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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA2620 2005-10-28 10:58:00 CONFIDENTIAL US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

BIC-IV: (U) MEETING ON ISSUES RELATED TO

Tags:   PARM KACT US RS BIC SORT 
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					C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002620 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS BIC SORT
SUBJECT: BIC-IV: (U) MEETING ON ISSUES RELATED TO
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS, OCTOBER 27, 2005

REF: 04 GENEVA 1027 (BIC-I-003)

Classified By: DAS Karin L. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC).
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d).



1. (U) This is BIC-IV-004.



2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2005
Time: 3:00 - 3:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (C) As a measure to improve transparency and
confidence-building, Russia repackaged its proposal
(originally made in BIC-I on April 9, 2004, REFTEL) to
sub-aggregate strategic nuclear warhead data. Russia
proposed that, in addition to providing the total number of
deployed strategic nuclear warheads that is already reported
in each side's briefings on its strategic forces, the sides
should also report sub-aggregated numbers of deployed
strategic nuclear warhead data for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy
bombers at each base. Alternatively, if the United States
cannot agree to provide the positional data, then perhaps the
sides could agree to provide the sub-aggregated numbers for
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The Russian Delegation
stated that the focus of Russia's proposal was to obtain a
clear picture of Moscow Treaty (MT) implementation. The U.S.
Delegation restated the U.S. position that providing
additional information in the BIC was unnecessary, but said
that it would report this proposal to Washington.



4. (C) In reference to the Russian Aide-Memoire on strategic
stability of September 20, 2005, Russia stressed that the
question of our future strategic relationship is an important
issue and noted that the expiration of the START Treaty had
provided the impetus behind Russia's Aide Memoire. The sides
need to cooperate to work through these important issues.
There would be a new administration in 2009; therefore, it is
important to examine these issues now. The U.S. side noted
that the United States was considering the Aide-Memoire, but
added that we are still four years away from the expiration
of START.



--------------------------


RUSSIA OUTLINES RE-PACKAGED
APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
AND TRANSPARENCY


--------------------------





5. (C) Ul'yanov stated that, in the Joint Declaration of May
24, 2002, the Presidents of Russia and the United States had
stated that the START Treaty provides the foundation for
providing confidence, transparency and predictability in
further strategic offensive reductions, along with other
supplementary measures, including transparency measures to be
agreed. This statement should be a direct assignment to both
delegations of the BIC by the Presidents of the United States
and Russia. He said that it was unfortunate that the amount
of data provided under the MT was much less than the amount
of information that was provided under the START Treaty.
Furthermore, he believed that the sides were more transparent
at the end of the Cold War than they are now, and that this
approach should not continue in this new era of partnership.



6. (C) As a way forward, Ul'yanov said that the sides should
focus on enhancing transparency. Thus, Russia proposed that
the sides provide additional sub-aggregated strategic nuclear
warhead data in the strategic forces briefings to improve
transparency and confidence-building measures related to
reporting numbers of such warheads under the MT. Russia
proposed that, in addition to providing the total number of
deployed strategic nuclear warheads that was already reported
in each side's briefings on its strategic forces, the sides
should also report sub-aggregated numbers of deployed
strategic nuclear warhead data for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy
bombers at each base. Alternatively, if the United States
cannot agree to provide the positional data, then perhaps the
sides could agree to provide the sub-aggregated numbers for
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Ul'yanov stated that such an
exchange of data would not include verification measures, and
that Russia is flexible regarding the form of the agreement.
Russia's past proposal was for an exchange of letters,
however, now Russia believes this could be based on each
side's mutual understanding. He concluded that the focus of
Russia's proposal was to obtain a clear picture of MT
implementation.



7. (C) Look stated that it has been a long-standing U.S.
position that it is unnecessary to provide additional data
for reporting strategic nuclear warheads under the MT -- that
position has not changed. The U.S. focus is on cooperative,
informal approaches that are reciprocal, but not necessarily
symmetrical, that do not require negotiations and agreements.
Look also disagreed with Ul'yanov about his comparison
between the MT and the START Treaty with the types and amount
of data that was provided. She said that information
provided under the START Treaty was not provided out of
generosity or openness. It was required to be provided
because of strict Treaty provisions developed because of the
nature of our Cold War relationship. In contrast, under the
MT, which grew out of, and is part of a changed U.S.-Russian
relationship, information is offered, not required, and the
mechanism for providing information is one of briefings and
dialogue. Look, commenting on the Russian side's repeated
focus on transparency for the MT, said that since we are now
several years into implementing the MT and are closing in on
the end date of the START Treaty (December 5, 2009), it was
probably more important to look to the future, as Russia had
outlined in its September 20, 2005 Aide-Memoire, rather than
try to improve the past.



--------------------------


RUSSIA'S AIDE-MEMOIRE: WHAT
SHOULD WE DO AFTER START EXPIRES?


--------------------------





8. (C) Ul'yanov stated that, with respect to future
dialogue, the START Treaty currently allows each Party to
view, with some degree of certainty, what the other side was
doing with its strategic forces. He asked whether the United
States had considered how it would address openness and
transparency after December 5, 2009. Look said that the
United States had not yet formally considered this issue.
However, she noted that the United States was considering
Russia's September 20 Aide-Memoire. Look said that, in her
view, Russia had asked the right question in its
Aide-Memoire; i.e., where do the sides go from here with our
strategic relationship? She said that the United States is
considering how to answer the question. She also said that
Russia's Aide-Memoire also indicates to her that Russia did
not have answers to these questions at this point either.
She said that although, in her view, we need to work to find
those answers, there is no sense of urgency as to when the
answers are needed.



9. (C) Ul'yanov said that Look was quite right in stating
that Russia did not have answers to questions beyond 2009.
He suggested that both the United States and Russia as
partners should work together to seek the answers. He said
that it may be easier to come up with the answers to these
questions separately at the higher levels of our governments,
but he said he did not believe that this was the right
approach. He said that the right approach was one of
cooperation among the two sides. As to Look's point on the
lack of urgency, Ul'yanov pointed out that there will be
Presidential elections in both Russia and the United States
before the end of START. The elections would have a
significant impact on our work, and it was important to
address these questions now. The new administrations would
not be focusing on questions related to the end of the START
Treaty, there would be bigger issues for the new
administrations to consider. Therefore, the sooner we began
the dialogue on the way forward on this question, the better
chance we have to end our dialogue in a more fruitful way.



10. (C) Look said she believes that a U.S.-Russia dialogue
should not be focused on the expiration of START. Ul'yanov
said that the expiration of START provided the impetus for
the Aide-Memoire, but the sides should, of course, focus on
the broader relationship. Russia wants a serious dialogue.
Look thanked Ul'yanov for his explanations and indicated she
would report them to Washington.



--------------------------


CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS


--------------------------





11. (C) Ul'yanov said that, based on established tradition,
the sides should discuss the date for the next BIC meeting.
Look said that, since she did not know who would be the U.S.
Representative for the next session of the BIC, it was unfair
to try to set a date now. However, in general, since the
U.S. Report on the MT is due to the Senate on April 1st,
perhaps sometime in the early spring could be used for
initial planning purposes. Ul'yanov said that two meetings a
year, one in the spring and one in the fall, seem right to
him. He noted that the sides could finalize the date in
diplomatic channels. By way of a summary of the session,
Ul'yanov said this had not been an easy session but the
dialogue had been good. However, he hoped that the sides
could approach the next session by taking a closer look into
finalizing the issues related to the definition and Russia's
proposal for increased transparency. Look agreed with
Ul'yanov's assessment of the dialogue at this session. She
said that while there were some dead ends, there were also
some possibilities for further fruitful discussions.



12. (U) Documents exchanged: None.



13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

DAS Look
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Singer
Col Smith
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Mr. Ul'yanov
Gen Maj Artyukhin
Mr. Artem'yev
Col Fedorchenko
Col Kamenskiy
Amb Masterkov
Mr. Mezhennyy
Ms. Sorokina
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)



14. (U) Look sends.
Moley