TIPS FROM THE MFA ON HOW TO FIGHT THE WAR OVER NGO'S IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001805

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: KDEM PREL PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TIPS FROM THE MFA ON HOW TO FIGHT THE WAR OVER NGO'S IN
TAJIKISTAN


CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Armbruster, DCM, Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C) DCM had a long talk with MFA North America Chief
Ismatullo Nasredinov on November 10 on the growing pressure on
U.S. and other Western NGO's. The DCM said Tajikistan appeared
to be taking a step backwards by not providing registration,
visas, or other support for NGO's like the Rotary Club and CADA,
two of the latest targets for harassment. Further, Tajikistan
cannot expect international businesses to establish in
Tajikistan if NGO's are under pressure. Nor can the Embassy
advocate more foreign investment if the mission is tied up with
defending beleaguered NGO's. Nasredinov, a young official just
back from the United States, offered a number of helpful
observations.


2. (C) Nasredinov suggested that the Ambassador approach the
Foreign Minister about hosting a roundtable discussion on NGO
activity in Tajikistan. Since one of DCM's talking points was
to suggest a roundtable for November 29-30, DCM readily agreed
that Nasredinov had hit on a good idea. Nasredinov said the
roundtable would not resolve all problems, but if mid to high
level officials from MFA, Justice, and Security attend, there is
a good chance of making progress. Nasredinov also suggested
that NGO's go on an information offensive and raise their
profiles. He said some NGO's such as Save the Children and IFES
are well known for their good work. Others "simply register and
never do any work or promotion." When DCM raised the Rotary
Club for example, an organization that is apparently being
denied registration, Nasredinov said most Tajik bureaucrats do
not even know that Rotary is a service organization providing
community projects and business promotion worldwide. Nasredinov
said Tajik officials are only getting one side of the argument
(from the Russian propaganda machine) but if presented with both
the negative and positive assessments they could analyze the
conflicting reports and hopefully come to the right conclusion.
As it is now, officials are only hearing the negative side.


3. (C) Nasredinov was quite impressed with his first-ever trip
to the United States. He was not aware of the power of business
and political lobbies prior to the trip, nor did he expect to
hear so many different opinions on foreign policy from his
interlocutors. The political debate that he was exposed to was
clearly eye opening and extremely useful in shaping his views on
American democracy. Nasredinov was impressed with the dynamism
of the interagency process and the competition for ideas.
American border control procedures in Buffalo, New York were
also useful in shaping his thinking on Tajikistan's border
operations.


4. (C) COMMENT: Nasredinov is not a power broker in
Tajikistan, but he is clearly not on the path to becoming part
of the "old guard." He is savvy enough to understand what can
and cannot get done in the U.S.-Tajik relationship and he is
willing to offer ways forward. However, it is clear that his
trip revealed to him just how backward his colleagues can be,
particularly on the issue of civil society. Post will have to
be careful not to expose Nasredinov as too much of a reformer,
and hope that he can rise to a level of influence within the
government soon. END COMMENT.


5. (C) AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: We have argued that this
government is neither monolithic nor dumb. We need to listen
carefully to our mid-level contacts, while recognizing that they
have very little influence at this time. We had already planned
to begin working on a major information and public relations
offensive, and will soon put this into play. We will soon
submit a cable outlining what we think is happening in the
country and steps that Embassy Dushanbe and the U.S. Government
can take in response. While we will inevitably be reactive, we
also want to take the high road and search for those strategies
that will best promote the goal of transformational diplomacy.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND


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