Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA1394
2005-06-07 10:04:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JUNE 2,

Tags:  PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 001394 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JUNE 2,
2005

REF: GENEVA 1387 (JCIC-XXVII-015)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 001394

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JUNE 2,
2005

REF: GENEVA 1387 (JCIC-XXVII-015)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-019.


2. (U) At a U.S.-hosted reception, held on June 2 at the
U.S. Mission, Delegation members engaged the other
participating Delegations' members from Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia and Ukraine on various topics under discussion in the
JCIC. Those conversations are reported below.

THANKS FOR THE LAWYERS


3. (S) Dunn spoke with Sorokina regarding work in the first
half of JCIC-XXVII. She confirmed that the only items she
was aware of that were to be completed were the Bulava
documents, the draft Agreement on Replacement of RDE, the
draft S-Series joint statement on Zlatoust, and possibly some
work on Ground Transportation formats. She did not indicate
that there was anything else the Russian Delegation was going
to raise. She also commented on how helpful it was to have a
lawyer on their Delegation, stating that was something she
had pushed for after the last session (based in part on the
U.S. request that Russia have a lawyer available). She said
it made it much quicker to get things done.


4. (S) On other topics, Sorokina indicated to Dunn that it
was her impression that the Russians are committed to the
June 28-30 Working Group One (WG-1) meetings (they already
have their logistics confirmed, and are arriving June 27),
and are fully expecting the United States to show.

BULAVA


5. (S) Foley asked Ryzhkov when the flight-test for the
Bulava could be expected. Would it be conducted before the
end of this year? Ryzhkov answered that it would probably
occur after the conversion of all the launchers on the

Typhoon had been completed. He stated that this is a
different system and that a non-standard process was being
undertaken to get it tested and deployed. He allowed as to
how the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement problem would have to
be addressed, but conducting the initial flight is the
imperative at this time.


6. (C) Fedorchenko told Singer, Page and Foley that Russian
experts believed that, from a statistical perspective, data
from a minimum of three RSM-56 flight-tests would be needed
to accurately calculate the missile's throw-weight.

SS-25 ELIMINATIONS


7. (S) Venevtsev asked Foley why the United States does not
consider the SS-25s as eliminated. The Russian view is that
they will never fly again and, therefore, Russia considers
them eliminated. Foley responded that the Treaty describes
certain procedures for the elimination of mobile ICBMs. In
the case of the recent SS-25 eliminations, those procedures
had not been completed, specifically for the SCDM and
nozzles. Accordingly, the United States considers that the
status of the four ICBMs remains open. He added that there
are significant differences of Treaty interpretation on this
matter and, until they are resolved, the situation must
remain open. Venevtsev asked whether there could be common
ground on the SCDM issue and suggested that the upper section
in dispute could be presented for inspectors to view and then
removed, but it would not be eliminated. Foley responded
that removal of the electronic devices and elimination of the
airframe containing those devices would provide a basis for
consideration. Venevtsev did not indicate any enthusiasm for
such an outcome. Foley stated that it was hard to understand
why those devices could not be removed from the airframe
without damaging them, but Venevtsev only responded that the
system was designed in that fashion. Venevtsev expressed
concern that the eliminations not be slowed down or halted as
a result of this dispute, because the backlog would create
serious problems with plans for elimination of the SS-25
force. Foley replied that the Parties needed to find a
solution.


8. (S) Johnston had essentially the same conversation with
Venevtsev on SS-25 elimination. Venevtsev suggested that it
would remove the issue, it was his view that Russia could
make the guidance and control section available for viewing.
However, Russia had no intention of destroying the unit.


