Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DUBLIN657
2005-06-01 08:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dublin
Cable title:  

NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINS EI UK NIPP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBLIN 000657 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EI UK NIPP
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND
COMMITTED TO GFA

REF: LONDON 4254

Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBLIN 000657

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EI UK NIPP
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND
COMMITTED TO GFA

REF: LONDON 4254

Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss' visit to Ireland
May 19-22, the Irish government emphasized that the Good
Friday Agreement and the December 8 joint communique must be
the basis for forward movement in the peace process. They
anticipate an IRA response to Gerry Adams' call to leave the
scene within 60 days; they believe the focus must be kept on
the IRA but do not have a specific list of steps the IRA must
take as pre-conditions to serious negotiations. They believe
serious talks will begin in September, but it could take
until early 2006 to put the pieces in place, especially since
the DUP would require a long period to verify IRA good
behavior. GOI officials uniformly expressed concern that the
UK's political interest in showing progress might lead the UK
to be too soft on Sinn Fein. Other issues raised include
Irish unhappiness with the UK's inquiry into the Finucane
murder; the importance of a non-violent marching season in
Northern Ireland; and concerns about IRA criminality. Reiss
briefed on his meetings in London and Belfast and informed
them of the USG's decision to refuse a visa to Sinn Fein
member Rita O'Hare.


2. (U) Mitchell Reiss met with the Taoiseach, PM Bertie
Ahern; Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, Justice Minister
Michael McDowell; Finance Minister Brian Cowen; and, UK
Ambassador Eldon. The Ambassador, DCM, POL/ECON Counselor,
and S/P Special Assistant accompanied him to all meetings.
Reiss and the Ambassador also had a private lunch with
President and Dr. McAleese. END SUMMARY

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


3. (C) GOI concerns about UK "softness" represent a role
reversal. Usually, it is the UK that is concerned Ireland
will be too accommodating to Sinn Fein. The GOI's eventual
position will depend on the Taoiseach. He is generally
considered "softer" on the provisional movement than either
the Foreign Affairs or Justice Ministers. However, he

believes Sinn Fein leaders were aware of plans to rob the
Northern Bank even as they negotiated with him last Fall.
Publicly, he has been unprecedentedly critical of Sinn Fein
and, until recently, greatly reduced private contacts as
well. We are told that Adams prefers to deal directly with
the Taoiseach and not with cabinet ministers. In deciding how
to move forward, the Taoiseach is likely to look carefully at
the IRA's response to Gerry Adams, given strong public
feelings against IRA crime and paramilitarism. He is
expected to call elections in 2007 or sooner. Having a deal
in place would serve his political interests best; however,
more failed attempts to reach a deal would hurt him
electorally, particularly if he were seen to have been played
by Sinn Fein. End Comment.

--------------
TAOISEACH ADVISOR DESCRIBES GOI EXPECTATIONS
--------------


4. (C) Michael Collins, Second Secretary General in the
Taoiseach's Office and senior foreign affairs advisor, opened
the meeting with an update of GOI actions. He said there had
been very little GOI engagement with Sinn Fein since the
talks broke down in December. He cited one meeting in
January, one in March in Washington, and several private
meetings between the Taoiseach and Gerry Adams.
Significantly, he said the official feelings toward Sinn Fein
had changed with all that has happened since December
(Northern Bank robbery, money laundering, McCartney killing.)
Collins said the GOI is interested in the Good Friday
Agreement and not in any "lesser models or deals." Following
UK elections, the pace was picking up, he said, and he
outlined a series of expected contacts with all parties. He
said the GOI was pleased at PM Blair's re-election, and that
Sinn Fein is aware that this is Blair's "last lap." That, he
said, plays both ways. Sinn Fein knows that no successor is
likely to be as engaged in the process as Blair, and that he
represents their best hope of a deal. On the other hand,
Sinn Fein also believes they could take advantage of Blair's
interest in getting a deal before leaving office. Special
Envoy Reiss, referring to his talks in London, said it is
never good in a negotiation to appear more eager than the
other side. Collins said the UK had offered Sinn Fein a
package following the December 8 breakdown, but withdrew it
after the Northern Bank robbery. (Note: Sinn Fein has
frequently expressed anger at the UK for "going back on its
word." While never specifically mentioning a post-December 8
package, during the negotiations, Sinn Fein seemed confident
that the UK felt Sinn Fein's decommissioning offer was worth
taking up even if a comprehensive deal with the DUP was not
reached.)

...KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE IRA


5. (C) Collins indicated the focus must be kept on the IRA.
The GOI, he said, hopes for decisive action, followed by a
"proving period" and leading to talks that restore the
executive. He anticipated that it might take until late fall
or early in 2006 to put all the pieces together; the IRA
would need to do something definitive within two months, and
the DUP would likely require a six-month testing period
before agreeing to sit down with Sinn Fein. Collins said
there is little appetite within the GOI or the Irish public
for going "round and round again." He said GOI will not go
about talks in a "headline way." The credibility of the
process and the players is in question, he said, and this
time, talks must work. A deal is possible, he said, but will
take time. Reiss responded by saying Gerry Adams had told
him to expect an IRA response in a month, before the marching
season. Reiss said Adams had stated that "the IRA must be
taken out of the equation." Reiss noted that public
tolerance of accepting things at face value is gone. The IMC
must confirm that the IRA takes any actions it promises.
When the Taoiseach joined the meeting, he said that
verification would have to include witnesses of decommissiong
(probably clergy),in addition to the IICD, as layed out
December 8.

...QUIET MARCHING SEASON NECESSARY


6. (C) Collins, Reiss and the Ambassador agreed that tensions
were high as marching season approaches, and it is vitally
important that violence is averted. That message needs to be
delivered to all parties. The Ambassador asked who is
engaging with the Parades Commission; Collins said there is a
disconnect between the Parades Commission and the PSNI. All
agreed that a violent marching season could set back
prospects for political progress.

...DUP FLEXING ITS MUSCLES, INCLUDING REGARDING POLICING BOARD


7. (C) Collins and Reiss exchanged views on the DUP,
following their big win in UK elections. The Ambassador
noted that DUP is looking to flex its muscles, and should not
be allowed to unwind existing mechanisms, such as the
Policing Board, whose mandate expires October 18. Collins
agreed and said the GOI favors renewing the policing board in
its current form.

--------------
TAOISEACH DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD
--------------


8. (C) The Taoiseach joined the meeting, and layed out his
vision of the way forward. Like Collins, he felt any deal
was many months away, with talks not starting until September
and a deal not likely until January. The Taoiseach then
discussed what he felt was realistic to expect from the IRA.
He said that no one can expect the IRA to agree to disband;
rather, it could enter a new commemorative role. His own
father, he said, considered himself to be an IRA man to the
day he died in the 1990's. IRA members, he said, consider
themselves to be soldiers and their IRA membership is the
center of their lives. They could, however, convert to a
commemorative organization that visits graves and plans
events to mark the anniversaries of atrocities. The
Taoiseach said he had explained this to DUP leader Ian
Paisley. By the same token, the Taoiseach said Sinn Fein
knows that they have milked the process as much as they can.
He said that "Gerry understands criminality must end", even
if he will not say that the IRA has been involved in crime.


9. (C) Reiss described changes in perception within the
Irish-American community. Their conversations with the
Taoiseach, and the IRA's words and actions following the
McCartney murder were giving them a more realistic view of
the IRA. The Taoiseach agreed, but noted that it is still
hard for much of Irish-America to accept that the IRA was
involved in the murder. Reiss then informed the Taoiseach
that the US had refused Sinn Fein member Rita O'Hare's visa
request.

