Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DUBLIN321
2005-03-15 17:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dublin
Cable title:  

IRISH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES ON MARCH 16 GAERC

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KAWC KPAO ETTC PTER KPAL EUN ICTY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000321 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KAWC KPAO ETTC PTER KPAL EUN ICTY
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES ON MARCH 16 GAERC

REF: A. STATE 39909

B. STATE 44531

C. STATE 44309

D. STATE 44486

E. DUBLIN 254

F. STATE 34900

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary E. Daly; Reasons 1.4 (
B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000321

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KAWC KPAO ETTC PTER KPAL EUN ICTY
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES ON MARCH 16 GAERC

REF: A. STATE 39909

B. STATE 44531

C. STATE 44309

D. STATE 44486

E. DUBLIN 254

F. STATE 34900

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary E. Daly; Reasons 1.4 (
B) and (D).


1. (U) On March 11, post delivered ref A demarche to Gerard
Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU Correspondent.
On March 14, post followed up with Keown on points in refs B,
C, and D on China, Croatia, and Iran.

China: Increased U.S-EU Dialogue Useful
--------------


2. (C) EU Special Representative Gianella's March 14-15
visit to Washington will help to promote useful U.S.-EU
dialogue on the China arms embargo, observed Keown. He
stressed that the EU had not yet taken a decision on the
embargo and that Gianella sought to explain, not negotiate,
the criterion for a decision, particularly in the context of
the Code of Conduct. He noted that the Code of Conduct had
been reinforced to include references to the interests of
friendly nations and to the Asian military balance.
Reiterating GOI views expressed previously, Keown observed
that the EU's aim in considering the lifting of the embargo
was not to increase arms sales to China. Rather, a number of
Member States regarded the embargo as an instrument that did
not serve the EU's best interests in its overall relationship
with China. Keown said that the Member States understood the
strength of feeling with which the U.S. Executive Branch and
Congress viewed the embargo issue. He added that the EU
looked forward to reactions to Gianella's presentations in
Washington and also to the outcome of Secretary Rice's March
20-21 visit to China.


3. (C) Regarding Ireland's national views, Keown noted that
the GOI espoused the position that EU interests in China were
not best served by the embargo. The GOI, moreover, would not

stand in the way of an EU consensus to lift the embargo,
though Ireland had nothing to gain from such a decision,
since it neither produced nor traded arms. (Note: Ireland is
seeking to expand trade and investment relations with China
and would benefit from closer EU-Chinese ties, though it does
not sell arms.) By the same token, Ireland hoped that the
embargo would not become a serious trans-Atlantic row and
that both sides would take advantage of every opportunity for
dialogue in resolving differences on the issue. In
particular, Ireland favored President Bush's suggestion
during his European trip for a strategic dialogue covering
U.S. policy on China and the Pacific region's military
balance. Regarding the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing, Keown noted that ref C talking points appeared to
focus on the Member States that would host the visit. He
believed, however, that Li's visit would flesh out objectives
on human rights and security that the United States and the
EU shared.

Croatia: Zagreb Should Reflect on Likely Disappointment
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Ireland anticipates that the March 16 GAERC will
decide to postpone the start of EU accession talks for
Croatia, said Keown. He noted that Ireland had originally
hoped that accession talks would begin March 17, in line with
the EU decision last December. The GOI acknowledged,
however, that the failure to apprehend Ante Gotovina did not
leave a basis for affirming Croatia's full cooperation with
the ICTY, the condition for beginning the talks. Keown
expressed Ireland's hope that the GAERC's decision to
postpone would be couched in firm but positive terms and
would give Croatia cause for serious reflection on its record
of cooperation with the ICTY. He added that Ireland welcomed
the recent voluntary transfer of Kosovo Prime Minister
Haradinaj to The Hague as a sign of progress on regional
cooperation with the ICTY.

