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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA2685 2005-11-03 10:57:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002685 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR NA-24
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND SS-25 ELIMINATION, NOVEMBER 1, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2682 (JCIC-XXVII-034)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-037.



2. (U) Meeting Date: November 1, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the
Russian Mission on November 1, 2005, to discuss warhead and
throw-weight attribution for the RSM-56 SLBM, as well as U.S.
concerns with Russia's SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures.
The U.S. Delegation stated that Russia had been obligated to
notify warhead attribution prior to deploying and
flight-testing the RSM-56, and requested that Russia provide
the attributed number of warheads or indicate when and how
attribution would be determined. Russia was urged to begin
discussions now in the JCIC to determine the procedures for
establishing the accountable throw-weight under the
Thirty-Second Agreed Statement. Russia also was requested to
provide a maximum calculated throw-weight as soon as
possible. The Russian Delegation said it would respond in
due time.



4. (S) The U.S. Delegation summarized the recent formal U.S.
review and legal analysis of Russia's SS-25 ICBM elimination
procedures. The United States had concluded that the
guidance and control section, which Russia did not eliminate,
was part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM).
The United States does not consider the 11 SS-25 ICBMs
presented for elimination during inspections conducted in
April and August of 2005 to have been eliminated because the
entire SCDM was not eliminated. Russia was urged to bring
its SS-25 elimination procedures into compliance with the
Treaty by eliminating the airframe for the forward section of
the SCDM or by developing alternative Treaty-compliant
procedures. The Russian Delegation said it hoped to be able
to provide a written response through diplomatic channels.



--------------------------


RSM-56 SLBM THROW-WEIGHT
AND WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION


--------------------------





5. (S) Taylor began the meeting and stated that the United
States believes that Russia should be prepared to provide
additional information about the RSM-56 SLBM now that it has
been deployed and flight-tested from a submarine. Although
the Parties worked hard to bring the RSM-56 canisterized SLBM
under the Treaty, Russia has, in effect, removed it from the
Treaty's provisions by deploying and flight-testing it
without making the Treaty-required declarations for the
number of warheads attributed and throw-weight.



6. (S) As the RSM-56 is a deployed missile, Taylor said
Russia has an obligation not to deploy or flight-test it with
more RVs than the attributed number of warheads. The United
States has the corresponding right to verify compliance with
this obligation. Without warhead attribution, these
important obligations and verification rights had been
rendered meaningless. As Russia had an obligation to notify
warhead attribution prior to deployment or flight-testing,
the United States requested that Russia identify the number
of warheads attributed to the RSM-56 or inform the U.S. how
and when warhead attribution will be determined.


7. (S) Taylor reminded the Russians that the Parties must
also agree on procedures for establishing the throw-weight
accountability of the RSM-56 according to the Thirty-Second
Agreed Statement. Now that the missile has been
flight-tested, the United States believes it is possible to
do so. Those discussions should begin now in the JCIC, with
the goal of reaching agreement as soon as practicable.



8. (S) Taylor observed that Russia was required to provide a
notification concerning throw-weight not later than five
days after the RSM-56 became subject to Treaty limitations.
There are no exceptions for missiles that skip the prototype
phase. The United States believes that Russia should have
been able to provide a "maximum calculated throw-weight"
without conducting a flight-test. The U.S. Delegation
requested that Russia provide this data as soon as possible.



9. (S) Boryak reiterated that the RSM-56 was being developed
in a manner that had not been envisioned by the Treaty
drafters. He said Russia is committed to bringing the RSM-56
development efforts under the Treaty, and that the previous
JCIC deliberations on this topic had anticipated all of the
issues that the United States just raised. The Russian
Delegation will study all of the U.S. questions carefully and
respond in due time.



--------------------------


U.S. RESPONSE ON SS-25
ELIMINATION PROCEDURES


--------------------------





10. (S) Taylor responded to the Russian Delegation's earlier
remarks concerning problems with SS-25 ICBM elimination
inspections (REFTEL) by summarizing the recent formal U.S.
review and legal analysis of the issue.



11. (S) In response to the Russian Delegation's assertion
that Russia had never considered the guidance and control
section to be part of the SCDM, Taylor explained why the
United States believes it is part of the SCDM. Applying the
Treaty definitions of "SCDM" and "front section" to the
SS-25, the United States concluded that the SCDM extends from
the top of the third stage interstage skirt to the beginning
of the front section. The forward portion of the SCDM
separates from the final stage with the front section and, by
controlling the maneuvering rockets and providing guidance,
contributes to independently targeting a reentry vehicle.
During the START negotiations, the Soviet Delegation stated
that the SCDM included the instrument compartment as well as
the fuel and oxidizer compartment. The Soviet Union
exhibited both portions of the SCDM during the SS-25
technical characteristics exhibition, as can be seen in an
exhibition photograph.



12. (S) In response to Russia's claim that it has a Treaty
right to retain the guidance and control sections, Taylor
stated the U.S. view that the Conversion or Elimination
Protocol requires the entire SCDM to be eliminated for mobile
ICBMs. Russia was allowed to remove guidance and control
devices from the SCDM prior to its elimination, but the
entire airframe of the SCDM, including the portion containing
the guidance and control system, must be eliminated. During
the START negotiations, the Soviet Delegation stated that the
airframe would be presented for elimination after the
electronics elements were removed. Prior to the April 2005
elimination inspection at Votkinsk, Russia had not indicated
a different view.


13. (S) Taylor stated that the United States does not
consider the 11 SS-25 ICBMs presented for elimination in
April and August of 2005 to have been eliminated because the
entire SCDM was not eliminated. He urged Russia to bring its
SS-25 elimination procedures into compliance with Section I
of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol during future
inspections by eliminating the airframe for the forward
section of the SCDM, or that Russia develop alternative
Treaty-compliant procedures.



14. (S) Boryak replied that the Russian Delegation would
carefully study the U.S. remarks and requested a written
copy. He hoped Russia would be able to provide a written
response through diplomatic channels. The U.S. Delegation
provided the points on SS-25 the following day.



15. (S) Begin text (U.S. Points on SS-25 Elimination):

JCIC-XXVII
U.S. Non-paper
November 1, 2005

SS-25 ELIMINATION PROCEDURES

- During the SS-25 elimination inspections conducted in
April and August 2005, the United States raised concerns
regarding Russia's failure to comply with the requirements of
subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol by not presenting the entire
self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) for elimination.

- Specifically, only the rear portion of the missile SCDMs
were presented for elimination. The entire forward portion
of each of the SCDMs had been removed prior to the arrival of
the inspectors.

- During the first part of JCIC-XXVII, the Russian
Delegation stated that, since the electronic components of
the guidance and control system were assembled into a
"unified component," this section in its entirety could be
removed from the SCDM, in accordance with subparagraph 2(b)
of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, prior
to the elimination inspection.

- The Russian Delegation further stated that the excluded
element "had never been considered a part of the SCDM by
Russia."

- Subsequent to these discussions, the United States
completed a formal review of this issue, including an
in-depth legal analysis.

- A summary of that review is provided below.

- First, applying the Treaty definitions of "SCDM" and
"front section" to the SS-25 ICBM we concluded that the SS-25
SCDM extends from the top of the third stage interstage skirt
to the beginning of the front section.

- Our review also noted that the forward portion of the SCDM
separates from the final stage of an SS-25 ICBM with the
front section, and, by controlling the maneuvering rockets
and providing guidance, contributes to independently
targeting a reentry vehicle.

- In reviewing the negotiating record, we noted that during
START negotiations, the Soviet Delegation stated that the
SCDM was understood by the Soviet side to include the
instrument compartment as well as the fuel and oxidizer
compartment.

- In addition, the Soviet Union exhibited both portions of
the SCDM during the technical characteristics exhibition for
the SS-25 ICBM, as seen in the photograph taken during the
exhibition at Balabanovo in October 1991.

- Therefore, the United States believes that the forward
portion of the airframe of the SCDM is clearly part of the
SCDM.

- With respect to the SCDM's elimination, subparagraph 4(c)
of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol
requires the entire SCDM for mobile ICBMs be eliminated,
except for "electronic and electromechanical devices of the
missile's guidance and control system," which may be removed
from the missile.

- In our review of the negotiating record for subparagraph
2(b) of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol,
we noted that the Soviet Delegation stated that the airframe
would be presented for elimination after the electronics
guidance elements were removed.

- Prior to the April inspection at Votkinsk, there had never
been any indication from the Russian Federation that the SCDM
was anything other than what Soviet negotiators had described
during the negotiations.

- Accordingly, the United States believes that the SS-25
ICBM elimination procedures which Russia used at Votkinsk in
April and August 2005 do not comply with the requirements of
paragraph 4(c) of Section I of the C or E Protocol, and the
United States does not consider the 11 SS-25 ICBMs presented
for elimination during these inspections to have been
eliminated under START.

- We agree that Russia may remove guidance and control
devices from the SCDM of SS-25 ICBMs prior to its
elimination. However, the airframe of the SCDM, which
includes the airframe containing the guidance and control
section, must be eliminated in order for these ICBMs, and all
SS-25 ICBMs presented during future elimination inspections,
to be considered eliminated.

- The United States urges Russia to bring its SS-25 ICBM
elimination procedures into compliance with Section I of the
Conversion or Elimination Protocol during future inspections
by eliminating the airframe for the forward section of the
SCDM, or that Russia develop alternative Treaty-compliant
procedures.

- The United States is prepared to work with Russia to
resolve the issue of SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures,
including eliminating the airframes for the missing forward
sections of the SCDMs of the first 11 SS-25 ICBMs that were
presented for elimination at Votkinsk.

- The U.S. Delegation is prepared to consider any proposals
or additional information that Russia wishes to provide
regarding its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures.

End text.



16. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Non-paper on Points on SS-25 Elimination
Procedures, dated November 1, 2005.



17. (U) Participants:
U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Maj Mitchner
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Dr. Zimmerman
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Mr. Boryak
Col Yegorov
Gen Maj Artyukhin
Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Istratov
Amb. Masterkov
Mr. Mezhennyy
Lt Col Novikov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Venevtsev
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran



18. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley