HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ISTANBUL CENTRAL ASIA TECHNICAL WORKSHOP

UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001840

SIPDIS


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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM TI
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ISTANBUL CENTRAL ASIA TECHNICAL WORKSHOP
TO PREVENT THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS


1. The goal of the workshop was to build a partnership between
technical advisors and export control agencies on a regional
level. The objectives were to find regional common ground
against smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and propose
projects to support the primary goal.


2. Regional Cooperation: It was recognized that some borders
will not need radiation monitors depending on what their
neighboring country has installed. The effectiveness of
radiation monitoring depends on the regional "protective net"
established within several countries not just on one countries
ability to protect its border. Combined training and equipping
with common type equipment will save money and be more
effective. Regional cooperation is extremely important in
identifying potential sources and users (information sharing).
Central Asia is seen as the transit ground; drugs north and WMD
south.


3. Conference Conclusion: The conference wrap-up was scheduled
for two hours with the goal being the production of a single
document, signed by all parties, agreeing on steps needed to get
to the next level. Unfortunately, this was not as simple a task
as it seemed. The group, which agreed on several issues during
discussion, could not agree on very much when it came to a
written agreement (what a surprise). The Turkmens agreed to
publish the results of the conference but not the names of who
attended (this took 20 minutes). All participants expressed an
interest in expansion of cooperation in the area of radiation
monitoring but argued for 45 minutes on terminology (the
difference between a control and a monitor). All had earlier
agreed on information sharing but all balked at the creation of
a website which would contain unclassified information on
systems and procedures. The Turkmens and the Kazakhs said the
website would be an information center for terrorists to learn
how to defeat their systems. All countries gave several
examples on how they share intelligence to combat illicit
narcotics trafficking, but none were willing to share technology
and tactics to defeat proliferation of WMD. Some things they
did all agree on were the use of a "risk based approach to
prioritize efforts and the development of mobile response
teams". (COMMENT: It was very interesting to see members from
all the Central Asian countries together in one room addressing
a common problem. There were some very strong personalities, a
strong sense of country pride, some minor barbs thrown at the
other countries, but in the end, some consensus was reached.
Regional cooperation is possible on certain issues; however we
have a long way to go to find true regional cooperation. END
COMMENT.)


4. CURRENT STATUS REPORTS BY COUNTRY:

(A) Uzbekistan: Viewed as a transit country with established
and developed major transit routes. Their top priority is to
control and eliminate the smuggling of drugs and WMD materials.
The Uzbeks consider themselves a leader in Central Asia when it
comes to installation of portal monitoring equipment (85 per
cent funded by U.S. dollars) but also realize that it is
impossible to install monitors at all potential border crossing
points. They see the need for a joint initiative and regional
cooperation and view smuggling of WMD as a serious issue. They
currently have 11 monitors in place with eight more by 2006, 11
more by 2007, for a proposed total of 100 by projects end. They
have established a centralized information and dispatch center
staffed by both customs and radioactive material technical
experts. They regulate movement of WMD in accordance with
several international regimes which includes monitoring the
internal movement of "legal" radioactive materials. Their
military doctrine prohibits the production and possession of
WMD. Uzbekistan is looking for new approaches to solve
smuggling of WMD that would also compliment efforts to combat
illicit narcotics trafficking. They have designed their own
monitors using a new approach (Z detectors shielded from each

other) which are still in the infant stage but have produced
peak data points. They feel that continuous, explicit training
is required for customs and border guard units and proposed a
three level training plan. Level one is basic training for
customs and border guards, level two is supervisory training,
and level three integrates university level training for customs
candidates.

(B) Kazakhstan: The Kazakh strategy for combating WMD
trafficking is a strong customs control. They currently have
167 legal border crossing points, controlled by 16 regional
customs offices, which they consider a comprehensive customs
system. They have enacted several new laws on radioactive
materials control, most of which were driven by WMD agreements
signed by the government. They claim to comply with all
international standards and that their laws are written using
international regime control lists. Several controls of varying
degrees are in place throughout the country. Aspect monitors
(Russian design) are used at the primary crossing points (major
road, rail, and airports) with portable monitors used at minor
ports and "green border" areas. Portable monitors consist of
ionizers, spectrometers, and radiation pagers. All data
collected is first evaluated by customs then sent to the
"experts" for review if deemed necessary by customs. Customs
also has "mobile labs" which they can dispatch to any area
reporting an anomaly. The Kazakh's also agree that information
must be shared in order to effectively combat illicit
trafficking of WMD. They currently cooperate with neighboring
countries and the Russian Federation. They have a system in
place to get all collected information to one control server.
Most of the Kazakh effort with respect to WMD trafficking is
financed by Kazakhstan, with only approximately 10 percent
financed by the U.S. (a fact they are very proud of). They
currently have a 10-hour training course in place which follows
a step by step process from introduction and identification to
advanced operation of monitoring equipment. Supervisors are
offered advanced courses in "new developments".