...TAOISEACH RAISES FINUCANE


10. (C) The Taoiseach raised the Finucane case, as did every
other GOI official with whom Reiss met. Reiss briefed him on
his talks in London, including with the head of MI5, who
committed to turning over all evidence her agency has to the
inquiry, but she was adamant that the inquiry will proceed
using the new legislation. Reiss noted his concern that the
Finucane case will become an irritant in Irish relations with
the UK and get in the way of a deal. The Taoiseach said that
the entire parliament was united in opposition to the UK
approach. Parliament does not believe the UK will give all
evidence because, in its view, the UK did not cooperate fully
with the Barron commission's investigation into the 1974
Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The Taoiseach said that the
GOI wants the UK to provide evidence acknowledging its
involvement in Finucane's murder and it wants to know how
high in the UK government collusion went. He said if the UK
were to provide the information, it would only grab the
headlines for a few hours because "everyone knows the UK was
involved." Other ministers made the same point and noted that
the Taoiseach is particularly seized with the Finucane case
and would have to personally approve any compromise to ease
the dispute with the UK, such as Reiss' suggestion of putting
an Irish judge in charge of the inquiry.

-------------- ---
FM ECHOES PM ON IRA, GFA, CONCERN ABOUT FINUCANE
AND MARCHING SEASON
-------------- ---

....IRA


11. (C) FM Ahern said he liked Reiss' public comments that
the IRA should respond "sooner rather than later," and he
agreed with Reiss that the IRA statement must be clean, with
no ambiguity, and that the three governments need to agree on
what they want from the IRA. In the end, the DUP must also
be on board in order for a deal to be struck. FM Ahern was
adamant that the Irish government was interested in a
comprehensive deal only, and was concerned that the UK might
be open to Sinn Fein's desire to cut a side deal with London.
He said that such talks between the UK and IRA were underway
in December between the breakdown of talks and the Northern
Bank robbery. Such a deal, he said, would have allowed Sinn
Fein to barter decommissioning for concessions. Moreover, he
said, a bilateral deal between the UK and Sinn Fein would
polarize the situation in Northern Ireland.

...Sinn Fein


12. (C) FM Ahern said that Sinn Fein knows serious
negotiations cannot begin unless trust is re-established. On
the other hand, he said, maybe that's not what they want.
(Note: FM Ahern is here referencing the theory that Sinn
Fein finds engaging in the peace process in its interest
because it softens the image of the party and gives them
photo opportunities with prime ministers. According to this
theory, the process is in Sinn Fein's interest, but Sinn Fein
is not actually interested in striking a deal.) FM Ahern
also touched on the balance the GOI tries to strike in
talking about and to Sinn Fein. He said PSNI and others told
the GOI that its tough line on Sinn Fein since December had
been helpful but no longer was, and they should "lighten up."
On the other hand, the GOI also is asked why it talks to
Sinn Fein at all, given that the International Monitoring
Commission reports that they are continuining their
activities. He noted that it is difficult for the two prime
ministers to say "no" when Gerry Adams asks for a meeting.
He said Sinn Fein is insisting on working out details at the
top level of government only. (COMMENT: This is tactically
smart of Gerry Adams, especially if he, like others, sees the
Taoiseach as less tough on republicans than the outspoken
Justice Minister or quieter but equally firm Foreign
Minister.)

...Parade Season


13. (C) Adrian O'Neill, from DFA's Anglo-Irish office, said
intelligence sources were worried that malcontents were
planning to disrupt the marching season. He noted that the
DUP and ORANGE Order were "playing games" with the Parades
Commission, and repeated the view that PSNI and the Parades
Commission were not connecting well. He said the GOI is
particularly worried about the "walk back" -- after the
parades and drinking, when marchers and hangers on walk back
through republican areas. Special Envoy Reiss said that a
violent marching season would play into the hands of those
who believe that only the IRA can protect Catholic
communities.

...Finucane


14. (C) FM Ahern raised the Finucane case, saying
categorically that the UK was not complying with its 2001
Weston Park commitments. He said the GOI has lived up to its
obligations and begun investigations into several cases.
O'Neill noted that the UK had pushed through its new
Inquiries Act and that the Finucane family would not
cooperate on that basis.
...Policing Board


15. (C) Special Envoy Reiss noted that the Policing Board was
set to expire on October 18, and asked for Irish views,
including on whether there were policy consequences of
choosing to "continue" the board or to "reconstitute" it. FM
Ahern said he had spoken to Northern Ireland Secretary of
State Peter Hain about the issue. He said the GOI favors
continuing the board, but the DUP wants to reconstitute it.
He asserted that the DUP has no legal right to demand
reconstitution on the basis of its electoral gains. FM Ahern
also said he had raised IRA crime with Peter Hain, especially
in the context of cross border cooperation between the Irish
Criminal Assets Bureau and the Northern Ireland equivalent.

