Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GENEVA1339
2005-06-02 05:15:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON GROUND

Tags:  PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 001339 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON GROUND
TRANSPORTATION (GT) NOTIFICATION FORMATS, REPLACEMENT OF
RUSSIAN RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPEMENT (RDE),AND RUSSIAN
RESPONSE TO SS-25 RVOSI RDE PROPOSAL, MAY 27, 2005

REF: A. STATE 81372 (JCIC-DIP-05-006)

B. STATE 71185

C. GENEVA 3033 (JCIC-XXVI-048)

D. STATE 60736

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 001339

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS
DOE FOR AN-1
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR MILLER
DTRA FOR OSA
DIA FOR RAR-3

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON GROUND
TRANSPORTATION (GT) NOTIFICATION FORMATS, REPLACEMENT OF
RUSSIAN RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPEMENT (RDE),AND RUSSIAN
RESPONSE TO SS-25 RVOSI RDE PROPOSAL, MAY 27, 2005

REF: A. STATE 81372 (JCIC-DIP-05-006)

B. STATE 71185

C. GENEVA 3033 (JCIC-XXVI-048)

D. STATE 60736

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-009.


2. (U) Meeting Date: May 27, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY


3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission
on May 27, 2005, to discuss the U.S.-proposed exchange of
letters relating to adding suffixes to Ground Transportation
(GT) Notification Formats 144 (REF A); replacement of Russian
Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) at the Washington and San
Francisco Points Of Entry (POEs) (REF B); and the Russian
response to the U.S. recommendation to use Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty RDE equipment and procedures to
resolve U.S. concerns over the use of an oversized cover
during START SS-25 RVOSI inspections (REF C). All Parties
were represented.


4. (S) On GT, Parties were in general agreement to exchange
letters that would codify adding a suffix to the Format 144
GT resupply notifications. However, the Russian Delegation
provided a draft Format 144A (U.S. Notification of Intent to
Use GT Vehicles),as well as a draft Format 144B (Russian
Confirmation of the Provision of GT Services). The latter
contained estimated border-crossing locations and dates. The
U.S. Delegation disagreed with the Russian Delegation's view
that specific truck border-crossing information added value

to the process, and stated that it is not a requirement for
existing notifications and is not needed.


5. (S) With respect to the replacement of Russian RDE
currently being stored at the Washington and San Francisco
POEs, Russia accepted the U.S. view that the Russian proposal
did not update all appropriate provisions of Annex B to the
Inspection Protocol. Russia had not decided how or when the
new RDE would be delivered to U.S. territory.


6. (S) The Russian Federation rejected the U.S. proposal
made during JCIC-XXVI to use INF RDE procedures during SS-25
RVOSIs.

FORMAT 144 IN THE RNRRC


7. (S) Fedorchenko opened the working group meeting and
stated that the five previously resupply shipments to the
portal monitoring facility at Votkinsk using the standard
miscellaneous NRRC Format 144 notifications highlighted the
need for an alternate notification format. He recounted the
history of this issue, stating that the initial
Russian-proposed resolution was to create entirely new
message formats so that GT notifications could be separated
from other, more critical, Format 144 notifications.
Further, Fedorchenko noted that the United States was
generally in agreement with the idea that GT notifications
should be differentiated from other Format 144 notifications
and had proposed that letters be exchanged among
representatives of the three countries concerned which
provided for the use of suffixes to the already existing
Format 144; for example, a 144A, B, and C, rather than
producing totally new NRRC notifications.


8. (S) According to Fedorchenko, receiving a Format 144
notification caused panic within the Russian Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center (RNRRC) as watch officers tried to decipher
the who, what, and where from the message text, and then
tried to notify the correct agency within the Russian
Government. Fedorchenko complained that he was often
awakened at home to be notified of a routine Votkinsk
resupply shipment. Fedorchenko reaffirmed that the purpose
of adding a suffix to the current Format 144 was to
differentiate it from other, higher priority, NRRC
notification messages. He concluded by stating that the
Russian Federation agreed to the exchange of letters during
this session as long as Belarus consented to the approach.