9. (S) Buttrick asked Bolotov and Smirnov how soon it would
be before U.S. inspectors would encounter burned-out
first-stage rocket motors during SS-25 ICBM elimination
inspections. Smirnov said he anticipated that it could occur
in the next batch of SS-25 eliminations, which should take
place the last two weeks in July. Bolotov said that he had
developed the proposed procedures for measuring the exterior
of the first-stage rocket motor in order to assist U.S.
inspectors in determining the type of ICBM that was being
eliminated during inspections. Buttrick thanked Bolotov for
suggesting this proposal, and said that it would be a helpful
proposal for Washington to consider. Buttrick said that he
believed issues were easier to work in JCIC channels when
Russia provided information to the United States in advance.
It is more difficult to work an issue when U.S. inspectors
are surprised during inspections. For example, if Russia
could have provided more information about its plans prior to
the first SS-25 elimination inspection, perhaps U.S.
inspectors would not have had such a difficult time during
the inspection. Buttrick said that it was a complete
surprise to the United States that Russia had not planned to
eliminate the entire section of the missile forward of the
SCDM, and aft of the front section. Bolotov said that this
section of the missile was important for sustaining the
remainder of the SS-25 ICBM force in the future. Buttrick
said that, since the Treaty clearly requires that the SCDM
and the front section of the SS-25 be eliminated, it is only
logical that the guidance and control section should be
eliminated as well. Smirnov said that Russia understands the
U.S. position, but believes that Paragraph 2 of the
Conversion or Elimination Protocol allows Russia to remove
this system before the missile is eliminated. Buttrick said
that Washington would be reviewing this issue before the next
elimination inspection.


10. (C) Smirnov told Singer and Page that Russia wants to
retain intact SS-25 guidance and control sections so they can
be used as spare parts. He explained that there is almost
nothing in those sections that can be serviced, and that they
are essentially line replaceable units. Many of the devices
in the guidance and control section are miniaturized, and
they are mounted in such a way that it would be nearly
impossible to remove them from the airframe without breaking
them. Fedorchenko claimed that it has been Russia's
understanding all along that it would be permitted to remove
and retain the guidance and control sections intact. Smirnov
reiterated that they have a few more SS-25s to eliminate that
have been the subject of experiments. He believed that our
concerns over the elimination of SS-25 nozzles will be
resolved after those missiles are eliminated, because the
subsequent nozzles will be presented intact for elimination.
He was adamant, however, that providing photographs of the
nozzles for U.S. inspectors to use during elimination
inspections would be "excessive."


11. (S) Look noted to Boryak that Russia had informed the
United States during this JCIC session of an additional
complication in SS-25 eliminations, namely that the length of
some SS-25 first-stages would be altered by the process of
burning the fuel. Russia had proposed a unilateral Russian
statement to acknowledge this situation and provide for a
different length measurement of these stages. Look stated
that he did not have guidance on this question and would need
to take the proposal back to Washington for consideration.
Hence, this issue could not be addressed during this part of
JCIC-XXVII. Look stated that, although he could not state
how Washington would respond to the substance of the Russian
proposal, he believed that procedurally any document on this
subject would need to be done jointly, thereby recording a
mutual solution to this problem. Boryak stated that he
agreed that the problem would only be resolved by a joint
agreement of some kind.


12. (C) Smirnov told Singer, Page and Foley that he expected
burn-through to be a problem only for the end domes of SS-25
solid rocket motors that had their propellant removed by low
pressure burning. He explained that the cylindrical portion
of the motor casing was reinforced, and that the end domes
were substantially weaker. This is why he believes that the
new Russian proposal to confirm missile type in such cases by
measuring the length of the cylindrical section of the first
stage will be a good solution. He reiterated that we must
reach agreement as quickly as possible on procedures for
confirming type for SS-25s that have been shortened in length
by burning, because Russia has begun to prepare several such
missiles for elimination.


13. (C) Johnston asked Venevtsev about the meeting on SS-25
elimination where Venevtsev had interjected a correction to
what the Russian interpreter (Yevarovskaya) had said. Had
Fedorchenko said that the guidance and control section of the
SS-25 was part of the SCDM, or had the interpreter made a
mistake. Venevtsev said that the interpreter had made a
mistake. He added that the Russian Delegation was very
dissatisfied with her work. She routinely did not translate
much of what was spoken in Russian into English. It was hard
for the Russian Delegation to understand this, given that she
had spent some time in New York translating at the UN.

