Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05GABORONE1656
2005-11-10 06:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Gaborone
Cable title:  

BOTSWANA'S VP ON SADC, ZIMBABWE, CRIME, TERRORISM,

Tags:  MARR PREL SENV US ZI BC SADC POL MIL 
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 ------------------5C0F59 101134Z /23 
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2668
AMEMBASSY GABORONE 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T GABORONE 001656 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL SENV US ZI BC SADC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA'S VP ON SADC, ZIMBABWE, CRIME, TERRORISM,
MILITARY ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Katherine H. Canavan for Reasons
1.4 (b) (d)

S E C R E T GABORONE 001656

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL SENV US ZI BC SADC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA'S VP ON SADC, ZIMBABWE, CRIME, TERRORISM,
MILITARY ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Katherine H. Canavan for Reasons
1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Kate Canavan's introductory
call with Botswana's Vice President Lt. Gen. Seretse Khama
Ian Khama November 8 highlighted environmental cooperation,
counter-terrorism, Zimbabwe, crime, and military issues.
Ambassador informed VP Khama of Botswana's acceptance for
the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) program,
discussed our anti-crime and money-laundering programs, and
asked Khama's views on how the U.S. might strengthen
relations with SADC in view of constraints involving
Zimbabwe. Khama said all regional leaders are concerned
about Zimbabwe and urged the U.S. and U.K. to engage with
Zimbabwe at an appropriate level in order to break the
impasse. The Ambassador also enlisted Khama's assistance
in obtaining Botswana's agreement to participate with the
U.S. in a fully-funded March-April airlift of troops from
Rwanda to Darfur. Khama, while explaining Botswana's
history of participation in peace-keeping operations
(PKOs),asked for more details and promised to raise this
with President Mogae. Mission is optimistic that Khama will
do this, since our proposal matches criteria previously
set forth in conversations with President Mogae, VP Khama,
and Foreign Minister Merafhe. VP Khama was exceptionally
open, friendly, and engaging during the meeting. End
Summary.

TFCA, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME


2. (U) The Ambassador lauded Botswana's acceptance as the
first African country to be accepted for the TFCA and
advised Khama that she had just written to the Minister of
Finance about the program, She told Khama the program would
permit Botswana to spend up to its $7.4 million debt on
conservation initiatives. Khama thanked the Ambassador,
saying he had toured some of the country's drought-stricken
game reserves recently to ascertain how to deliver water to
animals. He said these funds would be enormously helpful.


3. (C) The Ambassador also highlighted our
counter-terrorism assistance to Botswana, namely the
training offered by the International Law Enforcement

Academy (ILEA),our Treasury Department's money-laundering
program, and a $75,000 grant to the Botswana Defence Force
(BDF). She asked how the U.S. might assist further. Khama
replied that Botswana was both advantaged and
disadvantaged. While Botswana appreciated not having been
a terrorist target, it also needed to avoid the danger of
becoming complacent. Botswana's counter-terrorist capacity
remained weak, preventing the country from being able to
respond quickly.


4. (S) Khama called intelligence-gathering a priority.
Botswana, he said, still sought a dedicated intelligence
service since the police alone could not handle it. Khama
mentioned the Haroon Rashid Aswat case, saying Botswana had
been prepared to arrest him and hand him over to the U.S. He
added that Botswana would always be happy to "hasten the
departure of such people." The Ambassador detailed for
Khama the various resources the U.S. could use to assist
Botswana in expanding its counter-terrorist capacity. In
turn, Khama mentioned the proposal to set up the CT office
would come before the cabinet "soon."


5. (SBU) As the Ambassador noted the rise in crime, Khama
said Botswana hoped to hire 1000 additional special
constables
to address that problem, putting more police on the street.
He blamed illegal Zimbabwean immigrants for the increase.
He mentioned the use of the military to supplement the
police in fighting crime. He credited these additional
efforts in halting hijackings, indicating that much of it
is perpetrated by gangs, and drops off as the gangs are
broken up.

ZIMBABWE


6. (C) The discussion turned to Zimbabwe, as the
Ambassador thanked Khama for Botswana's standing firm
against Zimbabwe pressure to halt medium wave broadcasts
from the International Broadcasting Bureau station in
Selebi-Phikwe to Zimbabwe. Khama said that Botswana
reminded Zimbabwe that its government had been consulted
about the IBB agreement from the outset. Indeed, the
broadcasts had helped to combat apartheid. Khama added
that Zimbabwe had not understood that the IBB transmitted
broadcasts which originated in Washington, thinking
that they came from Botswana.


7. (C) On President Mugabe, Khama said he had a way of
manipulating situations in his favor. For example, on the
farm seizures, Mugabe reminded people of past injustice,
that 5% of the population had taken 80% of the land.
No one, said Khama, faulted the principle of returning
land, just the way Mugabe did it. Moreover, when
protests came mainly from Europe and the United States,
Mugabe argued that these countries were interested only
in whites. So, countries ignored his undemocratic
practices and (reluctantly) stood with him. The Ambassador
commented that the black Zimbabweans who were dispossessed
in the land seizures could have kept the economy moving.
Khama agreed that the first to receive farms were ZANU-PF
cronies. Khama also noted Mugabe's skill in associating
the opposition MDC with Tony Blair. He added, however, that
Zimbabweans had only to weigh their lifestyle and suffering
with "brainwashing from the government."

