RAK CROWN PRINCE COMMENTS ON IRAN'S AHMADINEJAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 006335

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015
TAGS: PREL TC IR IS PGOV
SUBJECT: RAK CROWN PRINCE COMMENTS ON IRAN'S AHMADINEJAD

REF: DUBAI 5316

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a December 15 meeting with CG, Ras
Al-Khaimah Crown Prince Saud Al Qassimi offered his views of
Iran's new president, views including elements of both scorn and
admiration. Saud sees Ahmadinejad's recent anti-Israel comments
as an effort to build his own street credibility at home and in
the region, by asserting himself as the only regional leader
willing to say aloud what others only think. Saud related
claims we have heard elsewhere about an Ahmadinejad
anti-corruption drive, including a willingness to give contracts
to foreign companies if they are more capable than Iranian
firms. Saud related a story about a prominent Iranian who had
refused to align himself with the new president, out of concern
Ahmadinejad was not up to the task. Some of what Saud said
tracks with what others are saying, though he seemed more upbeat
on Ahmadinejad's prospects for political longevity than many
Iranians we have spoken to. End Summary.

Speaking Out
--------------


2. (C) In a December 15 meeting with Consul General, Ras
Al-Khaimah (RAK) Crown Prince Saud Al Qassimi offered his views
on Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent comments about
establishing a Jewish state in Germany, Europe or (as reported
in local newspaper headlines here December 15) Alaska. Sheikh
Saud said comments like these were not aimed at the West, but at
"us -- the people and the leaders in the region." Such comments
resonated with people in the region, who admired Ahmadinejad for
saying "what many are thinking but no one else is willing to say
out loud," Saud claimed.


3. (C) While tacitly agreeing that Ahmadinejad was surely an
embarrassment to many Iranians, especially those in the regime,
Saud discounted reports that the president was on the verge of
being removed from power. "It's true that he puts Khamenei in an
awkward position because he (Ahmadinejad) is more pious and
fervent in his religious beliefs than the Supreme leader
himself," Saud allowed, "but Khamenei believes that Rafsanjani
is the only alternative, and is determined to keep him out of
power," so Ahmadinejad's position was secure. Saud said with
some incredulity that Ahmadinejad's belief in the imminent
return of Imam Mehdi was so strong that "he has just allotted 75
million dollars to widen and improve the road from Qom to
Tehran" to facilitate the 12th century imam's travel. According
to Saud, Ahmadinejad's belief in the imam's imminent return was
rooted in an incident "four or five years ago in Azerbaijan,"
where Ahmadinejad had been working in relative obscurity. A
devoutly religious contact there had revealed to him that "you
are the future of Iran, and Imam Mehdi will return in your
time." Initially skeptical of this prophecy, Ahmadinejad had
become a believer after unexpectedly becoming first mayor of
Tehran and then President of Iran, Saud claimed (he did not
state the source of this information.)

Squeaky Clean?
--------------


4. (C) Saud said that Ahmadinejad's avoidance of all the
trappings of power, and his squeaky clean administrative style,
were raising many eyebrows. Bashar Al-Assad of Syria had been
"shocked" when Ahmedinejad received him "in the street" and then
took him to a modest office. Senior officials at the Ministry
of Mining, meanwhile, had prepared for an Ahmadinejad visit "in
the usual fashion," by coming up with potential mining projects
that the president might consider awarding to his cronies;
Ahmadinejad "surprised them all" by rejecting such ideas and
saying "from now on, no projects will be rewarded based on
favoritism; instead they will be awarded to the company that is
best equipped to carry them out -- you must go out and recruit
foreign companies with the best expertise to exploit these
resources for the good of the country." (Comment: Saud
attributed the Ministry of Mining anecdote to a senior ministry
official who had been a "close friend for many years." While
Saud maintains many other contacts in Iran, it is likely that
this same friend was the source of some of the other material
mentioned here. End Comment.)


5. (C) Saud reported that at least one prominent Iranian
political figure (NFI) had refused the Supreme Leader's request
that he take up a senior position in the Ahmadinejad
administration. After letting it be known that he considered
Ahmadinejad an amateur and a novice with whom he did not wish to
be associated, this official was instead given a different task
by Khamenei: "taking care of all of former President Khatami's

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ministers" by finding bonyad positions for them.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Some of what Saud said corresponds to what we have heard
from other contacts. For instance, we have many other accounts
of people turning down opportunities to work in the new
government because they did not want to associate themselves
with Ahmadinejad. Saud clearly puts credence in the stories of
Ahmadinejad's conviction that the return of the twelfth Imam is
imminent; some of our Iranian interlocutors share that
assessment, while others argue that Ahmadinejad is only using
religious rhetoric in order to curry favor with clerics. We
have heard anecdotal evidence that the Arab street may indeed be
responding to Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel comments: a close
Iranian contact of Conoff recently claimed that during an NGO
conference she attended in Tunis she was approached by a number
of Arab delegates who congratulated her on Ahmadinejad's
election, applauding his religious piety, and his statements in
support of the Palestinians. In contrast to Saud, most Iranians
we have spoken to believe that one way or another, Ahmadinejad
will be sidelined within the next three to six months if he does
not do a better job proving himself up to the task.
DAVIS