TEMPLATED FORMAT 144s FOR GT RESUPPLY SHIPMENTS


9. (S) Fedorchenko provided the other Parties with drafts of
new Format 144A and 144B notifications (texts of both are
contained in para 19). He stated that the Russian Delegation
would not be submitting a Format 144C because it only
pertained to Belarus. Fedorchenko stated that the Parties
should work toward initiating the first use of the new
formats for the resupply mission to be conducted at the end
of the year since it was too late to use them for the
upcoming resupply mission. Mullins asked whether the 144A
and 144B notifications corresponded to the 40-day and 20-day
GT notifications currently being used. Fedorchenko responded
that the 144A corresponded to the U.S. 40-day preliminary
notification, and the 144B corresponded to the Russian
confirmation of the provision of GT services. He then
requested a change to the U.S.-proposed letter stating that
the last sentence of the second paragraph had a misleading
parenthetical phrase ("144A, 144B, 144C,..."). He explained
that the three periods at the end could lead a reader to
conclude that there would be more than three GT notification
formats (i.e., 144H, 144I, etc.). Mullins agreed to consider
the change.

RUSSIANS REQUEST BORDER-CROSSING
INFORMATION FOR GT


10. (S) Mullins asked whether anything had been added to or
deleted from the formats that were currently in use.
Fedorchenko stated that there was no way for the Russian and
Belarusian MODs to track the shipments once they departed
Darmstadt, Germany. To them, this was a flaw in the process
because their guidelines dictate they coordinate with a
number of different agencies within and outside of their
borders (law enforcement, border patrol, etc.) during the
shipment. He stated that the RNRRC currently only knew when
the shipment would depart Darmstadt and when it would arrive
at Votkinsk. Russia believed it was important that the RNRRC
know when and where the shipment would cross national
borders. As such, the Russian-proposed Format 144B contained
truck border-crossing information related to the estimated
time and location that the truck would cross a nation's
borders which was in addition to the information currently
conveyed between the Parties.


11. (S) Mullins stated that it was the belief of the United
States, as expressed during the NRRC consultations conducted
in March 2005 (REF D),that, since the Russian Federation was
using a Russian trucking company, border-crossing information
would be readily available from Department 162 at Votkinsk.
For example, the truck driver could advise of any deviation
to the actual border-crossing point due to road conditions.
Further, any requirement to provide updated border-crossing
information could be viewed as an additional obligation on
the part of the United States, which would be impossible to
fulfill since the information was not within U.S. control.
He also made it clear that the United States did not want to
conclude letters and then find out that there were
significant differences between the Parties of what was
expected, such as the additional information in the
Russian-provided formats.


12. (S) Fedorchenko stated it would not be proper to
coordinate with the various agencies within Russia based upon
information received from a truck driver. He also clarified
that the information contained in the Format 144B would not
be the exact border-crossing location and date, but rather a
planned location and date. If there was a deviation, there
would be no need for an update of that information by any of
the Parties. Mullins asked, if the border-crossing
information was just for planning purposes, what was the use
of putting the information in the Format 144B? As an
example, if the loading of cargo in Germany was estimated to
take one day, but took up to three days, then what was gained
from including estimated time for border-crossings? Mullins
asked Fedorchenko to consider the U.S.-proposed letter which
could be discussed again later in the session. He further
stated that the United States wanted to resolve the issue
without changing the GT arrangement. Fedorchenko stated that
there was a mutual understanding of the issue and that
Belarus would need to consent to the proposal.

BELARUSIAN RESPONSE TO GT ISSUE


13. (S) Grinevich stated that Belarus was complying fully
with the GT arrangement, as stated in their original letter
on ground transportation dated March 20, 2002. It had
reviewed the 144 suffix issue, supported the U.S.-proposed
letter and was prepared to exchange letters on this topic
this session. He further stated that Belarus concurred with
the Russian position.

NEW RDE AND UPDATED DOCUMENTATION


14. (S) Fedorchenko opened the discussion on the replacement
of Russian RDE by stating that the RDE currently located at
the Washington and San Francisco POEs was outdated and had
reached the end of its shelf life. It needed to be replaced
with more modern RDE. He handed over an updated
Russian-proposed draft agreement to Mullins, stating that it
was in the best interest of all Parties to have an agreement
negotiated as soon as possible. He acknowledged that the
U.S. Delegation had reviewed the original Russian draft and
accepted the suggested changes. Mullins asked whether the
proposed agreement now included MOU Annex 8 references which
were left out of the original proposal. Fedorchenko
confirmed that changes had been made to the RDE equipment
lists for RVOSI inspections and long-range non-nuclear ALCM
exhibitions stating that the draft agreement was now ready to
send to conforming.

