TAJIKISTAN: AMBASSADOR ZARIPOV COUNSELS NO SHARP RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN PROVOCATIONS

S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001702

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL, EB
NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: AMBASSADOR ZARIPOV COUNSELS NO SHARP RESPONSE
TO RUSSIAN PROVOCATIONS

REF: A) DUSHANBE 1696 B) FBIS CEP2005101927067 C) DUSHANBE 1681

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Tajikistan's Ambassador to
the United States Zaripov (strictly protect throughout),
Ambassador Hoagland and he both agreed that the U.S.-Tajikistan
relationship is generally solid, with few sharp ups and downs.
They discussed primarily the potential of U.S.-Russia
cooperation to develop Tajikistan's hydropower and on-going
problems for U.S. NGOs. The conversation stayed relatively
general, perhaps because Zaripov had a Foreign Ministry minder
with him, until a final pull-aside in Embassy Dushanbe's garden.
Zaripov let loose with details about Moscow's paranoia about
the United States and its intentions in Tajikistan. He
counseled patience and "no sharp response to provocations." His
bottom line was that Russia is increasingly playing hardball to
limit U.S. influence in Tajikistan. END SUMMARY

2. (SBU) While on home leave and consultations, Tajik
Ambassador to Washington Homrahon Zaripov called on the
Ambassador on October 19. Sirozh Rajabov, the Foreign
Ministry's Deputy Chief of Administration for Europe and North
America, accompanied him as note-taker.

EVERYTHING'S MORE OR LESS FINE~

3. (C) The ambassadors agreed that in principle the bilateral
relationship is on track and about 90 percent smooth. Zaripov
noted that President Rahmonov is generally satisfied, especially
because "he does not like sharp ups and downs in relationships."

4. (C) Zaripov expressed pleasure that U.S-Russia (i.e., AES
and RAO UES) cooperation appears possible to develop
Tajikistan's hydropower potential. He recounted how he had been
an early champion of this cooperation, and how he had worked
hard in the United States to promote it, "even though it is
dangerous to be involved in such big business." Ambassador
Hoagland noted a successful collaboration between AES and RAO
UES would have political value because it would concretely

SIPDIS
demonstrate U.S.-Russia cooperation for economic development in
Central Asia.

5. (C) The Ambassador briefed Zaripov in detail about the
October 13 visit of Secretary of State Rice. Zaripov had little
to say, but did express surprise about the Secretary's visit to
the Central Mosque and Girls' Madrassa. He confirmed it had not
been reported on Tajik State TV and said no one had mentioned it
to him.

6. (C) The Ambassador handed Zaripov a copy of the Tajik
Government's recent diplomatic note requesting what, in our
view, seems to be excessive information about all U.S. NGOs
working in Tajikistan (ref A). Zaripov read it carefully,
glanced at Rajabov, and noted it was the first he had heard of
such a request and, thus, was unprepared to comment on it. He
added that both sides should be patient and avoid "sharp
decisions." The United States should understand that Tajikistan
as an independent state is only 14 years old. "All of these
kinds of questions are solvable with patience," he said.

7. (C) In response to a question, Zaripov recounted President
Rahmonov's September meeting in New York during UNGA with George


Soros. Zaripov said that the meeting was positive in general
but had its sharp moments. He recounted that Soros had asked
Rahmonov if he has suspicions about the Open Society Institute
in Tajikistan. Rahmonov had responded firmly that he was highly
suspicious and watched it closely. So far, he had found no
fault, but was prepared to shut down Soros immediately if any
"irregularity" came to his attention.

8. (C) About life in Washington, Zaripov said he found it easy
to work with the State Department and the National Security
Council. He praised EUR DAS Byrza's energy, intense
involvement, and knowledge of the region. By contrast, Zaripov
noted that it is still difficult for him to make much progress
on Capitol Hill where he continues to run into pre-conceived
notions about Tajikistan. Ambassador Hoagland commented that
Embassy Dushanbe has worked hard to change Washington
stereotypes about Tajikistan, but Capitol Hill seldom sees
diplomatic reporting and relies more generally on media accounts
and information from groups with special interests. Both
Ambassadors agreed that it would be useful for CoDels and
StaffDels to visit Tajikistan so that they could gain
first-hand, accurate information.

~EXCEPT RUSSIA IS AN EVER BIGGER PROBLEM

9. (S) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador and Zaripov
had a one-on-one pull-aside in the Embassy garden apart from
Rajabov. The Ambassador repeated that the latest Tajik
diplomatic note requesting excessive information about U.S. NGOs
in Tajikistan is ominous and disturbing. He is seeking guidance
from Washington before responding. He asked for Zaripov's
candid assessment. Zaripov counseled go-slow caution. He
volunteered that President Rahmonov is subject to a drumbeat of
anti-U.S. attacks from the Ministry of Security prodded by
Moscow - not only from Russian mass media (ref B),but also from
the Russian-dominated Tajik Ministry of Security. Zaripov said
the message from Moscow, especially via the Ministry of
Security, is that the United States wants to overthrow Rahmonov,
kick the Russians out of their military base, and expand U.S.
influence from Afghanistan into Tajikistan as a link to
"U.S.-dominated Kyrgyzstan." The U.S. goal in this scenario is
"a string of anti-Russia military bases from Baghram to Manas."

10. (S) Zaripov continued the anti-U.S.-NGO drive - especially
against National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and
InterNews - comes directly from Moscow. Rahmonov is trying to
maintain an uneasy balance by not registering these three NGOs,
but also by allowing them to continue to operate. Zaripov
concluded that he sincerely hoped the timing of the new
diplomatic note about U.S. NGOs - which he in fact did know
about but did not want to discuss in front of Rajabov - was
simply coincidental to Rahmonov's October 7-9 meetings in Moscow
and St. Petersburg with Putin.

11. (S) Zaripov elaborated on his earlier comment about the
danger of being involved in "big business." He confirmed the
AES report (ref C) that then-Tajik PermRep to the UN Rashid
Alimov had tried strenuously to prevent the meeting in New York
between Rahmonov and the AES CEO, arguing to Rahmonov that the
U.S. Government is maneuvering AES to wreck Russian-Tajik
hydropower cooperation and push Russia out of Tajikistan.
Zaripov recounted that he had taken Rahmonov aside and had "a
shouting match with him." He said, "I was willing to be fired,
or even go to prison." But he convinced Rahmonov to hear out
AES, and Rahmonov has now apparently accepted the idea of
AES-RAO UES cooperation. (COMMENT: Although Zaripov's version


may be somewhat self-serving, it rings true with many other
disparate details we continue to pick up. Russia is playing
hardball to limit the influence of the United States in
Tajikistan. END COMMENT.)


HOAGLAND


NNNN