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05GENEVA2690 2005-11-04 06:15:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 GENEVA 002690 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
SS-25 RVOSI, SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND NEW VEHICLES AT SS-25
ICBM BASES, NOVEMBER 1, 2005


Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-035.



2. (S) Meeting Date: November 1, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the
Russian Mission on November 1, 2005, to discuss a new Russian
proposal to resolve the SS-25 RVOSI issue. The Parties also
discussed support equipment at SS-25 mobile ICBM bases, and
new vehicles at SS-25 mobile ICBM bases.



4. (S) The Russian Delegation presented a briefing on a new
proposal to allow U.S. inspectors to observe how the
barrel-shaped reentry vehicle cover is mounted on the reentry
vehicle. Measurements would be made of both the external
diameters of the upper and lower rings, which support the
barrel-shaped oversized cover currently being used during
SS-25 RVOSI inspections, and measurements would be made of
the internal diameter of the lower support ring. The
demonstration would be conducted by no more than ten U.S.
observers and would be in a two-stage process, the first
stage would follow a normal RVOSI inspection procedure
followed by a demonstration of Russian-proposed measurements
to be taken.



5. (S) The Russian Federation withdrew its proposal, to
declare and mark with a unique symbol support vehicles
located at SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases, citing the fact that
U.S. inspectors still did not agree that all support vehicles
were being properly declared and marked in accordance with
the arrangement that had been discussed at the last session.



6. (S) The Russian Federation informed the United States
that it will begin deploying converted eliminated SS-25
road-mobile launchers as "road security" vehicles at SS-25
road-mobile ICBM bases. The intent of these vehicles is to
match the weight of actual road-mobile launchers so that the
Russians can assess the safety of the roads over which
road-mobile ICBMs move at their operational bases.



--------------------------


NEW RUSSIAN PROPOSAL
FOR SS-25 RVOSI


--------------------------





7. (S) Boryak began the meeting by stating that the Russian
Federation had taken steps to resolve the SS-25 RVOSI issue
and the result was a new Russian proposal. He described the
proposal as a creative product from his side and apologized
that many of the terms and definitions used in the briefing
to be presented did not necessarily reflect those used in the
Treaty and were only tentative. He turned to Osetrov to
present the briefing on the Russian-proposed demonstration of
the covers used during SS-25 RVOSI. Osetrov began by
recounting some of the history on this issue, including the
fact that the United States believed the size and shape of
the cover used during SS-25 RVOSI procedures did not allow
inspectors to ascertain that there were no more reentry
vehicles on the SS-25 than the number of warheads attributed
to it. He displayed a slide that depicted a diagram of the
barrel-shaped oversized cover currently used during RVOSI
procedures. He explained that the cover consisted of an
outer soft portion made of some type of fabric which covered
two rings that were used to attach the cover to the reentry
vehicle. He then recounted the original Russian proposal, to
push in on one side of the soft cover, and showed a diagram
of that process and recounted the Russian additional proposal
to use a new type of radiation detection equipment (RDE) to
resolve this issue, both of which were rejected by the United
States.



--------------------------


PROPOSAL FOR A
TWO-STAGE DEMONSTRATION


--------------------------





8. (S) Osetrov stated that the Russian Federation proposed
to conduct a demonstration during which U.S. observers would
see how the cover used during SS-25 RVOSI procedures was
attached to the reentry vehicle as well as to conduct some
additional measurements that are not currently conducted
during inspections. He explained that the demonstration
would be an independent event from an inspection and would
not count against the U.S. quota for inspections. No more
than ten observers currently present on the START list of
inspectors would be allowed to attend the demonstration and
all costs for meals and accommodations, both at the point of
entry and at the SS-25 missile base selected for the conduct
of the demonstration, would be borne by the Russian
Federation. The date and point of entry for arrival of the
observation team would be delivered through Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center (NRRC) channels 30 days in advance of the
team's arrival. The United States would send a NRRC Format
144 to the Russian Federation not less than 72 hours in
advance of the team's arrival listing team member names,
passport numbers, and arrival times and airline. He
emphasized that the overall schedule for the proposed
demonstration would be determined by the Russian Federation.



--------------------------


STAGE ONE OF THE DEMONSTRATION


--------------------------





9. (S) Osetrov explained that the SS-25 road-mobile ICBM to
be used for the demonstration would be selected and inspected
by U.S. observers, in accordance with normal RVOSI procedures
during stage one of the process. Once the missile was
selected it would be moved to the demonstration site under
the direct observation of the U.S. team. (Begin comment:
Typically, during normal RVOSI procedures, the mobile
launcher is taken from the res tricted area to a building
within the base maintenance facility. End comment.) The
observers would be allowed to examine the individual cover
components, including the soft outer fabric piece, and the
two mounting rings for an unlimited amount of time. The U.S.
team would then be allowed to measure the length of the cover
prior to placement on the reentry vehicle and then the U.S.
team would be removed from the demonstration site, except for
two members, who would be placed behind the launcher so that
they could not see the actual placement of the cover on the
reentry vehicle, but still ensure that no additional cover
elements were being added or removed or that no reentry
vehicles were being removed as is typically done during SS-25
RVOSI procedures. Once the cover was placed over the reentry
vehicle, the entire U.S. team would be allowed to observe the
covered front section for the standard 15 minutes during
which time Russian escorts would point out the placement of
the mounting rings used under the soft portion of the cover.


--------------------------


STAGE TWO OF THE DEMONSTRATION


--------------------------





10. (S) Osetrov explained that, upon completion of the
15-minute viewing, the U.S. team would be asked to step away
from the immediate area of the front section, while still
remaining in the building, during which time the outer soft
cover would be removed and a conformal sock-like cover would
be placed over the upper mounting ring (closest to the top of
the reentry vehicle) and over the reentry vehicle leaving the
lower ring (closest to the bottom of the reentry vehicle)
exposed. The U.S. observers would be allowed to approach the
front section and observe the relationship between the
mounting rings and the sock-like cover. The U.S. observers
would then be removed from the immediate vicinity of the
front section once again while the mounting rings were being
removed and placed upon the ground. The U.S. team would then
be allowed to measure the external diameter of both the upper
and lower rings and the internal diameter of the lower ring
as well as to observe the spokes that are contained within
both rings. (Begin comment: Both the upper and lower rings
consist of two concentric metal circles attached by spokes in
similar fashion to a wagon wheel. The center metal circle
for the upper ring is intended to be attached to the top of
the reentry vehicle, hence it will have a much smaller
diameter than the center metal circle within the lower ring
which attaches to the bottom of the reentry vehicle.
Further, the spokes within the upper ring would have longer
spokes than those of the lower ring. End comment.) The
measurements would be recorded in an official demonstration
report and used during subsequent inspections. Osetrov
concluded by stating that the earlier Russian proposal to
push in on the cover at a single point was removed from the
table, but the proposal to use RDE to resolve this issue was
still of value and deserved further study.



--------------------------


U.S. CLARIFYING QUESTIONS


--------------------------





11. (S) Taylor thanked the Russian Delegation for the new
Russian initiative to help resolve this long-standing issue.
He asked whether the United States would be allowed to select
the SS-25 ICBM base for conduct of the demonstration.
Fedorchenko replied that the base would be selected by the
Russian Federation and the selected base would be the one
that would best be able to lower its alert level, based upon
which dates were selected for the demonstration. Taylor
asked which specific measurements would be taken and when
would they be taken. Osetrov stated that a measurement of
the length of the cover, prior to it being placed on the
reentry vehicle, as well as measurements of the external
diameter of both the upper and lower mounting rings and the
internal diameter of the lower ring, after they had been
removed from the reentry vehicle, would be taken. Also, the
U.S. team would be able to visually confirm the length of the
spokes for both mounting rings.