...International Fund for Ireland (IFI)


16. (C) As he has done publicly, FM Ahern talked about the
importance of continuing IFI activities and the need to
maintain donations from other governments. He said it is
increasingly difficult to tap EU peace and reconciliation
funds. FM Ahern talked about the need to reorient the board
toward reconciliation and policing, and noted the board was
considering a five-year strategy, ending in closure. He
asked for U.S. views. The Ambassador noted that supporters
of Ireland in the U.S. understand that the Ireland's economic
boom means that international contributions to IFI will end
at some point. One difficulty, he said, is that unionists
only recently have taken part, and will insist on getting
their fair share of grants. Special Envoy Reiss said that
the IFI's new ideas for policing are likely to be acceptable
under U.S. law.

--------------
Justice Minister McDowell focuses on the IRA
--------------


17. (C) Justice Minister McDowell, always the hardest hitting
of the Irish cabinet, opened the meeting by saying that the
Good Friday Agreement presumed the IRA would go out of
business and it is still in business seven years later. He
said the provisional movement (as he refers to jointly to the
IRA and Sinn Fein) regards its arms cache as an
embarrassment. Its semtex and kalishnakovs do not serve any
useful purpose, he said, and the provisionals do not want to
leave weapons in the hands of dissidents. He said the
provisionals consider their arms stash a political liability
that undermines their claim to be pursuing their goals
through peaceful means only.


18. (C) Minister McDowell believes the provisionals want to
close down the hardware side of their operation but to stay
in business to fund national and international programs. He
also said that the provisionals give no indication of
loosening their grip on national areas in Northern Ireland
where PSNI does not go. For that reason, he noted, the
provisionals want to hold on to personal weapons.


19. (C) McDowell said some lessons have been learned about
how to deal with the provisional movement. McDowell said
that you only get concessions from the provisionals when you
put your hand on their throat. When you play their
propaganda game, they press for concessions. McDowell said
he was "delighted" that Sinn Fein was not invited to the
White House on March 17. Looking forward, he said, the GOI
was not in appeasement mode, and should offer a cold shoulder
to the provisionals. Sinn Fein, he said, is "asking for warm
words" but governments should not offer them. He credited
Sinn Fein with being "brilliant negotiators." They create
eagerness and a sense of partnership, as if to say, "let's
get together to sort out Sinn Fein problems." What they
cannot stand, he said, is skepticism. McDowell said he has
warned Peter Hain against side deals with the provisionals,
especially now that there is no center ground in Northern
Ireland.

--------------
Finance Minister Brian Cowen
--------------


20. (C) In pursuing a political solution for Northern
Ireland, the British and Irish Governments needed to address
the economic dimension to the peace process, Finance Minister
Brian Cowen told Ambassador Reiss in a May 20 meeting. Cowen
cautioned against an approach that focused on establishing
institutions of self-government, while neglecting equally
urgent economic imperatives, such as improving social
services and tacking unemployment. He expressed concern that
HMG might wish to disengage from these challenges after a
solution was reached. While the British Exchequer had made
statements on the limits of UK financial support for the
peace process, Cowen believed that HMG and the GOI could
jointly foster a transition in Northern Ireland toward an
economic system less dominated by the public sector. This
cooperation could take the form of coordinating Ireland's
National Spatial Strategy with the North's development plans;
there was also the possibility of harmonizing tax rates and
key commodity prices to spur cross-border investment.
Ambassador Reiss agreed that it was important to avoid
scenarios where economic difficulties would continue to fuel
social tensions even after a political resolution was in hand.


21. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/P.
KENNY