RAFSANJANI VERSUS QALIBAF?

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBAI 001753


E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/19/2015
TAGS: PREL IR PGOV
SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI VERSUS QALIBAF?

CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: With 58 days left before the June 17 Iranian
Presidential election and 21 days until the start of candidate
registration on May 10, there are 19 Iranian men (and no women)
cited in Iranian press as possible Presidential candidates.
Former President and current Expediency Council Chairman Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who in public statements has skirted
ever closer but as yet refrained from announcing his candidacy,
is leading in most polls and is considered the favorite. Polls
show Former Education Minister Mustafa Moin more popular than
the other main reformist candidate, former Majlis Speaker Mehdi
Karrubi, although there is a real chance that the Guardian
Council will bar Moin from running. Most interestingly,
recently resigned Law Enforcement Commander Mohammad Baqer
Qalibaf seems to be becoming the favorite conservative
candidate, with some analysts saying that he might be a surprise
victor come elections. END SUMMARY.

IN THIS CORNER - AKBAR SHAH
--------------


2. (U) On April 14, Expediency Council chairman and former
President Hashemi Rafsanjani gave his clearest signal to date
that he intended to run for President, although stopping short
of declaring. At what could have passed at a campaign speech
before an audience of Office for Consolidating Unity (Iran's
largest student group) members at Tehran's Jamaran Hosseinieh,
he said that "my presence in the elections has become more
definite." Repeating his previous contention that he hoped that
someone else who had the requisite "personal capacity and public
popularity" became President, he said that "I'm still waiting,
but the more I proceed, based on polls, my hope in achieving
this wish becomes smaller~given that my poll numbers are high,
that my presence might perhaps maximize participation, that I
might get a high vote and might be able to lessen partisanship
('band bazi'),these are encouraging factors for my presence in
the election." He said that he would announce his final decision
within two to three weeks (Note: Candidate registration is May
10-14).


3. (C) Many political stalwarts are convinced that Hashemi (one
of whose nicknames is "Akbar Shah" due to his vast power and
possessions) has already made his decision to run, and is merely
delaying his announcement for maximum effect. A Rafsanjani-era
cabinet minister told Poloff on April 11 that he was "99 percent
certain" that Rafsanjani would run and win, and a serving Majlis
representative told Poloff on April 18 that he too was sure that
Rafsanjani would be Iran's next President.


4. (C) Although he has not yet announced, Rafsanjani has already
begun to set up his election apparatus. A wealthy Iranian-Azeri
industrialist told Poloff on April 16 that Rafsanjani has put
his former Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, Morteza
Mohammad Khan as his campaign manager in Tehran, and his former
Agriculture Minister Dr. Issa Kalantari for the same position in
Azerbaijan.


5. (C) Interestingly, this industrialist explained to Poloff
that many ordinary Iranians, especially in villages or outside
of the major cities, vote based on guidance from opinion
leaders. These opinion leaders are often prominent local clergy
or employers. This industrialist said that he himself had
approximately 400,000 workers under him, most of whom would vote
as he directed. As such, he has been feted by Mohsen Rezai
himself, and Mohammad Qalibaf's brother and Tehran Law
Enforcement Commander Morteza Talai on behalf of Qalibaf.
However, he told Poloff that he would be supporting Rafsanjani.
A prominent Mashhad industrialist told Poloff on April 18 that
he had been asked to rent out some of his prime office space in
Mashhad for use as a Rafsanjani campaign headquarters, although
being a staunch Rafsanjani opponent, he refused.


6. (C) Rafsanjani campaign material is also already in
circulation, and it indicates the slogans and strategies of a
campaign that seeks to portray him as a strong, capable, above
factional politics, and someone who can deliver Iran from its
current crises. On April 16, one of Poloff's contacts gave him
a 64-page booklet titled, "Passing Through the Crisis and The
Start of a New Season - Why We Should Vote For Hashemi."
Putatively written by "A Group of Independent Iranian Experts"
in Dey month 1383 (20 Dec 2004 - 19 January 2005),this book has
64 sections, each headed with a different reason why Rafsanjani
should become President, to include:

- Public need for Moderation and Tranquillity

- Society needs a President above Factions

- A Strong President for Increasing the System's Efficiency

- Worthy Managers are the Iranian Nation's and Islamic
Civilization's Capital, and Worthiness must be the Main Standard
for Directors Selected by the Future President

- Key Responsibilities must be Entrusted to those having
Experience and Liberality

- Exclusive Power is Corrupting; There are Currently Indications
of a Dangerous Movement of "Escape from Leadership" (i.e. all
three branches shouldn't be controlled by the same faction)

- The World has Changed Rapidly. Internal Affairs Shouldn't
Keep us in Ignorance of World Developments.