(C) Kyrgyzstan: The Kyrgyz were very involved with the former
Soviet Union Nuclear program with regard to mining of
radioactive materials. All of the mines with the exception of
Karabela have been closed leaving piles and tailings that pose a
radioactive hazard and need to be cleaned up. In 1999
Kyrgyzstan began revising laws on the regulation of radioactive
materials, which involved several agencies. From these
revisions a list of controlled products was compiled and
enacted; which has resulted in several vehicles traveling from
China being turned back at the border. In 2003 IAEA spearheaded
a joint seminar that produced an agreement that included
equipment donations to Kyrgyz Customs. There are several EXBS
technical programs ongoing, including capacity building projects
providing communications, transportation, inspection/detection
equipment, and computer support. The Kyrgyz enjoy a close
relationship with the U.S. Department of State and wish to
continue and build on that relationship. Portal monitors are
currently being installed at some ports with the help of the
EXBS program. In March of 2005, Second Line of Defense (SLD)
had a meeting that included the Department of Energy, Department
of Defense and the Kyrgyz Government. As a result of this
meeting the Kyrgyz Government is currently working on a WMD
agreement that should be completed and signed soon. The Kyrgyz
delegation sees information sharing as a very important step in
combating WMD trafficking and supports regional cooperation.
They also agree that regional training events and exercises
would be very beneficial.

(D) Tajikistan: The Tajik delegate started by saying,
"Tajikistan agreed that Uzbekistan was a good place to start a
pilot program on radiation monitoring because it helped to
strengthen the Tajik border as well, forming a 'shield' for the
Tajik border with Uzbekistan". He went on to say that "we
should concentrate on securing the outer borders of Central

Asia; this would be cheaper and at the same time provide the
desired results". (COMMENT: The Uzbek delegation was surprised
at this proposal since it would result in no need for monitoring
on their borders and they consider themselves the leader in
Central Asia when it comes to radiation monitoring. END COMMENT)
Tajikistan has recently revised laws on dual use, narcotics, and
radioactive materials but they are still in the implementation
stage. The law states that customs has the lead on radioactive
materials import and export however the Academy of Sciences has
the lead on radioactive materials in country. Tajikistan feels
there is a need to unite regional efforts in the areas of export
control and dual use legislation. They see a need for a
regional advisory center to coordinate efforts throughout
Central Asia to include training and equipping with common types
of detection. Tajikistan admits that several areas of their
border are very transparent and detection capability is limited.
They request help on the Afghan and Chinese borders but feel
the current efforts of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan adequately
protect their common borders. Due to limited infrastructure
there are really no established major routes as there are in
other CA countries. Tajikistan currently deploys radiation
pagers for detection of radioactive materials and feels that
installation of permanent portal monitors, while effective,
would be a hit and miss proposition at best (due to terrain and
infrastructure constraints).

(E) Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan is no different than the other
CIS countries; it has signed the WMD agreement and will not
facilitate the production of any new weapons. It pays attention
to all international standards and cooperate with the IAEA with
respect to signed agreements on the regulation of nuclear
materials. Turkmen laws have four provisions with respect to
WMD; 1.) Support combating of proliferation of WMD, 2.) Combat
illicit trafficking of any material that causes international
hazards and support all international efforts, 3.) Deny
over-flight of aircraft carrying WMD components (PSI agreement),
4.) Support additional steps on implementation of
nonproliferation efforts. As of April of 2005 all major border
crossings have radioactive material monitoring devices in place,
this includes five crossing points with Iran, one with
Afghanistan, one with Uzbekistan, and one Caspian seaport. The
Turkmen delegate stated, "You can all sleep well at night
because our borders are locked down tight". In 2006 they will
be opening a new "state of the art" border crossing and
deploying a mobile X-ray van. (COMMENT: All radiation
monitoring projects in Turkmenistan are 100 percent funded by
the U.S., a fact the Turkmen delegate seemed very proud of. END
COMMENT) Turkmenistan sees the value in regional information
sharing but on a limited basis within the customs community
only.


