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05GENEVA2712 2005-11-08 06:02:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002712 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW PAVLOGRAD PRODUCTION
FACILITY FROM THE LIST OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO
SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS AND UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
THE FUNCTION OF THE PAVLOGRAD CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION
FACILITY, NOVEMBER 2, 2005


Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-038.



2. (U) Meeting Date: November 2, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) At a heads of delegation (HOD) meeting, held at the
U.S. Mission on November 2 at which all Parties were
represented, the Ukrainian Delegation proposed to remove the
Pavlograd ICBM Production Facility from the list of
facilities subject to suspect-site inspections (SSI). They
also proposed to change the function of the Pavlograd
Conversion or Elimination Facility to that of a solid rocket
motor storage facility and remove it from inspectability.
The U.S. Delegation said that Washington would study the
proposal. Other Parties received the statements without
initial comment.



--------------------------


PAVLOGRAD SSI


--------------------------





4. (S) At a heads of delegation meeting at the U.S. Mission
on November 2, 2005, Shevtsov said Ukraine proposed that the
Parties consider a draft JCIC Agreement to remove the
Pavlograd ICBM Production Facility from the list of
facilities subject to SSI (text follows below). Shevtsov,
reading from a prepared paper, stated that SS-24 first-stage
solid rocket motors (SRM) without nozzles, which remained
after the first phase of phased elimination, were located at
the facility. Recognizing that, in accordance with paragraph
10 of Article IV of the Treaty, such SRMs for first stages of
mobile ICBMs may be stored only in production, storage, and
testing locations, he stated that the SS-24 first stages
would be moved to the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination
Facility, where they would be stored and the solid propellant
would be removed. Upon this transfer, he noted that there
would be no more items of inspection at the Pavlograd
Production Facility, which would permit the removal of the
site from the list of facilities subject to SSI as listed in
paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Ukrainian Memorandum of
Understanding. He noted that JCIC Agreement Number 51 on
removing Bershet' from the list of Russian facilities subject
to SSI had great influence on the creation of the Ukrainian
proposal. Taylor said Ukraine's proposal would be conveyed
to Washington for review. All other Parties took account of
the proposal without initial comment.



5. (S) Begin text (Ukrainian Non-Paper on the Removal of the
Pavlograd Facility Subject to SSI from the List of Facilities
Subject to SSI):


Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII
Non-paper of the
Ukrainian Side
November 2, 2005
Removal of the Pavlograd Facility Subject to
Suspect-Site Inspections from the List of
Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections

The Ukrainian side, on the basis of the provisions of
paragraph 5 of Section VIII of the Inspection Protocol, plans
in the immediate future to remove the Pavlograd Production
Facility (the Pavlograd Machine Plant) from the list of
facilities subject to suspect-site inspections.

At present the SS-24 ICBM solid rocket motors (SRMs)
without nozzles attached, which remained after the
elimination of ICBMs under the first phase of their
elimination in accordance with the provisions of JCIC Joint
Statement No. 34 on Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located
in Ukraine, are in storage at this facility.

The provisions of paragraph 10 of Article IV of the
Treaty specify that each of the Parties to the Treaty may
locate solid rocket motors (SRMs) for first stages of ICBMs
for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where
production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and
at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of
ICBMs.

Proceeding from the requirements of this article of the
Treaty, SRMs of ICBM first stages may be located at a
production facility; however, in connection with the
necessity for removing solid fuel from the cases of rocket
motors, the SRMs of the first stages will be transferred in
the immediate future to the Pavlograd Chemical Plant (a
portion of whose territory has been declared an "ICBM
conversion or elimination facility"), which radically changes
the situation at this facility. This means that at the
Pavlograd Production Facility there will no longer be items
of inspection, as defined in paragraph 20(a) of Section VI of
the Inspection Protocol.

In addition, the Ukrainian side is attentive to the fact
that for about 15 years there has been no production of ICBMs
for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stages of such
ICBMs at this facility.

Since January 1995, the Pavlograd Machine Plant has been
subject to the Treaty's inspection regime. Having conducted
numerous inspections at that particular enterprise over time,
the U.S. side has had the opportunity to ascertain that at
that enterprise there is no covert assembly of ICBMs for
mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of the first
stages of such ICBMs.

Attention should also be drawn to the fact that since
December 2001, the U.S. side has not conducted a suspect-site
inspection at the given facility, which testifies to the
absence of any concerns on the part of the U.S. side in terms
of the Ukrainian side's compliance with Treaty obligations in
regard to the given facility.

