QATAR: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CHALLENGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 002037

SIPDIS

FOR ISN/CB JAY HANLINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR KTIA QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS AGREEMENT OUTLOOK

REF: STATE 191328

Classified By: CDA Scott McGehee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Qatari authorities balked at meeting a CWC
Challenge Inspections negotiating team from Washington on
December 15 because, in post's view, senior decision-makers
had not been prepared by subordinates on the substance of the
meeting. Officials also had not obtained sufficient
decision-making authority through their inter-agency process.
Post will revisit the issue with the MFA and, using points
provided by the interagency team from Washington, will
encourage the GOQ to move toward a CWC challenge inspection
agreement. End Summary.

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A Slow Start
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2. (C) From October 2004 through October 2005, the Qatari MFA
was unresponsive to requests to discuss challenge
inspections. In November 2005, the MFA told P/E Chief that a
committee led by a brigadier general had been established to
look at the issue. POC on the committee, Hassan Saleh,
arranged for the interagency team, including Dr. David
Cooper, Col. Richard Smart, Dr. Deborah Ozga, and ISN/CB Jay
Hanline, to meet the committee on December 15. P/E Chief
provided (again) copies of the draft MOU, discussed the
purpose of the visit, and requested that MFA legal affairs
director be at the meeting.

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Qataris Balk at Last Minute
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3. (C) On December 11, Saleh confirmed the meeting with
control officer. The Qatari principal would be (as previously
discussed) Brig. Nasser al-Sulaity. The following day, Saleh
asked for a formal letter requesting a meeting with Brig.
al-Sulaity, which the Embassy provided. On December 14, the
day before the scheduled visit, Saleh said the meeting would
now be with Brig. al-Jumaan, and another letter was needed.
Controloff faxed the letter to the number provided by Saleh.
On the 15th, Saleh said the letter had not been received.
Controloff worked with DATT to get another copy delivered.
After delivery of the letter, Brig. Jumaan told controloff
that this was the first he had heard about the meeting.
Although the visiting team offered to reschedule for the
following day, Brig. Jumaan declined, saying the matter
needed to be worked through the MFA.

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The Internal Dynamic
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4. (C) Post's analysis is that, first, the MFA was not eager
to work the CWC MOU issue. With the departure of a senior
official with the bilateral pol/mil portfolio in September,
there is no official at the MFA with sufficient expertise or
seniority to bridge military and foreign affairs issues.
(Note. The MFA, like other Qatari government agencies, is
thinly staffed with capable people and easily becomes
overwhelmed with work.) Second, it seems that the Chemical
Weapons Committee had been prepared to welcome the American
delegation but questions of "turf" arose from officers in
charge of the bilateral military relationship. Thus the
substitution of Brig. Jumaan for Brig. al-Sulaity at the last
minute. Third, it is likely that Brig. Jumaan, who is
familiar with handling external issues, understood the need
for an MFA green light, and thus decided to scuttle the
meeting.

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Next Steps
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5. (C) Embassy Doha will to re-engage with the MFA to
identify the appropriate interlocutor and encourage the GOQ
to move forward on the issue. Post will make use of talking
points previously provided but welcomes addtional input,
especially to explain, in simple terms, why an MOU is in
Qatar's best interest.
MCGEHEE