SECOND PART OF JCIC-XXVII


14. (C) Boryak told Look that he thought a week would be
enough for the concluding, second part of this JCIC session.
Look said that he saw nothing developing that would take any
longer. Boryak went on to say that the Ukrainians had asked
him about the timing and duration for the second part of the
session and had told him that they had some agenda item they
wanted to discuss that might require more than a week to
conclude. Boryak did not know the topic that Ukraine had in
mind. Look stated that he would talk directly with the
Ukrainians about it.

FUTURE OF START

15. (S) Venevtsev asked Foley about U.S. views on the future
of START and whether it should be extended or somehow adapted
to cover the three-year interval between expiration of START
and expiration of the Moscow Treaty, or whether a new treaty
should be pursued and who should be party to it. Foley
responded that the United States had not begun its
deliberations on that subject yet, but eventually we would
begin such a process.


16. (S) Venevtsev and Kashirin asked Buttrick whether the
United States had considered extending the START Treaty
beyond 2009. Buttrick said that the issue had not yet been
discussed in Washington, but the policy community was aware
that this was an issue that needed to be discussed sooner
rather than later. Buttrick asked whether the issue had been
discussed in Moscow. Venevtsev said that it had not. He
said that this would be a controversial issue among different
agencies in the Russian Government. Buttrick said he
expected that the same would be true in the U.S. Government.
Buttrick asked Venevtsev if he envisioned the Treaty to be
extended as a five-party Treaty or if it should be a modified
Treaty that would continue with certain provisions of the old
START Treaty. Venevtsev emphatically stated that any future
Treaty on strategic offensive arms should only apply to
Russia and the United States, and that non-nuclear weapons
states should not be a part of it. Additionally, he believed
that only a few of the inspection/verification provisions
should be brought forward. Kashirin asked Buttrick whether
the U.S. Senate would need to ratify the extended Treaty.
Buttrick said he believed that the Senate would have to give
its advice and consent on any changes that were made to the
START Treaty as it exists today. Kashirin said he believed
that this could pose significant problems for extending the
Treaty.


17. (C) Grinevich asked Miller if he worked for the Ministry
of Defense. In an effort to elicit Miller's opinion on the
future of START, Grinevich offered that he thought START had
accomplished its purpose. Miller agreed that many objectives
of START had been met and that the Parties would have to
begin discussing the future of START at least a couple years
ahead of 2009. Grinevich stated that it was up to us to
determine whether START is extended, i.e., the United States,
because all issues relative to his country were resolved.

SS-24 ELIMINATION BY JAPAN OR SWEDEN?


18. (S) Shevtsov told Mullins that both Japan and Sweden had
expressed interest in assisting Ukraine in the elimination of
their SS-24 solid-rocket motors. He said that both countries
desired to be a partner with the Untied States, if the United
States provided additional assistance. Shevtsov said Ukraine
wanted to eliminate the solid-rocket motors before 2009, when
the Treaty ends; however, if Ukraine had to finance the
elimination of the rocket motors by themselves, he did not
believe they would be able to make that deadline.

TRIDENT MANEUVERS


19. (S) An exchange of pleasantries by Yegorov and Foley
about the good old days in the SCC abruptly morphed into the
question of Trident maneuvers. Yegorov and Fedorchenko made
the usual assertions to Foley that they were procedures for
dispensing. Foley answered that they were not such
procedures, they were made for range safety purposes, and
were not Treaty violations. The U.S. position was well-known
on this and had not changed. A short discussion about RSM-56
flight-testing plans with Fedorchenko produced the expected
reply that one could occur by the end of the year after
conversion of the Typhoon launchers.
ZLATOUST AND RDE SHOULD BE READY TO GO

20. (S) Kottmyer confirmed with Kotkova that the
U.S.-proposed text on the S-Series Joint Statement regarding
the site diagram changes at the Zlatoust facility for
suspect-site inspections was acceptable to the Russian
Federation. Kotkova confirmed that Russia would provide a
joint draft text as soon as possible so that the Parties
could proceed to conforming. With respect to the ad-ref JCIC
Agreement on replacement of radiation detection equipment,
Kottmyer provided Kotkova with a markup of the English text
showing the minor editorial points where the Russian ad-ref
text differed. Kotkova said that Russia would correct its
ad-ref text and provide the United States with a new version.
Specifically, she confirmed that "spare" batteries would be
acceptable, as opposed to "replaceable."