BATTERIES


15. (S) Mullins stated that one minor issue remained in the
technical manual for the new equipment. The manual mentioned
a battery-operated item, however, the proposed equipment list
did not include spare batteries. In a number of instances in
Annex 8, equipment lists included spare batteries and the
Parties should be consistent. After some discussion about
how to list the spare batteries, Fedorchenko agreed to
include them in the equipment lists in the draft agreement.

REMOVAL OF OLD RDE


16. (S) Mullins stated that, since the old RDE was being
replaced, the United States assumed the old RDE would be
removed from the territory of the United States when the new
RDE was delivered. Fedorchenko confirmed that after
agreement was reached, the next inspection teams into the
Washington and San Francisco POEs would remove the old
equipment. Mullins turned the discussion over to Smith to
address specific delivery issues.

DELIVERY OF NEW RDE EQUIPMENT


17. (S) Smith asked whether the new RDE would be delivered
by an inspection team in conjunction with a normal START
inspection or by a special delivery team not associated with
a START inspection. Fedorchenko stated that the new RDE
would be delivered by a team containing RDE experts due to
the need to conduct training and to answer any technical
questions that may come up during the initial equipment
examination. He stated that the RNRRC was contemplating two
options. Option one was to have an inspection team deliver
the new RDE and option two, the preferred option, was for a
team of technical experts to deliver the new RDE. Smith
stated that DTRA was prepared to support either option.
Fedorchenko stated that the type of team used to deliver the
RDE would be driven by the availability of funds within the
RNRRC to support an extra team just to deliver RDE.

RUSSIA REJECTS INF RDE PROCEDURES FOR SS-25 RVOSIs


18. (S) Fedorchenko gave the floor to Stefanovich of the
Russian MOD to discuss the U.S. proposal to use INF RDE
equipment and procedures during SS-25 RVOSIs. Stefanovich
stated that Russia could not accept the U.S. proposal for
several reasons:

-- It would increase the time required to complete the
RVOSI;

-- It would demand additional security and organizational
measures which would increase costs; and

-- It would cause a significant decrease in readiness of
the road-mobile launcher and its base.

He further asserted that the INF RDE procedures were shown to
be imperfect on short-range and intermediate-range missiles.
The procedures could not be used to determine the number of
reentry vehicles on an SS-25 ICBM. He stated that the new
Karusel RDE was available for use, but that he would not give
technical details on it because he knew the United States was
already aware of it. He opined that, although the current
START RDE would not be useful for SS-25 RVOSI procedures, if
the United States had such confidence in it, the United
States might find it useful in verifying the accuracy of the
Karusel RDE. Mullins stated that the Russian position would
be provided to the U.S. Head of Delegation.

TEXTS OF RUSSIAN-PROPOSED FORMATS 144A AND 144B
19, (S) Begin text of Draft Format 144A:
Official Translation

DRAFT

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO USE GROUND
TRANSPORTATION TO TRANSPORT CARGO


1. ANC/STR XX-XXX/144A


2. REFERENCES: A) ANC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX
B) RNC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX
C) JCIC MATERIALS


3. CONTENT:

A) MONITORED FACILITY: (blank underline)

B) POINT OF DEPARTURE: (blank underline)

C) INFORMATION ON CARGO ROTATION:


1. TYPE AND NUMBER OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES
REQUIRED TO SHIP CARGO FROM MONITORED FACILITY:


A. 1) TYPE: (blank underline)

2) NUMBER: XX


B. 1) TYPE: (blank underline)

2) NUMBER: XX


2. ANTICIPATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF VEHICLE AT MONITORED
FACILITY: XX.XX.XX


3. APPROXIMATE NUMBER, WEIGHT, AND DIMENSIONS OF
SEPARATE PALLETIZED OR OVERSIZE UNITS OF CARGO,
INCLUDING MODULAR STRUCTURES, TO BE TRANSPORTED
TO POINT OF DEPARTURE:

