Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA2734
2005-11-09 07:35:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON

Tags:  PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002734 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED SS-25 RVOSI PROCEDURES AND NEW VEHICLES AT
SS-25 BASES, NOVEMBER 3, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2690 (JCIC-XXVII-035)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002734

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED SS-25 RVOSI PROCEDURES AND NEW VEHICLES AT
SS-25 BASES, NOVEMBER 3, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2690 (JCIC-XXVII-035)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-041.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 3, 2005
Time: 11:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (U) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on November 3, 2005, to discuss the Russian-proposed
SS-25 road-mobile ICBM RV on-site inspection (RVOSI)
demonstration, and the new vehicles which the Russian
Federation informally announced will soon be at SS-25
road-mobile ICBM bases. All Parties except Kazakhstan were
represented.


4. (S) On the Russian-proposed RVOSI demonstration, the U.S.
Delegation stressed the need for relevance between the
demonstration and future inspections. The Russian Delegation
said that, during the demonstration, measurements would be
made of the outer diameter of two rings, and the inner
diameter of the aft ring. The inner diameter of the forward
ring will be covered. U.S. inspectors would be permitted to
make these same measurements during follow-on RVOSIs.
Moreover, it would be clear where the aft ring was attached
to the front section. The U.S. Delegation also asked a
series of questions related to the logistics of the
demonstration as well as questions on the status of
participants. The Russian Delegation suggested the team
composition should be similar to an inspection team. The
Russian Delegation clarified that they would select the base
for the demonstration, but the U.S. team would select the re

stricted area as well as the launcher.


5. (S) With respect to the new vehicles at SS-25 bases, the
U.S. Delegation asked how the United States would distinguish
these vehicles from launchers during cooperative measures.
The Russian Delegation acknowledged that answers to questions
related to the number of vehicles and where they would be
located were still unknown and, if problems arose, the issue
could be discussed in the JCIC. These vehicles were .78
meters shorter than SS-25 launchers, had the jack points cut
off and there was no missile launch canister. They would
begin appearing in the Spring of 2006.

--------------
SS-25 RVOSI DEMONSTRATION
MODELED AFTER TRIDENT
DEMONSTRATION
--------------


6. (S) At a working group meeting at the Russian Mission on
November 3, 2005, Buttrick began the meeting by stating that
it was obvious that a great deal of work had been done in
Moscow and at the road-mobile ICBM bases. He explained that
the U.S. Delegation needed to ask some clarifying questions
concerning the presentation made by the Russian Delegation at
a previous meeting (REFTEL). Buttrick noted Russia's
explanation that the demonstration was modeled after the
Trident RVOSI demonstration and stated that demonstrations
appeared to go a long way towards helping to resolve issues
and hopefully will. Buttrick emphasized that the Trident
RVOSI demonstration proved the relevance between the
demonstration and what would be seen by inspectors in the
course of future RV inspections.

--------------
WHAT MEASUREMENTS
WILL BE PERMITTED?
--------------

7. (S) Buttrick asked whether U.S. inspectors on SS-25
RVOSIs would be permitted to make the same measurements of
the diameters of the RV cover's forward and aft attachment
rings that were made during the demonstration to confirm that
the rings are the same size as those that would be used in
the demonstration. He also asked Fedorchenko to explain
exactly which measurements would be made during the
demonstration. Fedorchenko explained that, after observers
viewed the front section with the standard RVOSI cover,
Russian escorts would remove the forward and aft rings from
the front section and place them on the ground one on top of
the other. He stated that it would be obvious that the rings
have the same outer diameter. Then measurements, as
described in the Russian briefing, would be made.
Measurements would be made of the outer diameters of the
attachment rings. Observers would also ascertain visually
that the spokes of the forward attachment ring connecting the
aft ring to the forward ring are longer than the spokes of
the aft attachment ring connecting the aft ring to the
forward ring. Measurements would be taken of the inner
diameter of the aft ring; however, the inner diameter of the
forward ring would be covered. Buttrick asked whether the
length of the spokes would be provided. Fedorchenko
responded that the length of the spokes could be determined
by subtracting the inner diameter from the outer diameter.
Buttrick asked whether measurements would be made in the
second phase of the demonstration of the sock-like cover on
the front section, as was done during the first phase with
the large, barrel-shaped RVOSI cover. Fedorchenko replied
that the procedure in the briefing is an additional
procedure. The current procedure calls for measurement of
the assembled soft cover. The length that will be measured
is 3.2 meters.