12 (S) Mullins asked whether the diameter of the lower ring
was constant, to which Osetrov replied that the ring
diameters are all consistent within the covers being used for
RVOSI procedures. Taylor asked how the recorded measurements
would be used during future inspections. Osetrov explained
that U.S. inspectors would be able to conduct similar
measurements during subsequent inspections. Mullins asked
whether the rings would be shrouded during the measurements,
to which Osetrov responded that the rings would not be
shrouded. Kuehne asked whether there would be any
opportunity to measure the distance between the two rings
during phase II of the demonstration while they were on the
missile. Fedorchenko explained that U.S. inspectors were
currently allowed to measure that distance during each
inspection prior to the cover being placed on the missile.
(Begin comment: Russian escorts place the two mounting rings
inside the soft casing of the cover, stretch it out and allow
a measurement while the cover is on the ground. End
comment.) Singer asked whether the U.S. observers would be
able to see clearly where the lower ring attached to the
reentry vehicle, as well as during subsequent inspections.
Fedorchenko explained that this was already done during each
inspection. Taylor made the observation that, during the
presentation, it had been explained that a soft sock-like
cover would be placed over the upper mounting ring and the
reentry vehicle leaving the lower ring exposed. Speaking
personally, Taylor noted that this type of cover was similar
to those used during Minuteman RVOSI inspections and would be
excellent covers for the Russian Federation to use to resolve
this issue. There was no response from the other Parties.
Boryak closed the discussion on this issue by stating that
the Russian Federation considered this to be a very serious
proposal and understood that additional discussion of the
specific procedures would be required.



13. (S) Begin text (Russian proposal):

(Begin Comment: Pages 3, 5, 7 and 14 contain depictions
which cannot be included in this text. Adobe files were made
of pages 3, 5 and 14 and e-mailed to Washington (STATE/VCI).
Page 7 is a depiction of the Russian proposal using RDE,
which the United States has rejected. End Comment.)

Official Translation

Title Page: Additional Demonstration of the Cover Used
during Reentry Vehicle Inspections of SS-25 ICBMs under the
START Treaty

Page 2

Problem:

-- During inspections conducted at ICBM bases for
road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, U.S. inspection teams are not
confirming that the front sections of SS-25 ICBMs contain no
more than one RV.

-- In the view of the inspecting Party, the shape and
dimensions of the cover used by the inspected Party do not
allow the inspectors to achieve the objectives of the
inspection.

Page 3

Schematic for Covering an RV (Diagram)

-- Soft cover with two rigid elements for attaching the
cover (rings)

-- Launch canister

-- Front (upper) ring

-- Rear (lower) ring

Page 4

The Russian Proposal for Pressing in on the RV Cover

-- In July 1999 the Russian side tabled a proposal that
makes it possible to resolve the issue of inspecting SS-25
front sections. The essence of the Russian proposal is to
press in on the cover on the RV during one SS-25 RVOSI, as a
result of which the conical shape of the inspected RV would
be unequivocally identified and the fact that there is only
one cone-shaped item under the cover would be confirmed.

-- The United States of America did not agree to
participate in the proposed activity.

Page 5

Pressing in on the Covered RV (Diagram)

-- The cloth casing of the cover touches the RV body.
Conclusion: there is one cone-shaped item under the cover.

Page 6

Russian Proposal on Using a New Type of RDE

-- In March 2004, at JCIC-XXVI, at its own initiative the
Russian side raised for discussion by the Treaty Parties a
proposal on a new method of instrument verification, which
could be used during RVOSI. The proposed method was based on
the use of a new type of radiation detection equipment
provisionally named the "Karusel'."

-- For the purpose of additional consideration of the
technical and treaty-legal aspects of the proposals on using
the new type of RDE, technical consultations were organized
in Moscow in May 2004, in which experts from the U.S.,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan participated.

-- In October 2004, during Part II of JCIC-XXVI, the U.S.
side rejected the Russian proposals to reach specific
agreements on using new equipment.

Page 7

Russian Proposal on Using Karusel'-type RDE

(See diagram)

Conclusion: there is one nuclear item inside the monitored
space.