5. U.S. PRESENTATIONS:

(A) Dr. Ken Sale, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, gave a
presentation on the U.S. perspective of WMD enforcement on U.S.
borders. He stated the strategy was to have "smarter borders"
which involves pushing borders outward and relying on
international cooperation. The highest payoff in border
management is not in the equipment, it's in the people
coordinating and cooperating with each other. Radioactive
materials, some of which are legal, are small and easily
shielded from monitors. For this reason the United States needs
more technical cooperation to help detect methods of
transportation and end users. It is imperative that all
personnel involved have a complete understanding of detection
systems and their limitations. The focus is changing to
detection and training that must be comprehensive and
compatible. There are several new detection devices being
developed and deployed, to include the "ARAM system", a portable
system being used by the California Highway Patrol that has
produced positive results. The United States needs to cooperate
locally and internationally as a team in order to combat the

threat of WMD, which potentially threatens all countries.

(B) Major Chip Parker, CENTCOM J5 Disaster Preparedness, gave a
CENTCOM Strategy briefing which proposed a Regional Disaster
Preparedness Center for Central Asia. This concept was first
introduced by CENTCOM in Africa which now has 11 nations
participating. It is not a U.S. centric program; it relies on
regional cooperation in order to work. CENTCOM considers
Central Asia a very strategically important region and feels
there is a willingness within the individual states to cooperate
with each other. The proposed center would promote information
sharing on experiences and best practices as well as facilitate
regional training in legal, response, and equipment aspects.
CENTCOM will be visiting all the CA countries in the next couple
of months to discuss this concept with the respective ministries.


6. WORKING GROUP TOPICS AND RESULTS:

The delegates were separated into two working groups for the
morning session, then shuffled and formed two new working groups
for the afternoon session.

(A) Group I - Portal Monitors. This group evaluated the
current status of the portal monitors currently being used and
made recommendations on further procurement. The consensus of
the group was that there are several different types in use and
all have pluses and minuses. The need to integrate technical
experts into the detection process was split, some feel the
customs personnel can evaluate the data and don't need technical
experts unless asked for, others agreed that the monitoring
staff should include full time technical experts to evaluate
data. The need to standardize equipment and terminology was
agreed upon by all parties. Standardized training and joint
exercises was also well received.

(B) Group II - Alternatives Detection Systems. This group
looked at alternatives to portal monitors where portal monitors
weren't feasible (ie. Small crossings and infrastructure limited
crossings). Several ideas were tossed around but the group came
up with three priorities for implementation. 1.) Increased
awareness training for customs and border guards. 2.)
Development of a list of sources and container types to include
visual aids that can be maintained at all posts and easily
updated when required. 3.) Deployment of mobile groups
consisting of multi-agencies within the country. Coordinate
efforts to ensure mobile groups from one country aren't working
the same areas as the neighboring country, thus providing a
larger coverage area.

(C) Group III - Training, standards and exercises. This group
discussed training programs, the standards utilized by each
country, and exercises conducted (both internal and cross
border). Training was an easy subject because everyone agrees
that training is important and should be standardized as much as
possible to include regional training. However, standards were
another story. Each country agrees they are committed to
enforcing international standards however each country also has
its own laws and views of what international standards are.
Each country wants to hold on to the "individuality" of its
customs system and authority. Cross border cooperation is
currently happening at the working level (ports and border
forces) but not at the capitol level. All countries stated that
they work well with their counterparts across the border and all
are committed to enforcing common laws when it comes to illicit
trafficking. The consensus on regional exercises was positive
with joint training as a favorable by-product.

(D) Group IV - Regional Advisory Council. This topic was not
well received at all. All countries stated that they already
have regional customs meetings and that don't see any value in
this concept. When it was explained to them that the concept
was to integrate the "technical experts" with the "enforcement

agencies" they felt this wasn't necessary. Turkmenistan was
adamantly against the proposal followed closely by Kazakhstan.
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were open to discussion
but were shut down by very strong personalities of the Turkmen
and Kazakh delegates. Bottom line, there will be no regional
advisory council.
HOAGLAND


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