-Hashemi was the Architect of the Policy of Decreasing Tensions
and Building Confidence Internationally, and he can Engineer any
Negotiations with Honor and Authority


7. (U) Some however contend that Rafsanjani has still not made
up his mind. In a April 14 article in the reformist "Sharq"
newspaper titled, "the Lonely Statesman," prominent political
scientist (and fervid Rafsanjani supporter) Sadeq Zibakalam
wrote that despite popular perceptions, Rafsanjani has not yet
decided to run. Zibakalam claims that Rafsanjani is still
seeking to answer two basic questions, the first being whether
he could win. Zibakalam points out that Iran has approximately
48 million eligible voters. If 50 percent participate, Hashemi
would need at least 12 of the 24 million votes cast (a
percentage significantly higher than his current polling). The
second question is that even if he does win, it remains to be
seen what he could do in the face of solid opposition from the
conservative "Osulgarayan/Abadgarayan" (i.e. the "Principlists"
and "Islamic Developers") faction, both within and outside of
the Majlis. Zibakalam also points out that many if not most of
Rafsanjani's traditional lieutenants, such as Ataollah
Mohajerani, Abdollah Nuri, Gholamhossein Karbaschi and (the
late) Mohsen Nurbakhsh are no longer with him to advise and
assist him should he run.


8. (C) A prominent Tehran-based political analyst told Poloff on
April 15 that Rafsanjani's brother-in-law and right-hand man
Hossein Marashi (currently head of Iran's Tourist Organization)
had quite recently told him that Rafsanjani was still unsure.
This political scientist, himself a staunch reformist, was
scheduled to meet with Hashemi at some point within the week of
April 17-24, at which time he told Poloff he would add his own
voice to those urging Rafsanjani to run.

AND IN THIS CORNER - THE NEWCOMER
-------------- --------------


9. (U) Among the ranks of Iran's conservative Osulgarayan, the
traditional conservative faction controlling the conservative
coalition "Coordinating Council for the Forces of the Islamic
Revolution" (CCFIR) , headed by former Majlis speaker Ali Akbar
Nateq Nuri, Majlis Deputy Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, and the
pro-bazaar "Islamic Coalition Association," are supporting
former Director General of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting (IRIB),Ali Larijani. Among the five conservative
candidates who have rejected what they see as the CCFIR's
premature annotation of Larijani (Majlis representative Ahmad
Tavakoli, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Tehran
Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad, resigned Law Enforcement Commander
Mohamad Baqer Qalibaf, and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen
Rezai),conventional wisdom is that Qalibaf and Ahmadi Nejad are
the front-runners.


10. (C) On April 18, prominent Tehran-based international
business consultant "Hassan" made the case to Poloff that
recently resigned Law Enforcement Commander Mohammad Baqer
Qalibaf stands a good chance of being Iran's next President. He
prefaced his comments by pointing out the potential importance
of Iran's youth vote (age 16-25). According to Hassan, this
group is potentially 40 percent of the vote. Although many
won't vote, many will, to include a large portion of first-time
voters (indeed, Hassan said that turnout might well be as high
as 60-65 percent). Hassan said he believed these would be the
'swing voters' in the upcoming election, and that the logic of
their candidate selection was important, albeit difficult, to
understand.


11. (C) First, Hassan said that many of those in this age group
who do vote will use their vote to "get revenge" against the
system, and that a young (43) non-cleric like Qalibaf would be
the most likely candidate to glean these young protest votes.
These young voters are not likely to vote for Rafsanjani, a
71-year old cleric they see as an establishment figure disliked
even more than Khamenei.


12. Secondly, since becoming Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)
commander in June 2000, Hassan claimed that Qalibaf has
transformed it into a much more moderate, professional and
public-friendly corps, which no longer hassles Iran's youth in
the streets for mingling with members of the opposite sex and
related social offences. The head of a major Iranian youth
group reiterated this point to Poloff in a April 19
conversation, saying that Qalibaf has been responsible for a sea
change in the LEF, with young people no longer fearing LEF
presence on the streets. Hassan also pointed out that Qalibaf
has vastly simplified procedures having to do with registering
for mandatory military service, to the point where it can be
done on-line, vice repeatedly queuing at different LEF offices
for weeks. Qalibaf's stewardship of the LEF during these years
has given him the reputation of a competent, apolitical manager.


13. (C) Hassan said that Qalibaf's reputation has also been
burnished while serving as head of Supreme Leader Khamenei's
anti-smuggling/anti-corruption drive. This drive has made
headlines by shutting down an Payam airport in Karaj for
smuggling activities and for arresting the Iran Tobacco
Organization's Director General and some senior managers for
bribery and financial corruption. Hassan said that he believed
Khamenei truly wished to cut back on high-level corruption and
for that reason chose Qalibaf, who, with his IRGC background,
would be relatively safe from retaliation by IRGC elements. He
claimed that Qalibaf's track record in this regard has
demonstrated that he has sufficient political courage to at
least attempt to tackle this problem.


14. (C) Hassan also said that Qalibaf has a very warm and
personable style and appearance, much like Khatami, as opposed
to many of the other 'scowling and bearded' candidates whose
appearance can be somewhat off-putting for many young Iranians.
Hassan pointed to a March 27 appearance of Qalibaf on Iran's
'Hot Seat' interview program ('Sandali-ye Daq'),where Qalibaf
recounted the time when he was travelling in civilian clothes
and was needlessly detained and hassled by LEF members on a
family trip to Mashhad (until he finally revealed who he was),
as an example of his ability to reach out and connect to
Iranians.


15. (C) Hassan said another factor working in Qalibaf's favor is
that he has a solid record as a pilot in the Iran-Iraq war,
having successfully flown a high number of sorties over Iraq.
Qalibaf also heads the Iranian Pas football team, which won the
Iranian league last year and is doing well this year this year
in the Asia Cup. Given that Iran is likely to have made the
World Cup before election day, Iran's football euphoria might
also benefit Qalibaf.


16. (C) Hassan pointed out that Supreme Leader Khamenei himself
might ultimately support a Qalibaf candidacy, seeing Qalibaf as
young, a good manager, someone who can rein in corruption, and
someone who would serve as more of a Prime Minister than a
President. Qalibaf's IRGC background would also make him more
attractive to Khamenei.


17. (C) Another factor in favor of Qalibaf is that he might well
be supported by the "Mashhad Circle" ('Dayereh-ye Mashhad'),
i.e., a network of prominent and affluent Mashhad-born
businessmen and industrialists. This group, despite Khamenei's
Khorasani background (which is relatively recent),feels
under-represented in the highest circles of power and might well
back a Qalibaf candidacy, as did the Yazd group did for Khatami
during his campaigns (although the Khorasan 'kingmaker'
Ayatollah Vaez Tabasi himself, head of the Astan-e Qods Razavi
Foundation, is supporting Rafsanjani).


18. (C) Finally, Hassan said that contrary to what many believe
in the West, there is no ambient sense of crisis among the young
in Iran. He claimed there is an emerging feeling of
self-confidence, bolstered by the economy relative strength. He
cited the relative ease that one can get a car loan these days
with only 20 percent down as an example of factors that are
lightening the public mood. He also said that US pressure on
Iran and scenarios of a US-led strike against Iran are not taken
seriously by many young Iranians. He claims that desires for
greater democracy are not a priority, but rather that the young
are looking to be left alone to "have a good time." The youth
leader with whom Poloff spoke reinforced this point, saying that
Iranian youth today, unlike when Khatami was first elected, are
more 'pleasure-seeking' ('lezzat-gara'),and are unfazed by even
unemployment as long as their parents, often working two to
three jobs, are able to provide them with pocket money. Hassan
added that he sensed that what people were looking for from the
system currently was primarily 'greater efficiency,' which could
play to Qalibaf's strength.


19. (C) Hassan also pointed out that Qalibaf, who only recently
has declared his desire to compete, is already polling better
numbers than the other conservative candidates. In a just
concluded 'Baztab' website poll, he finished third overall with
13.8 percent, behind Rafsanjani (21.6 percent) and Moin (16.6
percent - but there is a real chance that the Guardian Council
will bar Moin from running). Qalibaf's numbers increased three
percentage points over the first Baztab poll in mid-March, and
Hassan told Poloff that conservative polling organizations are
consistently showing Qalibaf as the main vote-getter among
conservatives. Hassan suggested that if Qalibaf's numbers
continue to improve while CCFIR favorite Larijani's stay in the
high single-digit, even Larijani himself might choose to drop
out of contention to save himself embarrassment.


20. (C) Despite the above, Qalibaf does have many negatives
Hassan conceded, primarily the fact of his military background.
Hassan and many other Iranians have told Poloff that as a rule
Iranians don't like the military when it comes to selecting
civilian leaders. Indeeed, Qalibaf's opponents have already
started their campaign against him by stating that as a military
man, he cannot be President, since Article 115 of the
Constitution states that "the President must be elected from
among religious and political personalities." A Guardian
Council spokesman has said that this matter is for the Majlis to
decide, which is unlikely before June, and it seems unlikely
that Qalibaf would be barred from running on this account.


21. (C) Nonetheless, Hassan concluded his reasoning by pointing
out that the Iranian voter quite often votes on the basis of
emotion, and that if a Qalibaf candidacy were to 'catch fire' as
did Khatami's (albeit for different reasons) in 1997, then he
could well wind up winning. Indeed, Hassan said that one reason
that Rafsanjani was delaying committing was to wait to see how
serious Qalibaf was about his quest, and he said that ultimately
Rafsanjani would choose not to run, being unsure of a
first-round victory (election laws says that there is a run-off
between the top two candidates if no single candidate gets a
majority of the vote).


22. (C) COMMENT: Qalibaf himself recently told press that "my
only serious opponent in the elections is Hashemi Rafsanjani,"
and indeed indications are that Qalibaf might be potentially be
Rafsanjani's strongest competition. Hassan's theory puts
Qalibaf in the interesting position of possibly becoming a
'protest candidate' with Establishment backing. None of the
other conservative candidates show any sign of increasing their
popularity beyond single-digits, and as the 1997 Khatami victory
(or, more accurately the Nateq-Nuri loss) showed, the
conservative clerically-dominated 'Establishment' can only do so
much for its candidate if another candidate catches the public's
eye.


DAVIS