EU-3 Diplomacy and Iran: A Welcome USG Gesture
-------------- -


5. (C) Europe welcomes the USG decision to drop its
opposition to Iran's application to the WTO and to consider,
on a case-by-case basis, the licensing of spare parts for
Iranian civilian aircraft, said Keown. In February
discussions with President Bush in Brussels, EU leaders had
pressed for USG support of EU diplomacy with Iran. The
economic platform of the Iran-EU 3 talks had identified
Iran's interest in the WTO and aircraft parts, and President
Bush's positive gesture would hopefully demonstrate for
Tehran the value of the negotiations in pursuing these
objectives, Keown observed. He noted that Ireland had no
particular national position on Iran beyond finding a
diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue, a goal shared by
all Member States.
Human Rights: EU Will Co-table Belarus Resolution
-------------- --------------

6. (C) The March 16 GAERC discussion will develop EU
priorities for the UN Commission on Human Rights, said Keown.
He remarked that the EU intends to co-table the Belarus
resolution, a measure supported by Ireland.

The Middle East Peace Process/Hizballah
--------------


7. (C) The March 1 London meeting with the Palestinian
Authority was positive and highlighted years of EU assistance
to the Palestinian community, said Keown. The Member States
hoped that Mahmoud Abbas would be able to carry out the
security, infrastructure, and administrative reforms
discussed in the meeting and thereby secure buy-in for his
program from ever larger portions of the Palestinian
population. Israel's February 21 release of 500 Palestinian
prisoners would help Abbas to demonstrate continuing change
on the ground, observed Keown. He noted that the EU welcomed
U.S. support for Abbas and looked forward to USG efforts to
move Israelis and Palestinians ahead in the peace process.


8. (C) Keown reiterated the GOI's ref E request for written
copies of USG materials presented in ref F demarche on
Hizballah's designation. He also repeated that it was
important for the USG, in pursuing Hizballah's designation,
to address the question: why now. Keown noted that the
situation in Lebanon, where Hizballah held Parliamentary
seats, had become fragile and that this should be a factor to
consider in the U.S. push for designation. Given the size of
public demonstrations in Beirut, there remained the
possibility of destabilization and a resort to communal
violence. Keown commented that Ireland would support a
likely GAERC conclusion condemning the murder of Prime
Minster Hariri and calling on all sides in Lebanon to show
restraint. He added that the EU also supported UN Envoy
Roed-Larsen's efforts to clarify the Syrian time table for
withdrawal.

Sudan: Ireland Favors Referral to ICC
--------------


9. (C) The EU continues to fund and provide logistical
support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),
remarked Keown. The Commission, and Member States
bilaterally, were focused on a variety of hygiene/medical
problems facing the Darfur refugees and appreciated the
opportunity to coordinate with the United States on these
issues. The EU maintained its position, however, that human
rights abuses in Darfur should be referred to the ICC, which
had been established precisely to deal with such cases, said
Keown. He recalled that Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern
had voiced Irish support for the ICC's role in Darfur during
discussions with UNSYG Annan in New York on February 6. He
also noted that the U.S. draft UNSC resolution on Sudan did
not clearly address the question of accountability.

Russia/Moldova: An Increasing EU Concern
--------------


10. (C) There were no substantive differences in U.S. and EU
perspectives on Russia/Moldova/Transnistria, which was
becoming a significant EU concern, observed Keown. He
remarked that the new Ukrainian Government was playing a
constructive role in the Transnistrian issue by improving
border control. The EU was also about to appoint a new
Special Representative to Moldova, who was likely to be a
Dutch national. In Ireland's view, said Keown, a major
difficulty in resolving the Transnistrian conflict was
convincing the Russian Government that the EU could make a
positive contribution to ongoing diplomacy. The outcome of
events in the Ukraine, however, had made the Russian
Government suspicious of EU efforts and had reinforced the
Russian view that Transnistria was a "diplomatic game of
winners and losers." Keown conveyed the Irish view that a
resolution for Transnistria would need to take account of
Moldovan sovereignty, appropriate protections for
Russian-speakers, and the need for Russian troop withdrawals.

Russia/Georgia: Disappointment on BMO
--------------


11. (C) Ireland shares the EU's disappointment that the
OSCE's Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) is finished, said
Keown. He explained that this development, as with Moldova,
was symptomatic of Russian reluctance to countenance a
diplomatic role for Western Europeans "east of Vienna." The
EU was concerned about the tightening of pressure on Georgia
and would consider ways to engage on the border question.
Keown agreed with U.S. talking points that there remained a
role for the OSCE to train Georgian border guards inside
Georgia. He noted that Germany was also conducting such
training on a bilateral basis.
BENTON