Page 8

New Russian Proposals

-- Continuing, in a spirit of good will, to search for ways
to resolve the issue regarding the equipage of SS-25 front
sections, the Russian side proposes

an unprecedented step - conducting a demonstration
during which the inspecting Party will see how the cover used
by the Russian side is attached to the SS-25 RV. The visual
information, plus the additional measurements that will be
made during the demonstration, will make it possible to
resolve the U.S. side's questions.

Page 9

Overall Arrangements for Holding the Demonstration

-- The demonstration will be organized and conducted as a
stand-alone event (outside the START quota).

-- The group of observers should consist of no more than 10
representatives from the U.S., who are included in the
current list of START inspectors.

-- The Russian side will bear the costs of organizing and
holding the demonstration itself, including the provision of
lodging and food at the point of entry and at the facility.

Page 10

Overall Arrangements for Holding the Demonstration (continued)

-- The timeframe for holding the demonstration will be
proposed by the Russian side.

-- The point of entry and timeframe for holding the
demonstration will be communicated to the U.S. side through
NRRC channels well in advance, but not later than 30 days
before the estimated time of arrival of the group of
observers at the point of entry.

-- No less than 72 hours prior to the arrival of the group
of observers at the point of entry, the U.S. side will
provide, through NRRC channels (format 144 notification),
information analogous to that specified in the format 116
notification provided in accordance with subparagraphs 5 (a),
(b) and (d) of Section III of the Inspection Protocol.

Page 11

Overall Arrangements for Holding the Demonstration (continued)

-- The schedule for transporting the group of observers to
the facility and the schedule for conducting the event will
be determined by the Russian side.

-- The specific launcher for the demonstration/RVOSI will
be selected by the U.S. side.

-- The event will take place in two phases: during the
first phase inspection procedures analogous to those
performed during RVOSIs will be carried out; during the
second phase additional demonstration procedures will be
carried out.

Page 12

First Phase - Inspection

-- After the launcher has been selected, the event will
follow the same procedures and methods used in organizing a
regular RVOSI:

-- the group of observers will be taken to the selected
launcher;

-- the launcher will be prepared for operation and, with
the group of observers watching, will be moved to the site of
the inspection/demonstration;

-- the group of observers will be given an opportunity,
with no time limit, to examine the cover components: the two
rigid elements for attaching the cover (rings) and the cloth
cover itself;
-- the observers may measure the length of the assembled
structure of the cover before it is placed on the front
section;
-- the launcher with ICBM will be prepared for
inspection; two observers stationed behind the road-mobile
launcher will observe the process of preparing the front
section for inspection;

-- the front section, covered in the usual manner, will
be presented for viewing for 15 minutes, during which time
the ring placements will be shown to the group of observers.

Page 13

Second Phase - Demonstration

-- Additional demonstration activities will be carried out
upon completion of the procedures for inspecting the front
section of the selected road-mobile launcher with ICBM; these
activities will include the following:

-- after the 15-minute viewing period the group of
observers will move out of the inspection zone, without
leaving the building where the inspected launcher is located;

-- the inspection support crew will remove the cloth
casing of the standard cover, leaving its rings on the
inspected RV;

-- the observers will be invited into the inspection
zone and will view the RV with the rigid elements for
attaching the cover (rings) in place; the RV and the upper
attachment ring will be covered by a stocking-type cover;

-- the group will leave the inspection zone, the
inspection support crew will remove the rings of the cover
and, with the observers watching, will move them to the place
where the observers will be given the right to measure the
diameters of the outer supporting rings of these elements of
the cover and the inside diameter of the lower attachment
ring, and also to ascertain visually that the spokes of the
upper attachment ring are longer than the spokes of the lower
attachment ring.

Page 14

View of the Front Section during the Demonstration Phase
(Diagram)

-- Stocking-type cover concealing the surface of the RV and
the front ring

-- Launch canister

-- Front (upper) ring under the cover

-- Rear (lower) ring

Page 15
Outlook for the Future
-- If there is appropriate legal codification in the JCIC
of the measurements recorded in the demonstration report,
they will be used in the future during SS-25 RVOSIs as
auxiliary data that assist in achieving the objectives of the
inspection.