ENGAGING SADC


8. (C) Having been charged with strengthening relations
with SADC, the Ambassador noted that relations were
somewhat moribund owing to the Zimbabwe problem. She said
regional organizations could be a good source of
development. Now that Botswana was chairing SADC and a new
Secretary-General was in place, perhaps we could revive the

SIPDIS
relationship beyond the technical cooperation already in
place. The U.S., she emphasized, did not want to be held
hostage to Zimbabwe.


9. (C) Khama replied that people did not understand why
the other 12 SADC countries had to suffer because of
Zimbabwe. He pointed out that, while Botswana's population
tended to be somewhat hostile to the Zimbabwe government
because of all the problems created for them by the
troubles in Zimbabwe, people in other countries often
sympathized with the GOZ and pressured their governments
accordingly. This pressure discouraged their leaders from
speaking out even though they privately disagreed with
Mugabe's policies and tactics.


10. (C) To break the impasse, Khama suggested the U.S.
and U.K. open channels to reverse the false impression
propagated by Mugabe. Why not call Mugabe's bluff, he
said, and talk frankly to the leadership? Khama also
suggested we ask to address SADC meetings and recommended
bringing in a UN mediator to pressure Mugabe (comment: he
did not mention Zimbabwe's reaction to the report of the
recent emissary on food issues. end comment). The
Ambassador expressed appreciation for his suggestions
and assured Khama his message would be passed. On aid
to SADC, she said the U.S. would be seeking to partner
with other donors. Khama added that his own comments
reflected those of regional leaders and suggested the
Ambassador engage President Mogae on this issue again.
The Ambassador replied that the U.S. still provided
humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe. She underscored
the importance of SADC to U.S. relations with the entire
region, especially since some issues could be better
handled regionally.

11.(C) Khama mentioned the success the U.S. had in
the past with Congressional or other non-executive
branch delegations in speaking to countries such
as Zimbabwe. In particular, he noted that these
delegations frequently consisted of individuals
of differing genders, racial backgrounds, and
religions. As such, governments might more
readily accept them and their views.

BOTSWANA TO PARTICIPATE IN AIRLIFT?


12. (SBU) When the Ambassador shifted the discussion to
C-130s, VP said he knew what was coming, but in fact, he
was surprised to learn that the U.S. could completely
support and fund Botswana's participation with the U.S. in
a March-April mission to airlift troops from Rwanda to
Darfur. The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. would lead
the mission and pay all operating expenses. She mentioned
that visiting U.S. contractors had commented that never
had they seen aircraft as well-maintained as Botswana's
C-130s. She asked the VP for Botswana's participation.


13. (SBU) The VP asked the Ambassador for further details
and promised to raise the issue with President Mogae. The
Ambassador thanked Khama and said the details would come in
a formal request, probably from EUCOM. She added how much
she'd been impressed with Botswana's leadership in PKO
training and understood the difficulties that long
deployments presented for Botswana. She again expressed
her thanks for Botswana's skilled intervention during
her tenure as Ambassador to Lesotho.


14. (C) Lesotho was not the problem, said Khama. Rather,
it
was Botswana's experiences with "mission creep" in Somalia
and Mozambique that has led Botswana to be so cautious.
Botswana had gone to Somalia with UNOSOM 1, but then the UN
took over and instituted "less robust" rules of engagement
(ROE),allowing locals to retain their weapons. He said the
best way to avoid getting killed is to not get shot at, and
the best way to avoid that is not to allow the wrong people
to have weapons. The U.S. recommended that Botswana, as the
most professional contingent, be given responsibility for
Baardheere. Khama personally visited Somalia seven times,
telling his troops to continue to adhere to the stricter ROE
as practiced under U.S. leadership to avoid problems. It
worked, said Khama, since Botswana lost no one. Moreover,
Botswana's troops focused on a "hearts and minds" approach,
interacting with the local population at all levels. It was
one of the "best things they ever did," said Khama, although
the initial three months deployment turned into two years.
Then, Botswana was asked to send half its troops to
Mozambique
where one year became two. Subsequently, he had to send the
troops
back to Baardheere and also to take over the areas previously
held by departed Italian troops.


15. (C) Khama underscored his point by saying that, while
Botswana had no C-130s then, it seeks to avoid involvement
at the outset in open-ended missions with high costs, where
no ceasefire is in place among the factions, and where
peacekeepers are taken hostage, as in Darfur today. With
HIV/AIDS, drought, and other priorities, in a democracy
where people can freely voice their opinions, Botswana
could expect questions if it participated in such
missions. He indicated that missions in the subregion, such
as Lesotho, were still in the realm of possibility. In
closing his comments on our request for C-130
support, Khama opined that "our pilots would love to do
it." Ambassador also raised the issue in a later
conversation with Foreign Minister Merafhe the same day.

COMMENT


16. (C) This is the warmest we have seen Khama in a long
time. The half hour courtesy call turned into a one hour
meeting during which he clearly spoke from the heart about
issues important to Botswana, namely the Zimbabwe problem
and Botswana's peacekeeping past. As a former Chief of
Staff of the Botswana Defence Force, his experiences match
his concerns about deploying Botswana troops in PKOs.
Based on past discussions with Botswana's leaders about
what kind of PKOs would be acceptable, our request for
the C-130s, with full up-front payment, complies with
virtually all of their previously-stated criteria.
Accordingly, post is optimistic that this request will
receive serious consideration, although it is premature
to speak of certain concurrence.

CANAVAN


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