--------------
DOES THE DEMONSTRATION
TRANSLATE INTO IMPROVED
INSPECTOR CONFIDENCE?
--------------


8. (S) Buttrick stated that what was needed for an effective
demonstration was to provide the observers with facts from
the demonstration that could be used by inspectors during
subsequent RVOSIs to ensure that there were no more than the
attributed number of RVs on the SS-25 ICBMs. For example,
during the Trident RVOSI demonstration, the U.S. demonstrated
that the Trident RVOSI hardcover was placed on the missile
the same way during each RVOSI. This was the same cover that
inspectors see at each RVOSI. Russian inspectors were
allowed to measure any dimension of the hardcover. During
the Trident demonstration, the RVOSI hardcover was lowered
onto the missile and showed observers that there was a
consistent distance between the top of the cover's spoke and
the top of the third-stage rocket motor. Buttrick followed
this description by asking Fedorchenko how Russia will prove
that the SS-25 RV cover would be placed on the missile in the
same configuration during every subsequent RVOSI, and whether
escorts would be able to provide proof that the cover was
being presented for inspection the same way each time.
Fedorchenko differentiated SS-25 RVOSIs from Trident RVOSIs,
in that Russia had allowed RV soft cover measurements which
were not required by the Treaty. He stated that U.S.
inspectors will be permitted to measure the aft ring's inner
diameter and this would provide inspectors with the assurance
that this is the same sized ring and that it is mounted in
the same manner as in the demonstration. He further stated
that all RVs have the same conical shape and that, when the
cover goes on an RV, it fits in the same place as in the
demonstration. He again invited the United States to the
demonstration. Singer asked Fedorchenko whether inspectors
will also be able to measure the inner diameter of the aft
ring during an RVOSI. Fedorchenko assured the U.S.
Delegation that all measurements done during the
demonstration will be available during an SS-25 RVOSI.
Singer asked whether inspectors would be given the
opportunity to measure the distance between the aft and
forward attachment rings while the cover was on the missile.
Fedorchenko replied that they did not envision that.

--------------
COMPOSITION OF THE
OBSERVATION TEAM
--------------


9. (S) Smith began a series of questions about the specifics
of the observation team. He asked what the diplomatic status
of the U.S. observation team would be while in Russia. Smith
recalled that, during the demonstration of Russia's new
radiation detection equipment (RDE) in Moscow, the U.S.
observation team was comprised of various individuals who
were not on the Treaty's inspector list. Fedorchenko
responded by asking whether the United States wanted to
include people who were not on the inspector list. Smith
explained that the United States would like to have the
flexibility to build the team based on personnel
availability. Fedorchenko responded that these were two
different kinds of demonstrations. The RDE demonstration was
in Moscow, not at a Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) base.
Smith continued by asking why Russia was limiting the number
of observers to ten individuals, stating that the United
States envisioned a mix of expertise on the observation team,
such as linguists, individuals with inspection experience, as
well as members of the JCIC Delegation. Fedorchenko replied
by asking how many individuals the United States wanted to
have on the team. Smith explained that it would be more
useful to have about 15 observers. Fedorchenko responded
that space limitations in the demonstration building would be
the same, and that the figure of ten observers, to include
linguists, was from the Treaty. To gain further
clarification on the planned status of observers, Smith asked
whether the observers would be afforded the same privileges
as inspectors, such as diplomatic status and emergency
medical care. Fedorchenko responded that this is why Russia
would prefer observers to be on the inspector list and have
START visas. He stated that he wanted to make the
demonstration as close as possible to the inspection regime.
The only difference was the proposal for the United States to
provide notification of the observation team's arrival with a
NRRC Notification Format 144 instead of a Format 116 as is
the requirement for notification of inspection team arrivals.
He explained that using the Format 144 would not reduce the
United State's inspection quota. He stated that for the
Russian bases the demonstration would be like an inspection,
and for Russia's financial accounting the demonstration would
also be treated like an inspection. He asserted that that
only the Russian military leadership was aware of the
demonstration, not the SRF. Buttrick asked whether other
Parties would be present during the demonstration.
Fedorchenko responded that he did not find it necessary,
stating the other Parties did not enjoy the right to
inspections at Russian bases.

