IRISH RESPONSE TO PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 000598

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS EUN
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE

REF: A. STATE 90085

B. DUBLIN 512

C. DUBLIN 542

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jonathan Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary: On May 18, Post delivered ref A talking
points to Gerard Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
EU correspondent. Keown noted that Ireland viewed the China
arms embargo in terms of the EU's opportunity to send a major
political signal encouraging China to play a constructive
international role. He said that the SFOR-EUFOR transition
in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed the EU's ability to assume
more robust military responsibilities, and he remarked that
Ireland was considering ways to support the expanded African
Union Mission in Sudan in response to AU Chairman Konare's
May 17 discussions with EU officials. End summary.

China Arms Embargo
--------------


2. (C) Going beyond ref A talking points, Emboff asked Keown
to elaborate on indications from Prime Minister Ahern and DFA
Secretary General Dermot Gallagher in recent discussions with

SIPDIS
the Ambassador that Ireland preferred to see the China arms
embargo lifted (refs B and C). Keown noted that, for
Ireland, the issue centered on the EU's opportunity to send a
major political signal that would encourage China to play a
constructive international role, such as with UN reform,
North Korea, and global trade. The GOI had not initiated the
proposal to lift the embargo, but wished to acknowledge
changes in China since the Tiananmen era, including
discernible, if slow, movement on human rights. Echoing
Gallagher's points, Keown said that it was unfair to put
China in with the same category of rogue states as North
Korea and Zimbabwe, which also faced EU arms embargoes. At
the same time, the GOI was aware of USG concerns and welcomed
the opportunity to begin a strategic dialogue on East Asia.
The GOI also sought to ensure that any action on the arms
embargo would include concomitant efforts to prevent
increases in EU weapons transfers to China. Keown added that
the arms embargo was not on the May 11 GAERC agenda and that
the GOI did not expect a decision on the embargo anytime
soon. Emboff stressed that the Administration and Congress
remained strongly opposed to the embargo's removal and would
take serious interest in Ireland's position on the matter.

ESDP
--------------


3. (C) Like the United States, Ireland and Member States
were pleased with the SFOR-EUFOR transition in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and with EUFOR's performance of its mandate, said
Keown. The transition showed that the Berlin-Plus
arrangements were effective and that the EU was capable of
assuming increasingly robust military responsibilities. The
Member States were also reviewing the transition with a view
to fine-tuning Berlin-Plus. Keown pointed out, however, that
while Defense Ministers would attend the May 23 GAERC,
EU-NATO cooperation was not on the agenda.

Sudan
--------------


4. (C) Following AU Chairperson Konare's May 17 discussions
with EU officials, Member States would reflect on "who might
provide what" to meet EU procurements for the expanded
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),noted Keown. The May
17 discussions had advanced the EU's ongoing negotiations
with the AU on logistical support for AMIS, which extended to
transportation, housing, equipment, and technology. The AU,
exercising its UN-mandated lead role in Sudan, had been clear
that it preferred to have European assistance rather than
European troops. Ireland would consider what material
support to provide and would continue to review the
possibility of contributing troops to a UN peacekeeping
operation in Darfur. (Note: We have reported previously that
prospects for Irish troop contributions are slim, since
Ireland already has soldiers in Afghanistan, Liberia, and
Bosnia and is near its cap on the number of soldiers (850)
who can be deployed overseas.)
KENNY