration, that the front section of
the inspected SLBM contains no more than eight reentry
vehicles."

End text.


4. Taylor sends.
Moley