NUMBER WEIGHT(KG) LENGTH(CM) WIDTH(CM) HEIGHT(CM)


A. .... .......... .......... ......... ..........


B. ... .......... .......... ......... ..........


4. HAZARDOUS CARGO REQUIRING SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES
DURING TRANSPORTATION FROM MONITORED FACILITY TO
POINT OF DEPARTURE:


A. MATERIAL: (blank underline)


B. AMOUNT: XX


C. SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES REQUIRED DURING
TRANSPORTATION: (blank underline)

D) INFORMATION ON CARGO ROTATION:

1. TYPE AND NUMBER OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES
REQUIRED TO TRANSPORT CARGO TO MONITORED FACILITY:


A. 1) TYPE: (blank underline)

2) NUMBER: XX


B. 1) TYPE: (blank underline)

2) NUMBER: XX


2. ANTICIPATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF VEHICLE AT POINT
OF DEPARTURE: XX.XX.XX


3. APPROXIMATE NUMBER, WEIGHT, AND DIMENSIONS OF
SEPARATE PALLETIZED OR OVERSIZE UNITS OF CARGO,
INCLUDING MODULAR STRUCTURES, TO BE TRANSPORTED
TO MONITORED FACILITY:

NUMBER WEIGHT(KG) LENGTH(CM) WIDTH(CM) HEIGHT(CM)

A..... .......... .......... ......... ..........


B. .... .......... .......... ......... ..........


4. HAZARDOUS CARGO REQUIRING SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES
DURING TRANSPORTATION FROM POINT OF DEPARTURE TO
MONITORED FACILITY:


A. MATERIAL: (blank underline)


B. AMOUNT: XX


C. SPECIAL SAFETY MEASURES REQUIRED DURING
TRANSPORTATION: (blank underline)

E) ANTICIPATED DATE OF RETURN OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION
TO MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX

F) SERVICES FOR ARRANGING TRANSPORT: (blank underline)


4. REMARKS: (blank underline)


5. END OF ANC/STR XX-XXX/1;4A (sic)

End text.

Begin text of draft Format 144B:

DRAFT

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF READINESS TO PROVIDE GROUND
TRANSPORTATION TO TRANSPORT CARGO


1. RNC/STR XX-XXX/144B


2. REFERENCES: A) ANC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX
B) RNC/STR XX-XXXX/XXX
C) JCIC MATERIALS


3. CONTENT:

A) TYPE AND NUMBER OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES
OF EACH TYPE TO BE PROVIDED:

1. (blank underline)


2. (blank underline)

3. (blank underline)
B) ESTIMATED DATE OF PROVISION OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION
VEHICLES AT MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX

C) ESTIMATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION
VEHICLES AT POINT OF DEPARTURE OF CARGO: XX.XX.XX

D) ESTIMATED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION
VEHICLES AT MONITORED FACILITY: XX.XX.XX

E) SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE:
(blank underline)

F) PASSPORT INFORMATION FOR DRIVERS AND ESCORTS:


1. (blank underline)


2. (blank underline)


3. (blank underline)

G) ESTIMATED DATES AND POINTS FOR CROSSING THE
BORDERS OF A COUNTRY OF TRANSIT:


1. XX.XX.XX


2. XX.XX.XX


3. XX.XX.XX


4. XX.XX.XX


4. REMARKS: (blank underline)


5. END OF RNC/STR XX-XXX/144B)

End text.


20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Draft Format 144A and 144B Notifications; and

-- Russian-proposed Draft Agreement on Replacement of RDE.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Lt Col Couch
Col(sel) Emig
Mr. Foley
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Maj Mitchner
Mr. Page
Mr. Smith
Mr. Tiersky
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus
Mr. Grinevich
Kazakhstan

Mr. Baysvanov

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Col Razumov
Ms. Sorokina
Ms. Kotkova
Col Maksimenko
Lt Col Novikov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Stefanovich
Mr. Shabalin
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int)

Ukraine

Mr. Zakharchuk


22. (U) Look sends.
Moley