The Ukrainian side has prepared a draft of an
appropriate JCIC Agreement ("Removal of the Pavlograd
Facility Subject to Suspect-site Inspections from the List of
Facilities Subject to Suspect-site Inspections") which will
be handed over to the delegations at today's meeting.
While developing this document, the Ukrainian side used
as a prototype an analogous agreement regarding the Russian
"Bershet'" facility, which was signed during the first part
of the current session.

It is important for us at today's meeting to hear the
preliminary thoughts of the other Parties about this issue in
order to coordinate our subsequent actions in this area.

End text.



6. (S) Begin text (Ukrainian-Proposed Draft Text of JCIC
Agreement):

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII
Draft Proposed
by the Ukrainian Side
November 2, 2005

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
AGREEMENT NUMBER BLANK
RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION
AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
OF JULY 31, 1991

REMOVAL OF THE PAVLOGRAD FACILITY SUBJECT TO
SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS FROM THE LIST OF
FACILITIES SUBJECT TO SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS

The Government of the United States of America, the
Government of the Republic of Belarus, the Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Russian
Federation, and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,

In accordance with the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Acting pursuant to the authority contained in paragraph
5 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspections and
Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The Pavlograd Facility Subject to Suspect-Site
Inspections shall be removed from the list of facilities
contained in subparagraph 12(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum
of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base
Relating to the Treaty.

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its
signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty
remains in force.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly
authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this
Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on (BLANK), 2005, in five copies, each in
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE

End text.



--------------------------


PAVLOGRAD C OR E FACILITY


--------------------------





7. (S) Shevtsov, reading from a prepared paper, said that
Ukraine proposed to change the function of the Pavlograd
Conversion or Elimination Facility to that of an SRM storage
facility (text follows below). Noting that
partially-eliminated SS-24 SRMs will be stored there,
Shevtsov explained that the Treaty did not provide for the
storage of SRMs at conversion or elimination facilities. He
argued that, based on the fact that "storage facility(ies)
for solid rocket motors" are not listed in paragraph 5 of
Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, such facilities are
not subject to data update or new facility inspections under
the Treaty. He said that the change in function would occur
five days after Ukraine issued a NRRC notification. After
the solid propellant has been removed from the motor cases by
hydro-mining at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, Ukraine intends
to declare a new Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination facility
for the second stage of the phased elimination process.
Taylor said the proposal will be sent to Washington for
further study. All other Parties took account of the
statement without initial comment.



8. (S) Begin text (Ukrainian Non-Paper on Changing the
Function of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility):

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII
Non-Paper of the
Ukrainian Side
November 2, 2005

On Changing the Function of the Pavlograd
Conversion or Elimination Facility

As our colleagues are aware, the elimination of SS-24
ICBMs is being carried out by the Ukrainian side in
accordance with JCIC Joint Statement No. 34 on Phased
Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located in Ukraine.

At present all the tasks of the first phase of
elimination of Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs have been performed in
full. We now have to implement the final operation to
eliminate the SRM cases after removing the solid rocket fuel
from them.

Despite the fact that the U.S. cut off funding for this
project, preparations for the second phase of elimination of
SS-24 ICBMs are proceeding successfully. In June 2005 the
process of actually washing out the solid rocket fuel began,
using the water washout method from standard ICBM motors at a
pilot unit.

Taking into account the foregoing, there exists an
opportunity to make certain adjustments to the function of
the facilities and simplify the situation at the Pavlograd
facilities.

In this context the Ukrainian side intends in the near
future to change the function of the Pavlograd Conversion or
Elimination Facility to the Pavlograd Storage Facility for
Solid Rocket Motors.

Despite the fact that in accordance with the provisions
of JCIC Joint Statement No. 17 on Changes in the Function of
a Facility, each Treaty Party has the right to change the
function of any facility declared in the MOU data, the
Ukrainian side considered it necessary, on a preliminary
basis, to provide the delegations with information on this
issue.

This was due to the fact that there are certain special
features for the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility
(within the boundaries pursuant to JCIC Joint Statement No.
S-20 on Changes to the Boundary of the Pavlograd Conversion
or Elimination Facility).

Solid rocket motors (SRMs) of SS-24 ICBMs without
nozzles attached, which remained after the elimination of
ICBMs under the first phase of their elimination in
accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned JCIC
Joint Statement No. 34, are in storage at the Pavlograd
Conversion or Elimination Facility (PCP (Pavlograd Chemical
Plant)).

In accordance with paragraph 107 (103) of the
Definitions Annex, the term "solid rocket motor" means that
part of a stage that consists of the case filled with solid
fuel.

