TERRORISM FINANCE: 2005 UPDATE NO. 2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000353

SIPDIS

EB/ESC/TFS (DAVID NELSON)
S/CT (TODD KUSHNER)
IO/PSC (JOLEEN SCHWEITZER)
EUR/UBI
TREASURY (JUAN ZARATE)
OFAC (ROBERT WERNER)
EB/EPPD (CAROL THOMPSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014
TAGS: KTFN KVPR EFIN PTER ETTC PREL CVIS
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: 2005 UPDATE NO. 2

REF: A. STATE 32688



B. DUBLIN 254


C. DUBLIN 310

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF MARY DALY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D)

(C) Post welcomes the opportunity to provide input about
Ireland's efforts to combat terrorism finance (TF). The
answers below are keyed to ref A para 10 questions:



A. Since the publication of European Council Regulation No.
881/2002 (the EU regulation mechanism corresponding to UNSCR
1267), Ireland has frozen seven accounts belonging to five
individuals. Under Council Regulation No. 2580/2001
(corresponding to UNSCR 1373), Ireland has frozen the account
of one individual. The aggregate value of funds frozen under
these two Regulations is approximately euro 90,000. No
additional domestic actions were taken against these
individuals. In discussions with emboffs, Department of
Finance (DOF) and Central Bank officials said that no
accounts were frozen under either Regulation in 2004. They
added that suspects in terrorism financing (TF) schemes, in
order to escape detection from ever-increasing scrutiny, have
diversified financial exchanges away from banks and into
'informal banking,' such as Halawa, charities and insurance
transactions. According to the officials, in response to
these forms of alternative banking that have become popular
with Ireland's growing immigrant population, the DOF and
Central Bank are in the process of developing new authority
to supervise such transactions.



B. Irish officials have cited lack of information-sharing as
the biggest impediment to Irish co-sponsorship of
designations. In a number of meetings, DFA officials have
charged the USG with providing only assertions, allegations,
and limited details, rather than the 'smoking gun' of
evidence. DOF/Central Bank officials added that delays in
identifying suspected terrorism financiers, as well as
problems in certifying the suspects' identities, are
hindrances to the freezing of assets. Another issue recently
raised was that of procedure. Regarding the March 1 oral
demarche on Hizballah designation, DFA officials told emboffs
(ref B) that presenting evidence orally was procedurally
questionable and could possibly be ruled out of order in EU
Clearinghouse discussions.



C. Regarding willingness to accept USG training and technical
assistance, GOI officials suggested that training programs
for police would be most pertinent. With the passage of the
Criminal Justice (Terrorism Offenses) Act on March 8th, (ref
C) police have new authorities and are developing strategies
for targeting and seizing the assets of suspected terrorists.
DOF and Central Bank officials expressed interest in USG
seminars but acknowledged that they are already regular
participants in EU seminars and training programs on TF.



D. The risk of Ireland becoming a site for significant
fund-raising or banking services for terrorists is low,
notwithstanding a growing population of immigrants with ties
to the Middle East. First, Ireland coordinates well
internally among domestic government departments and with
financial institutions on TF issues. Second, Ireland has
demonstrated a strong willingness to cooperate
internationally and has implemented all forty Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations along with the eight
Special Recommendations. Third, Ireland's new Terrorism
Offenses Act is a powerful tool to combat TF and also opens
the door to ratifying the four remaining UN
Conventions/Protocols on terrorism. According to a DOJ
official, this new law is unique in that it targets proceeds
or finances of crime/terrorism instead of the suspects. The
law builds on the 1994 Proceeds of Crime Act, which allows
senior police officials, who are satisfied that a person is
using funds for illegal activities, to apply directly to
courts to freeze the funds. In this manner, the funds or
proceeds of criminal activity (and now terrorism) will be
targeted, even while evidence against the individual may be
insufficient to charge or prosecute him. If the court is
satisfied that circumstances warrant freezing, it will, in
theory, order seizure of assets for 40 days. During this
period, police must apply for an 'interlocutory' order,
freezing the assets for seven years. Suspects have right of
appeal to reclaim their assets, but must prove a legitimate
claim to and use of those assets. Any proceeds beyond this
period revert to the State. The new legislation, following
on the successful use of the Proceeds of Crime Act to freeze
ill-gotten assets, puts the onus on the suspect to prove how
he obtained and plans to use unexplained assets.
BENTON