"ALTERNAT" AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES


21. (S) Kottmyer informed Kotkova of the fact that the
Treaty Office in Washington had been consulted on the way the
JCIC completes the "alternat" for its documents. Kottmyer
said she had followed up on a comment Kotkova had made at the
conforming meeting held on June 1. Kotkova had questioned
Kottmyer on the JCIC method of completing documents. She
pointed out that it did not appear to be done in strict
conformity with treaty practice. She pointed to the example
of the Moscow Treaty, where the Russians received an English
and Russian version with Russia listed first, and the United
States received an English and Russian version with the
United States listed first. In the JCIC, however, there are
two versions prepared of each document: an English version
with the United States listed first, and a Russian version
with the FSU Parties listed first in alphabetical order.
Kottmyer said that State L/T advised that, since these
documents were not treaties and the START Parties had
established a long-standing practice (12 years and over 100
documents),it was not critical for normal treaty practice to
be strictly followed, and that the established practice
should continue with no modification. Kotkova agreed, and
thanked Kottmyer for checking with the treaty experts.


22. (C) Sorokina and Johnston talked about accreditation of
BIC and JCIC Delegation members. Sorokina said that nothing
new had occurred since the Delegations met in October.
Russia had not had any difficulty getting visas this time
because they worked directly with the Swiss in Moscow. It
was the Russian view that Russia and the United States should
approach the Swiss jointly to ask for accreditation.
Johnston said that the Swiss had provided a note saying they
would provide privileges and immunities for BIC members, but
would not issue the identity cards. It was his view,
however, that this was only someone's word and may not be a
formal Swiss Government position. If there were a real
problem, some form of written proof that we had these
privileges and immunities would certainly be required.

TELEMETRY


23. (C) Razumov told Singer he was not aware of the April
U.S. F144 NRRC notification informing Russia that we had
resolved the cyclical synchronization problem with some
Russian missile flight-test telemetry recordings raised
informally by the U.S. at the last JCIC session. Singer
explained the cause of the problem and thanked him for
Russia's efforts to find a solution. Razumov said he hoped
we would continue to try to resolve these types of problems
through cooperation at the working level. Although Russia
does not plan to raise any telemetry issues during Part I of
JCIC-XXVII, Razumov said they intend to discuss the March 12,
2003 Peacekeeper flight-test during Part II.

MMIII AND TRIDENT RVOSI ISSUES


24. (C) Ryzhkov further explained to Emig the Minuteman (MM)
III RVOSI example that he had cited during the Heads of
Delegation meeting on that subject (REFTEL). He said that a
cone-shaped RV cover was placed in the viewing area,
apparently covering an RV. A gust of wind blew, possibly
through a crack or gap in the van, and moved the cover,
revealing that there was no RV beneath the cover. Ryzhkov
appeared to suggest that the U.S. was hiding something. When
asked what he thought would solve this MM III issue, he said
the United States must completely change its method of
presenting the front section, citing the example of
Peacekeeper. Emig commented that it sounded like they would
prefer that the United States leave the front section in the
silo rather than lift it up into the van. Ryzhkov said he
thought that might be a step in the right direction. Emig
pointed out that the current MM III RVOSI procedures allow
them to see more than if we left the front section in the
silo. Jones asked if they thought a demonstration, similar
to the Trident II, was needed to resolve this issue. Ryzhkov
said he thought it might be useful.


25. (C) Ryzhkov told Emig that, for all intents and
purposes, the Trident II RVOSI issue was resolved. He
expressed his personal opinion that the concluding agreement
should not be too specific, but simply spell out the
procedures. He thought the new procedures would eventually
resolve their concerns.


26. (U) Look sends.
Moley