The provisions of paragraph 10 of Article IV of the
Treaty specify that each Treaty Party may locate SRMs for
first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at
locations where production and storage, or testing of such
motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for
mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Such a category of facilities is provided for in the
Treaty and is specified in paragraph 5 of Annex I to the
Treaty's Memorandum of Understanding. The Ukrainian side
believes that the Pavlograd Chemical Plant falls into the
category of an SRM storage facility.

Thus, based on the requirements of the aforementioned
article of the Treaty, as we understand it, SRMs of ICBM
first stages may not be located at conversion or elimination
facilities. Only the rocket motor cases that remained after
the solid rocket fuel was removed from them may be located at
such facilities for the purpose of their subsequent
elimination. Indeed, that is one of the reasons for our
proposal on changing the function of this facility.

We would like to point out to the Delegations of the
Parties some further aspects concerning this issue.
In connection with the beginning of actual work on
removing solid rocket fuel from the rocket motor cases using
the water washout method at the Pavlograd Conversion or
Elimination Facility (Pavlograd Chemical Plant), a special
regime has been introduced at this enterprise, under which
access of individuals to the premises during this work has
been restricted to the maximum extent. This is because a
large quantity (approximately 5,000 tons) of hazardous
explosive material is concentrated at the enterprise.

The process of removing rocket fuel from the rocket
motor cases is not subject to confirmatory inspections, as
specified in para. 2 of Section I of the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol. At the same time, in inspecting this
facility, as an ICBM elimination facility, provision is made
for access of U.S. inspectors and escort team members to that
portion of the enterprise which is in direct proximity to the
structures where the fuel removal work is carried out.

Taking into account the fact that the inspected Party is
responsible for the safety of inspection team members during
an inspection in Ukraine, the Ukrainian side will be
compelled to suspend work at the enterprise during the
inspection period; this is unacceptable since such actions
will prevent ensuring the safety of the technological process.

In addition, this will lead to violation of the
requirements of paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Inspection
Protocol, under which inspectors do not have the right to
interfere with ongoing activities at an inspection site...and
do not have the right to hamper or delay the operation of a
facility. Moreover, under this provision inspectors do not
have the right to take actions affecting the safe operation
of a facility.

Thus, the Ukrainian side believes that these arguments
are valid and are such that they do not contradict the
provisions of the Treaty and that they are aimed at strict
fulfillment of the provisions of the Treaty as it pertains to
ensuring safety while conducting inspections.

Taking into account the requirements of the provision of
JCIC Joint Statement No. 17 on Changes to the Function of a
Facility, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 9 of the
Notification Protocol, the Ukrainian side will provide
notification formats for changing the function of a facility.

In addition, the Ukrainian side understands that after
the change in function, under the requirements of JCIC Joint
Statement No. 17, this facility will be regarded as a new
facility and will be declared in Annex I data of the START
MOU.

At the same time, under paragraph 5 of Section VII of
the START Inspection Protocol, this category of facility,
"storage facility for solid rocket motors," is not subject to
data update or new facility inspections under this Treaty.
On this basis, after expiration of a five-day period from
the time the U.S. side receives the notification, in
accordance with paragraph 3 of the Notification Protocol, of
a change in the data by categories of data in the MOU in
connection with a change in the function of a facility, the
inspection regime at that new facility will be terminated.

In the future the Ukrainian side plans to declare a new
facility, the "Pavlograd Elimination Facility for ICBMs,"
where the final phase of SS-24 elimination, i.e., the
elimination of solid rocket motors, will be carried out,
taking into account the elimination method selected by the
Ukrainian side, as well as the requirements of the START
Treaty and the agreements reached in the JCIC.

Thus, our proposals are within the Treaty framework, are
consistent with the current state of affairs, and are aimed
at simplifying the final phases of elimination.

End text.



9. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Ukraine:

-- Ukrainian Non-Paper on the Removal of the Pavlograd
Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections from the List of
Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections, dated
November 2, 2005;

-- Ukrainian-Proposed JCIC Agreement on the Removal of
the Pavlograd Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections
from the List of Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site
Inspections, dated November 2, 2005; and

-- Ukrainian Non-Paper On Changing the Function of the
Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility, dated November
2, 2005.



10. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Maj Mitchner
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Mr. Boryak
Col Yegorov
Mr. Istratov
Ms. Kotkova
Amb Masterkov
Mr. Mezhennyy
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Fokin (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran
Mr. Dotsenko
Gen Fedotov



11. (U) Taylor sends.
Cassel