-- The Russian side's previous proposals for pressing in on
the cover are taken off the negotiating table.

-- We continue to regard the proposals on using
Karusel'-type RDE as relevant.

End text.



--------------------------


RUSSIA WITHDRAWS ITS
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PROPOSAL


--------------------------





14. (S) Fedorchenko read a prepared statement concerning the
results of the most recent data update inspections at Teykovo
and Barnaul SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases as well as the
Plesetsk Test Range. He stated that U.S. inspection teams
ignored Russian escort efforts to resolve this issue and in
each case documented comments in their inspection reports
that they could not confirm that some of the vehicles
assigned to those facilities were not SS-25 support vehicles.
This was done despite the placement of unique symbols on
those vehicles declared to be support vehicles by the Russian
Federation. He noted that the Russian proposal to place
unique symbols on declared support vehicles as well as to
provide official photographs of those marked vehicles was not
objected to by the United States during JCIC-XXVI. He
observed that the procedures used during these recent
inspections did not work and, as a result, the Russian
Federation was withdrawing its proposal.



15. (S) Taylor noted that the United States welcomed the
Russian Federation's proposal to declare and mark all SS-25
support vehicles with unique symbols and said the United
States was evaluating the results of those recent
inspections. He explained that it was understood that those
markings would be more permanent, as opposed to the temporary
paper markings that were observed during the inspections. He
made it clear that the United States was pleased to see that
nine support vehicles were declared at both of the SS-25 ICBM
bases and two at the test range, but that the presence of
paper markings, as well as the presence of additional,
similar support vehicles that were not declared or marked,
did not give the United States confidence. As a result, U.S.
inspectors had questions. He stated that the Russian
decision to withdraw its proposal was troubling and asked the
Russian Federation to reconsider its position. Fedorchenko
held up three inspection reports and noted that nowhere in
those reports did U.S. inspectors complain about the type of
markings they observed and they were able to confirm that all
of the vehicles declared were support vehicles. He explained
that Russia's disappointment was that U.S. inspectors did not
agree that other vehicles present on the site were not
support vehicles, despite escort assurances that only the
marked vehicles were capable of performing launch functions
while the other similar vehicles were not. He also noted
that the Russian Delegation had proposed that this procedure
was only temporary and if accepted it would become permanent.


--------------------------


NEW VEHICLES AT SS-25
MOBILE ICBM BASES


--------------------------





16. (S) Boryak stated that the Russian Federation paid close
attention to the protection of its nuclear weapons. With
this in mind, a new measure was being implemented which
entailed the placement of specialized vehicles at SS-25
road-mobile ICBM bases which would be used to monitor the
condition of roads over which SS-25 ICBMs would be moved.
This was an effort to increase nuclear safety and security.
These new vehicles were former SS-25 road-mobile launchers
that have undergone elimination procedures at the Piban'shur
SS-25 launcher elimination facility. Concrete blocks
supported by a specialized frame have been affixed where the
launch canister usually is located to simulate the weight of
an actual missile in its canister. Additionally, these
vehicles would not be declared as support vehicles since they
do not directly support missile launch and would begin
arriving at missile bases in Spring 2006. Kuehne asked how
these concrete blocks would be configured, to which
Fedorchenko responded that he was not aware of the specifics,
just that the vehicles were intended to match the weight of
actual SS-25 mobile launchers. National technical means may
have trouble telling them from the real thing, but inspectors
would have no problem.



17. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Briefing on a Demonstration of the Covers Used During
SS-25 RVOSI; and

-- Draft JDT for a Joint Statement on First Stages of
SS-25 ICBMs Burned Without Nozzles Attached, dated November
1, 2002.



18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Maj Mitchner
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Col Smith
Mr. Smith
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Mr. Boryak
Col Yegorov
Maj Gen Artyukhin
Mr. Kashirin
Mr. Kotkova
Amb Masterkov
Lt Col Novikov
Col Osetrov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Fokin (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Dotsenko
Mr. Fedotov
Col Taran



19. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley