Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA1825
2005-08-02 10:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

11-15 JULY 2005 MEETINGS OF THE WTO RULES NEGOTIATING

Tags:  ETRD WTRO USTR 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 001825 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

PASS USTR FOR ALLGEIER, DWOSKIN
STATE/EB/OT FOR CRAFT
USDA/FAS/ITP FOR MTND/HENKE, FAA/SE/WILSON
USDOC FOR SPETRINI, JACOBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD WTRO USTR
SUBJECT: 11-15 JULY 2005 MEETINGS OF THE WTO RULES NEGOTIATING
GROUP


This cable is Sensitive but Unclassified - Please Protect
Accordingly

SUMMARY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 001825

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

PASS USTR FOR ALLGEIER, DWOSKIN
STATE/EB/OT FOR CRAFT
USDA/FAS/ITP FOR MTND/HENKE, FAA/SE/WILSON
USDOC FOR SPETRINI, JACOBS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD WTRO USTR
SUBJECT: 11-15 JULY 2005 MEETINGS OF THE WTO RULES NEGOTIATING
GROUP


This cable is Sensitive but Unclassified - Please Protect
Accordingly

SUMMARY


1. (SBU) The WTO Rules Negotiating Group met formally and
informally 11-15 July 2005. Thirteen papers were submitted for
these meetings (nine on antidumping and countervailing duties,
one on subsidies and three on fisheries subsidies) demonstrating
a continued high level of interest in these negotiations; the
negotiating group ran out of time for discussion, so five of
these papers will be taken up at the September meeting. The
Chairman also continued his plurilateral consultations with a
smaller group of approximately 14 delegations; this has become an
important forum primarily for the discussions on antidumping,
although for the first time in the plurilateral consultations the
group took up a proposal on subsidies (a paper by the United
States on the allocation of subsidies). There were also
substantive discussions on papers from Egypt on currency
conversion in antidumping calculations, Canada on special dispute
settlement rules from antidumping and countervailing duty cases,
China on establishing post-initiation comment procedures, and two
papers from the Friends of Antidumping Negotiations, one on
limiting the number of exporters examined and one on introducing
a public interest test. A prior discussion of a paper by the
Friends on reviews of antidumping duty measures was also resumed.


2. (SBU) There were also fisheries subsidies papers from Japan on
illegal, unreported and unregulated ("IUU") fishing and from
Australia, Ecuador and New Zealand on aquaculture. However, the
most significant discussion of the week related to a very
ambitious paper by Brazil laying out a broad proposal on the
kinds of subsidies that should be prohibited or permitted, and on
special and differential ("S&D") treatment for developing
countries. Although there was much informal discussion about how
to intensify the negotiations in anticipation of the Hong Kong
Ministerial meeting in December, for example by lengthening the
meetings or forming smaller groups to address specific issues, no
changes were formally announced. The United States also used the
opportunity of the Rules Group meeting to meet bilaterally with,

among others, Brazil, China, Mexico and Norway, and
plurilaterally with the EC, Australia and Canada to discuss
countervailing duty and subsidy issues. The next Rules Group
meeting will be held 26-30 September 2005. End summary.

ANTIDUMPING

EGYPT PAPER ON CURRENCY CONVERSION


3. (SBU) Egypt presented in formal session its paper
(TN/RL/W/183) on clarifying the rules on conversion of currency
in antidumping calculations, specifically, by defining the terms
"fluctuation" and "sustained movement" of currency, as they are
used in Article 2.4.1 of the antidumping agreement. Most of the
comments by Members were supportive, although several Members
asked Egypt to describe its own methodology. Several Members,
including Brazil and Japan, noted that this would be a very
difficult issue to negotiate, and therefore tended to favor a
prior US proposal (TN/RL/GEN/5) which approached the issue as one
of transparency, by asking Members to report their practices to
ensure consistency, rather than attempting to define permissible
practices. Korea and Thailand both stated that they had no
experience with this provision in their antidumping practice.
The EC recalled the difficult negotiations on this issue in the
Uruguay Round, and said that it avoided the problem by using
average exchange rates; where there is a problem, the EC breaks
its averaging into sub-periods, such as months.


CANADA PAPER ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT


4. (SBU) Canada presented its paper (TN/RL/GEN/48) in informal
session and in the plurilateral meeting on improving dispute
settlement procedures in cases involving antidumping and
countervailing duty measures. The proposal would require a
Member, promptly upon a finding by the dispute settlement body of
any WTO-inconsistency in an antidumping or countervailing duty
measure, to suspend the measure until a new, compliant measure is
put into place and approved by a panel. Unlike an earlier
proposal by Canada (TN/RL/GEN/37),this proposal was modified so
as not to require refund of all duties back to the time the
measure was originally put into place. (NOTE: This proposal
reflects Canada's concerns that its companies have had to make
large deposits of antidumping and countervailing duties during
the ongoing disputes relating to softwood lumber.)


5. (SBU) This version of Canada's proposal received much broader
support, particularly among some of the Friends of Antidumping.
However, from the tone of interventions, it is not clear how
seriously Members are taking this proposal. A number of Members
questioned whether this proposal goes too far in the case of
minor inconsistencies. Several Members, including Japan and the
US also asked why this proposal was limited to antidumping and
countervailing duty measures; the US noted that the economic harm
from measures inconsistent with other agreements could be just as
great; Mexico noted that in the DSU negotiations it had made a
similar proposal applicable to all agreements; Brazil, half-
jokingly, suggested it would like to see this proposal applied to
the agriculture agreement. Canada replied that special treatment
was justified by the high number of challenges to antidumping and
countervailing duty measures, and by the large amounts of money
involved. Japan also asked how the proposal would affect
prospective duty collection systems, which would not be able to
reach back and collect any duties if the Member taking the
measure is successful on appeal; they suggested that in light of
this problem, the proposal should be limited to retrospective
duty assessment systems. (NOTE: The US has the only clearly
retrospective duty assessment system for antidumping and
countervailing duties.) The EC described Canada's paper as a
move in the right direction, and it looked favorably on it;
however, it noted that there are certain details of the proposal
that need to be worked out.

FRIENDS PAPER ON LIMITED EXAMINATION
AND THE ALL OTHERS RATE


6. (SBU) Norway on behalf of the Friends of Antidumping presented
their paper (TN/RL/GEN/46) in informal session on conditions
under which an authority may limit the number of exporting
companies it examines in an antidumping investigation, and how it
calculates the "all others" rate applicable to non-investigated
exporters. While several Members said that the provisions of the
Antidumping Agreement in question needed clarification, support
for this paper was quite limited. Many Members questioned the
feasibility of the proposal to require examination of at least
2/3 of the exporters in every case.


7. (SBU) The US suggested that more clarification was needed of
the kinds of reasons that would justify a limited examination,
and also noted that the proposal to require authorities to accept
up to ten volunteered responses in addition to the 2/3 of
exporters it was otherwise required to examine seemed to require
the impossible, and effectively required examination of all
exporters in virtually all cases. Mexico argued that all known
exporters should receive a questionnaire, but those who did not
make themselves known and "remained in the shadows" should be
treated as uncooperative; after the exporters have responded, the
authority can decide for which of them it will calculate a margin
of dumping. (NOTE: Mexico recently lost a dispute settlement
challenge by the US to its antidumping measure on rice and was
criticized by the Panel for passively waiting for exporters, who
may not have known about the case, to announce their interest to
the authorities, and treating any who did not as uncooperative
parties subject to highest possible rate of duty.) The EC
delivered a long (over 30 minute) critique of the paper that drew
an equally long defense by Norway. (NOTE: Norway is reportedly
unhappy about the way the EC selected exporters in its recent
investigation of Salmon, which may, in part, have been the
genesis of this paper and would explain the tone of the final
exchange.)

CHINA PAPER ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
COMMENT PERIOD AFTER INITIATION


8. (SBU) China presented in the informal session its paper
(TN/RL/GEN/55) on establishing a formal 20-day comment period
after initiation during which all investigative activity would be
suspended while parties commented on the allegations in the
petition, the product coverage of the investigation, and any
other issue they thought needed to be addressed promptly. The
response to the paper was quite positive, although the Friends
clearly are of the view that the paper does not go far enough in
disciplining initiations, while most users of antidumping were
concerned about the disruption of their process. Korea and
Norway agreed that there should be a time set aside for comment
on the petition, but that time should be prior to initiation so
that improper initiations can be avoided. The EC seemed to echo
this view by observing that it may be more difficult for
authorities to end an investigation that has already begun than
never to begin one at all. Brazil wondered why this proposal is
necessary, as parties can already submit any comments they
believe are relevant; it asked if establishing a formal comment
period would preclude comments later. The US also noted that,
while it is not opposed to this concept, parties are already free
to submit comments at any time; the US asked for more details
about how this proposal would work in practice. Australia
expressed concern that this proposal would delay the
questionnaire, which is a serious concern given its relatively
short investigation period. China recognized the possible timing
implications of its proposal and indicated that it did not
believe that it would extend the procedure too long.

FRIENDS PAPER ON LESSER DUTY


9. (SBU) The Friends presented their paper on lesser duty
(TN/RL/GEN/430 during the plurilateral consultations, and India
also re-presented a paper it had submitted in the spring
(TN/RL/GEN/32). Neither Japan (for the Friends) nor India had
much new to say about their Lesser Duty proposals. The
discussion was dominated by the EC and Brazil (co-sponsor from
the Friends),each discussing their respective lesser duty
practices and methodologies. The EC, in particular, seemed
intent on seizing leadership of the issue, by criticizing the
Friends' proposal and methodologies at great length, and
explaining how the EC's methodology was the only real workable
one consistent with a high level of ambition. The EC also
criticized the technical level of the discussion of the proposals
before Members really had begun that discussion.


10. (SBU) The EC lost some of its bluster, however, when Korea
said that, unlike the inflexible US system, the EC "negotiates"
the lesser duty between exporters and the domestic industry.
The EC indignantly denied that they "negotiate" this, stating
that the Commission applies rules, although the administrators of
course have a certain degree of discretion. A continuation of
the discussion focused on the determination of an appropriate
level of profit when calculating a lesser duty and again
highlighted the high degree of administrative discretion in some
Members' practices. The US used these exchanges to point out the
dangers of "managed trade" posed by these proposals. Another big
focus of the discussion was the impact of the application of the
dispute settlement system on lesser duty methodologies, which are
currently discretionary and largely non-transparent. There was
also a discussion of how judicial review in the US would affect
the lesser duty methodologies. The US raised a number of other
concerns, previewing the issues raised in the US paper
(TN/RL/GEN/58) to be discussed in September. Egypt, Argentina
and Canada also raised concerns about a mandatory lesser duty
rule, but a number of Members, such as China, remained silent.
The Chairman stated that we will continue the discussion of
lesser duty at the September plurilateral session.

FRIENDS PAPER ON PUBLIC INTEREST


11. (SBU) On behalf of the Friends, Hong Kong presented in the
informal session the revised paper (TN/RL/GEN/53) on a mandatory
public interest test. Hong Kong pointed out that the proposal is
limited to requiring examination of a measure's economic effects,
rather than the broader public interest. The proposal also does
not define how those effects should be examined, although that
can be discussed at a later meeting. India noted that all
Members consider their public interest, but asked whether we
really need a legal obligation; it also asked Members to share
their experiences. Canada, which has an infrequently-used public
interest provision in its current law, indicated that it
supported the thrust of the paper, but believed that such an
inquiry should be distinct from the determination of AD/CV
duties. It believed that a public interest test should be
considered only after a Member has determined that antidumping
measures are otherwise appropriate. Reflecting comments by many
Members at the prior meeting, Brazil expressed concern about how
a public interest decision would be treated by a dispute
settlement panel. China complained that the new version of this
paper was limited to economic interests, rather than broader
public interest; in China's view Members should consider such
issues as public health, the environment and national security in
deciding whether to apply antidumping duties. At this point,
time ran out, but the Chair said he would return to this paper at
the September meeting.

FRIENDS PROPOSAL ON REVIEW
PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 9


12. (SBU) Korea presented in the plurilateral consultations the
FANs paper (TN/RL/GEN/44) on proposals for Article 9 procedures
(imposition and collection/assessment of antidumping duties).
This was the second time the paper was discussed during
plurilateral consultations. (Note: at the last plurilateral,
the FANs were having such difficulty explaining and justifying
their proposals that the Chairman stopped the discussion and
asked that proponents do some homework in order to better present
their case for the next meeting.) This time Korea was better
prepared and the discussions went more smoothly, although little,
if any convergence on issues was reached.


13. (SBU) The FANs' paper advocates that certain rules and
principles applicable to the investigation phase of a dumping
investigation be equally applicable to subsequent proceedings
(for example new shipper reviews and, in the U.S. system,
"administrative reviews," during which the final assessment of
antidumping duties is determined). Two central issues flow from
this proposal: (1) whether the practice of "zeroing" should be
disallowed in the context of administrative reviews and (2)
whether the "de minimis" threshold in investigations should be
applicable to administrative reviews. Because the practice of
zeroing in the context of administrative reviews is currently
being examined by two WTO dispute settlement panels, Members
recognized that further discussion of the issue should wait until
after the examination of the panel reports. As to the de minimis
issue, the FANs argued that there was no reason why the two
percent threshold applicable in investigations should not be
equally applicable to administrative reviews. The United States
countered by stating that the de minimis threshold was a
negotiated threshold without any substantive meaning and that, as
the WTO Appellate Body has recognized, nothing in the current
text of the Antidumping Agreement required the two percent
threshold to be applicable to administrative reviews.


14. (SBU) The FANs paper also proposed that the evidence and due
process provisions of Article 6 become applicable to Article 9
review proceedings. As an initial matter, several Members,
including the United States, made the point that the FANs should
clarify precisely which specific provisions of Article 6 should
be applicable Article 9 proceedings and for the provisions that
would apply, precisely how they would apply. More generally
however, the United States expressed some support for this
proposal given that numerous due process procedures are already
part of U.S. practice. Others with less transparent systems were
more argumentative. The EC, for example, asked the FANs to
explain their practice in this area, knowing that Korea, despite
being a significant user of the antidumping remedy, has conducted
very few, if any, reviews under Article 9. Korea's unconvincing
response was that their initial investigations were so thorough
that subsequent reviews were unnecessary. The EC also made the
relatively weak argument that Article 9 proceedings in the EC
system were only of concern to the importer and exporter being
examined, ignoring the fact that decisions made in one
determination might establish an important precedent in other
proceedings involving similarly situated interested parties.
Overall, given the vastly different systems of Members under
Article 9 (e.g., retrospective versus prospective duty
collection),it became abundantly apparent that the FANs
proposals would have varying ramifications and that Members were
reluctant change their particular duty collection system.

SUBSIDIES

US PAPER ON WHEN AND HOW TO ALLOCATE
SUBSIDY BENEFITS OVER TIME


15. (SBU) The US presented in informal session, and again in the
plurilateral consultations, its paper (TN/RL/GEN/45) synthesizing
and elaborating upon three earlier proposals (TN/RL/GEN/4,
TN/RL/GEN/12 and TN/RL/GEN/17) on the decision of whether to
allocate the benefits of a subsidy over time rather than
attributing them solely to the year of receipt. If benefits are
allocated, the US paper addressed the period and model of the
allocation. The US noted that there are at least three possible
bases for distinguishing subsidies to be allocated from those to
be expensed: frequency, size and use. There was broad support
for the US approach which identifies subsidies to be allocated
based on frequency with which the subsidy is granted, i.e., on
whether a subsidy is recurring or non-recurring, with the latter
subsidies being allocated over time. On this point, Canada noted
that it distinguishes subsidies based on the use and purpose of
the subsidy, and would want any rules or guidelines on subsidy
allocation to remain sufficiently flexible to accommodate
Members' different approaches. The US agreed that some
flexibility should be preserved, and noted that the Canadian and
US methodologies often lead to the same result.


16. (SBU) While there also appeared to be general agreement as to
the use of the average useful life of assets in the industry in
question as the allocation period, several Members commented that
they favored using an allocation period based on the average
useful life of industry assets in the exporting country rather
than on the assets of the importing company, as suggested by the
US. The US pointed out that this would mean that in a
countervailing duty investigation, similar subsidies given by
different exporting countries could result in different
countervailing duty rates and, moreover, the average useful life
of particular assets are generally the same regardless of the
country in which they are used.


17. (SBU) With regard to the US proposal that the time value of
money be factored into any allocation model, Brazil suggested
that, as in the case of the export credit rules, this would
disadvantage developing countries who generally have higher costs
of capital. The US responded that the time value of money is a
fundamental principle of finance, that the export credit rules
are an entirely separate issue, and that a GATT Panel and an
Informal Group of Experts has already endorsed inclusion of the
time value of money in any allocation formula. Finally, several
Members asked whether the US proposal would only apply to
countervailing measures, or would also apply to direct dispute
settlement challenges to subsidies. The US responded that it was
focusing on countervailing duties, but suggested that it may be
appropriate to apply these principles to other parts of the
Subsidies Agreement as well and that there should be a separate
discussion on this issue.

FISHERIES SUBSIDIES


18. (SBU) On July 15, meeting for almost a full day, the Rules
Negotiating group discussed the fish subsidies element of its
mandate, in what may have been the most substantive and technical
discussion to date. Three papers, from Japan, Australia, and
most importantly, from Brazil, addressed which kinds of subsidies
should or should not be permitted under a future agreement.
Japan's paper provided an overview of international efforts to
combat illegal, unreported and unregulated ("IUU") fishing.
Australia, Ecuador and New Zealand cosponsored an informative
paper to help Members decide whether new fisheries subsidies
disciplines should be applicable to acquaculture and whether
there might be a risk of circumvention of stronger disciplines on
wild (fisheries) if aquaculture were excluded. Brazil's paper
presented a detailed, revised proposal addressing which
particular subsidies should be actionable, and what special
provisions might apply to developing countries. While there are
many difficult issues ahead, it is clear that the negotiating
group is engaging at a technical level that is necessary to make
significant progress in the negotiation.

JAPAN PAPER ON "IUU"
FISHING


19. (SBU) In welcoming Japan's paper, Members acknowledged the
role of IUU fishing in depleting fisheries resources and
distorting trade but roundly questioned the WTO's role in
addressing the matter. Canada and Chile took the opportunity to
inform Members of their countries' successful conclusion of
national plans of action implementing the FAO International Plan
of Action on IUU Fishing. Many delegations pointed out the
obvious fact that no country explicitly subsidizes IUU fishing.
These delegations suggested that overcapacity was the primary
driver of IUU fishing, and that stronger disciplines on subsidies
that contribute to overcapacity would help address the causes of
IUU fishing. There was also an extensive discussion of the only
example given by Japan of the kind of subsidy that should be
disciplined to help address IUU fishing: subsidies associated
with transferring vessels from a contracting party of a regional
fisheries management organization (RFMO) to a non-contracting
party of an RFMO and vice versa.

AUSTRALIA, ECUADOR AND
NEW ZEALND PAPER ON AQUACULTURE


20. (SBU) Australia characterized its paper as an attempt to
spark debate on what aspects of aquaculture were within or
outside the scope of the Rules Negotiations. The Australian
delegate said it was important that new disciplines on fisheries
subsidies not weaken existing disciplines on aquaculture and
reminded delegations of the rapid growth of the sector and the
interplay between wild caught and farming operations (as feed
fish and as fingerlings for ranching operations, for example).
Although certain delegations, including the United States,
pointed out the importance of debating the implications of not
specifically including aquaculture as a focus of the
negotiations, there was a general sense that (1) wild capture
fisheries should be the focus of this negotiation and (2) any
subsidy element associated with wild caught inputs to the sector
would likely be captured by new and/or existing disciplines.
BRAZIL PAPER ON FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT


21. (SBU) Brazil's proposal has been the most ambitious and far-
ranging in the discussions so far, as it attempts to lay out a
broad plan of the kinds of subsidies which should be prohibited
or permitted, and of the circumstances under which special and
differential treatment should be granted to developing countries.
The proposal would prohibit all subsidies to the wild (capture)
fisheries sector (that is, excluding aquaculture and inland
fisheries),except for programs included in a non-actionable
green box. The non-actionable programs would include subsidies
for various conservation, health and safety purposes, programs to
reduce fishing capacity (i.e., buybacks) and retraining programs
for fishermen. Subsidies to artisanal and small-scale fishing
would also be non-actionable depending upon the state of the
stock (as determined by the FAO). The paper offers definitions
of "artisanal" and "small-scale" fishing. (Note: this exclusion
would apparently apply to developed as well as developing
countries.) However, if any vessel and/or company of a Member
were found to engage in IUU fishing, serious prejudice would be
deemed to exist for all of that Member's otherwise non-actionable
subsidies. Members would have three years to phase out or
eliminate all prohibited subsidies. Members would also have to
comply with more detailed notification requirements (including
information identifying the fishery receiving the subsidy,
subsidy amounts on a per vessel/fleet/fishery basis and the
management status of the fishery); if a subsidy is not notified,
it would be presumed to be prohibited.


22. (SBU) For developing countries, an additional list of
subsidies would be permitted under certain conditions (e.g.,
Members which are part of a regional fisheries management
organization would receive special flexibility),including
subsidies to fishing vessel construction, repair and
modernization, government-to-government payments for access to a
country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and assistance to
disadvantaged regions. However, serious prejudice would be
presumed in certain circumstances (e.g., subsidies benefiting any
vessel not operating under the rules of a regional fisheries
management organization).


23. (SBU) The paper was very well received with many delegations
applauding the substantive work and level of technical
engagement. Virtually every aspect of the paper provoked
discussion as delegates responded to the many details offered in
the paper, mostly reacting to the text rather than questioning
the Brazilian formulation or assumptions. Developing countries,
such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, et al, welcomed the
S&D provisions but questioned the strictures involved. Japan,
Korea and Chinese Taipei in an apparent concern for the treatment
of China, criticized the two-tiered approach to disciplining
subsidies. Korea questioned whether the proposal was too
elaborate at this stage in the negotiations. Many countries
questioned the draconian nature of the one-strike-and-you-are-out
proposal on IUU fishing and the difficulties of meeting the
notification requirements, although many countries welcomed
strong transparency provisions, including the EC which has made
transparency its strongest objective. There were calls for
further refinement of distinctions between artisanal and small
scale fisheries. In every instance, Brazil described its paper
as a work in progress intended to stimulate discussion, and
expressed flexibility on the particulars.


24. (SBU) The United States reaffirmed its discomfort with a
green light category, and questioned if some of the proposed
greenlight programs could instead be simply exempted from the
contemplated stricter disciplines. New Zealand highlighted the
need to keep the approach simple and suggested that infusing a de
minimis threshold into the negotiated text might obviate the need
for an S&D response to every provision.

TECHNICAL GROUP ON QUESTIONNAIRES


25. (SBU) The technical group on questionnaires reconvened to
continue a discussion of Members' practices with regard to
antidumping questionnaires. For this meeting, the Group's
Chairman provided members with a matrix comparing the standard
exporter questionnaires of Brazil, China, The European
Communities, India, New Zealand, and the United States. The
Group reviewed sections of the matrix addressing company contact
information, corporate structure, and affiliation. The Chair
concluded that there was general agreement on two points: 1) E-
mail addresses should be requested and used to facilitate the
process of collecting data, recognizing that the medium may not
be appropriate for the transmission of certain information; and
2) an organization chart of the respondent company is a useful
tool which should be requested. Finally, the Chair noted that
Members' questions regarding affiliation differ significantly.
The level of detail contained in the United States' affiliation
questions became the focus of the discussion, but the session
concluded with no consensus on the requisite questions that
should be asked with regard to affiliation.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL MEETINGS


26. (SBU) The Chairman held a series of meetings with individual
Members and small groups to discuss ways to intensify the process
leading up to the Hong Kong ministerial in December. The Chair
made it clear that in his view the current process is working
well, but may need to be augmented. The problem with the current
process was illustrated by the fact that the Group did not have
time to discuss four of the papers submitted for this meeting.
Various ideas were floated including lengthening the meetings,
and appointing "facilitators" to guide the discussions on certain
issues. However, the Chair did not announce at the meeting any
specific decision regarding the details of such proposals.
(NOTE: In a subsequent report to the Trade Negotiating Committee,
the Chair stated that he expected to select "Friends of the
Chair" to advance the work on particular issues.)


27. (SBU) The United States had a bilateral meeting at the
request of Brazil in order to allow its administrators to make a
presentation on their calculation of a "lesser duty" in
antidumping investigations. The United States met bilaterally
with China and with Mexico to get a better sense of their views
on the progress of negotiations. The United States also met
bilaterally with Norway to discuss its proposal on transparency
and due process in antidumping investigations that it will be
presenting to the negotiating group in September. Finally, the
United States met plurilaterally with the EC, Canada and
Australia to discuss how to move the countervailing duty/subsidy
aspects of the negotiations forward. Shark