--------------
WHEN AND WHERE?
--------------


10. (S) Buttrick stated that he understood from the briefing
that the selection of the demonstration's base would be based
on the time of year; however, for U.S. planning purposes, he
wanted to know whether the Russian Federation had an
approximate date for the demonstration to take place.
Fedorchenko responded by reminding the delegation that the
Trident RVOSI demonstration was proposed in 2000 and was only
conducted this year. However, he said that Russia was ready
to conduct the demonstration in the near future. He stated
that he needed first to view the demonstration himself and
report the results to his leadership who would make the
decision. He stated that his leaders were skeptical so there
was no date set and it would depend on how soon the United
States accepts the demonstration proposal. Fedorchenko
stated that the point of entry (POE) would be Moscow to
facilitate the processing of the demonstration observers;
adding the base selection would depend on the SRF.

--------------
HOW LONG?
--------------


11. (S) Buttrick stated he understood that the duration of
the visit in Russia would depend on the base and the travel
time to the base, however, how long would the demonstration
last? Fedorchenko reiterated that the demonstration had two
phases. He said that RVOSIs at road-mobile bases go quickly,
but there will be an additional phase for the demonstration
and it would require preparation. He stated that he was not
sure how long the preparation would take, but possibly 10-16
additional hours for base personnel. He said that the team
would probably be at the base for two days. Buttrick
verified with Fedorchenko that the United States would select
the re stricted area from within the base chosen by the
Russian Federation.

--------------
THE PROCESS
--------------


12. (S) Fortier asked whether observers would have
continuous observation of the launcher during preparation for
phase two of the demonstration as is done during a RVOSI. He
noted that inspectors during RVOSIs were normally located at
the rear of the launcher. Fedorchenko stated that all
operations will be conducted under observation of the U.S.
team. Fortier asked Fedorchenko to clarify whether the
observation is for the duration of the demonstration.
Fedorchenko responded that they would conduct all actions as
in a normal inspection. Responding to this statement,
Fortier asked whether the sock-like device to be used during
the second phase would be available for inspection also.
Fedorchenko replied that it would be in the room, but there
was no need to examine it.
--------------
KARUSEL RDE REVISITED
--------------

13. (S) Rumohr remarked that the Russian Federation removed
their "poke" proposal from the table, but kept open the
Karusel RDE as a proposal. He asked whether the Russians saw
the RDE as being a confidence-building proposal to augment
the new RVOSI proposal. The United States was not clear what
the value added would be from RDE. Fedorchenko responded
that many in the Russian Federation believe it is the best
method and should be used. He added that it detects the
number of RVs remotely, is highly precise, and simplifies
RVOSIs. He stated that he believed it has a bright future.
Buttrick thanked him for the explanation, saying it was
important that the U.S. Delegation understood the new RVOSI
proposal clearly in order to accurately characterize it to
Washington.

--------------
UKRAINE'S VIEWS
--------------


14. (S) Shevtsov stated that he believed the demonstration
would be very useful and worth accepting without prejudice,
as was the case with the Trident Demonstration. He said that
having two or three additional observers on the team was not
a problem. As for the other Parties' participation, he said
they needed to discuss this because a JCIC document may be
produced as a result of the demonstration. Finally, Shevtsov
asserted that the Karusel RDE is a universal approach for
counting RVs.

--------------
THE NEXT STEP
--------------


15. (S) Following up on Shevtsov's question, during the
break between issue discussions, Kottmyer asked Fedorchenko
whether the Russian Federation thought that the proposal
should be recorded in some fashion, if the Parties ultimately
decided that it would resolve the issue. Fedorchenko replied
that the Parties could consider recording it in a coordinated
plenary statement, as in the case of the Trident RVOSI issue.

--------------
NEW VEHICLES AT SS-25
ROAD-MOBILE ICBM BASES
--------------


16. (S) Buttrick began discussions regarding the information
Russia presented at the November 1, 2005 Heads of Delegation
(HOD) meeting on new vehicles that will appear at SS-25
road-mobile ICBM bases (REFTEL). Buttrick said that the
United States appreciated the goodwill statement Russia
provided on this issue, and acknowledged the U.S.
understanding that the new vehicles Russia referred to would
be former SS-25 ICBM road-mobile launchers that had been
eliminated in accordance with the Treaty and were no longer
accountable. (Begin comment: Per REFTEL, these vehicles
will be used by Russia to ensure the safety and security of
roads to be transited by SS-25 road-mobile ICBM launchers.
End comment.)


17. (S) Buttrick asked how many vehicles Russia planned to
have at each SS-25 road-mobile ICBM base, how many total
vehicles Russia planned to use, and where Russia planned to
locate these vehicles within the re stricted areas of
road-mobile ICBM bases. Fedorchenko replied that he did not
know the specific plans for the provision of these vehicles
to Russian bases. He stated that the vehicles exist already
at the Conversion or Elimination Facility at Piban'shur and
would be sent to SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases in early 2006.
However, he stated that the Russian Delegation did not know
at this time exactly where they would be sent and which re
stricted areas they would be located in. Buttrick responded
that it would be helpful if Russia provided that information
in the future.


18. (S) Buttrick questioned why the Russian Delegation
stated, in its November 1, 2005 presentation of this issue,
that it would be difficult to identify these vehicles using
national technical means (NTM). Buttrick further asked how
the United States would distinguish these vehicles from SS-25
road-mobile launchers, particularly during cooperative
measures when launchers were removed from their fixed
structures.


19. (S) Fedorchenko responded that the issue would be
discussed in the JCIC if there proved to be a problem.
Regarding potential difficulties arising from the NTM ability
to distinguish these vehicles, Fedorchenko commented that he
was not aware of U.S. NTM capability, so the previous comment
about it potentially being a problem was a guess. He stated
that if, during the course of an inspection, U.S. inspectors
found such a vehicle they could take photographs to help
address potential problems. He noted that the vehicles had
certain features that distinguished them from SS-25
road-mobile launchers:

-- The vehicles are 78 centimeters shorter;

-- The jack points have been cut off;

-- There is no missile canister; and

-- There are concrete blocks instead of a launcher
mechanism.

Fedorchenko noted that he did not know the shape of the
concrete blocks, and suggested the blocks might be loaded at
the ICBM bases.


20. (S) Buttrick asked for clarification as to when Russia
would begin using these vehicles, to which Fedorchenko
replied "Spring of 2006." Buttrick asked whether the
vehicles would be based on Version A launchers, Version B
launchers, or both. Fedorchenko replied that he did not know
and it would not make a difference; Russia probably would use
whichever vehicles worked, and since the launchers were
considered eliminated anyway, it did not matter. Buttrick
thanked the Russian Delegation again for the information and
stated he would convey the information to Washington for
review.


21. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


22. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Maj Mitchner
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Col Yegorov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Kashirin
Col Razumov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Mezhennyy
Lt Col Novikov
Col Osetrov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Stefanovich
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Venevtsov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran


23. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley