QATAR: S/I JEFFREY'S OCTOBER 6, 2005 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001752

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARPI: STHORNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2010
TAGS: IZ PREL PTER QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: S/I JEFFREY'S OCTOBER 6, 2005 MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER HAMAD BIN JASSIM AL-THANI

Classified By: Amb. Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor on Iraq James Jeffrey and an
interagency team that included representatives from the NSC,
DOD, and Treasury met with Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh
Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani (HBJ) on October 6. HBJ assured
the U.S. delegation that Qatar was committed to winning the
war in Iraq and stressed the importance of preventing Iraq
from becoming a breeding ground for terror. HBJ pressed the
delegation to give more time to allow for greater Sunni
participation in the political process and insisted that
de-Ba,athification focus only on top Ba'ath party
leadership. He also said that per the USG's requests Qatar
had raised with the Syrians the latter's failure to address
the issue of insurgents crossing from Syria into Iraq and had
urged the Iranians to not interfere in Iraq. HBJ also
indicated that Qatar remains committed to forgiving Iraq,s
external debt, but he showed sensitivity to pressure when
asked about Qatar's policies on Al Jazeera. End Summary

Iraq/GWOT
--------------

2. (C) HBJ emphasized that despite the all of the criticism
Qatar had shouldered for its support of the war in Iraq, it
was committed to victory there. "When you succeed in this
war, we all succeed," HBJ told Jeffrey, stressing the
importance of Iraq in preserving stability in the region and
of the need to prevent Iraq from becoming a terrorist
breeding ground from which terrorists could strike Qatar and
the Gulf, as well as Europe and the U.S. HBJ felt that
states in the region were not adequately sharing information,
which he suggested that if done on a weekly basis could
provide a clearer picture of the situation in Iraq. He also
expressed his firm opposition to Bremer's plan for
categorical de-Ba,athification within Iraq, insisting that
"you could not get a job in Saddam,s Iraq without being
Ba,athist."

Iraqi Constitution
--------------

3. (C) HBJ advised Jeffrey and delegation that "even if it
takes two to three months," it was absolutely necessarily to
secure Sunni Arab support for the constitution, predicting
that without Sunni buy-in the constitution would be rejected
and another year of political wrangling would ensue. Jeffrey
pointed out that that the parties had dithered for months, at
the expense of American and Iraqi lives, and it was
ultimately the deadline that pressed them to produce the
constitution. Jeffrey praised the constitution, but noted
that Ambassador Khalilzad believed that additions should be
made, including regarding de-Ba'athification and to clarify
what action would be taken against the former senior
leadership. When asked by HBJ whether Chalabi had the ear of
the USG, Jeffrey made clear that the USG does not support any
one person or party, but added that he would not listen to
Chalabi on de-Ba,athification.

Arab Police Force
--------------

4. (C) Referring to a proposal that HBJ had previously
transmitted to General Abazaid, HBJ touched on his idea that
an Islamic police force should be deployed in Iraqi cities to
reduce the American presence there and to leave fewer
American targets for insurgents to attack. "Then the
insurgents) will be killing Arabs, not Americans," HBJ
explained. The proposed police force would be composed of
Muslims from countries in the region (with the exception of
Syria). BG Mike Jones, representing the Joint Staff,
requested more detail on the composition and capability of
the force, pointing out that though some countries are good
at peacekeeping Iraq is not currently peaceful. Some
countries may resist the kind of rules of engagement that
success in a environment like Iraq requires. Further, any
such force would have to have the express support of the
Iraqi government to operate. Jeffrey added that any such
force would require fighting elements as this would be a
combat mission, but acknowledged that the Qataris need an
official response to their proposal from the USG.

Sunni Leaders
--------------

5. (C) On the subject of Sunni leadership, HBJ cautioned that
Americans should be careful not to "insult" Sunni tribal
chiefs, who will not easily forget perceived insults and
could prove difficult to work with for years to come. HBJ
said that the USG should "press its) policy on them slowly."
"Let them play the game," and in this way build mutual
respect. Jeffrey agreed and asked for Qatar's help in
identifying specific leaders with whom the USG should work.
HBJ replied that his Executive Assistant had already passed
names to former Ambassador Maureen Quinn. After some
discussion about the head of the Iraqi Muslim Ulema Council,
Jeffrey warned HBJ about talking to people with blood on
their hands.

Diplomatic Help: Iran, Syria, and Iraq
-------------- -

6. (C) HBJ told Jeffrey and delegation, "The Iranians are
interfering in Iraq. They want to keep you busy with this
job." Jeffrey responded that he hoped that HBJ had told the
Iranian foreign minister not to interfere, which he affirmed
he had. Responding to a misconception heard elsewhere,
Jeffrey told HBJ that, "we are not opening the door to the
Iranians. No one is more opposed to the Iranians than the
U.S. We fought a two-year naval war in 1986-88) against
them." Jeffrey also instructed HBJ that the Qataris, as
friends of the U.S., needed to talk frankly with the Syrians
to discourage them from deliberately closing their eyes to
the passage of foreign fighters into Iraq. HBJ said he had
done so within the past few days, as requested.


7. (C) Jeffrey told HBJ that the U.S. needs help"from Arab
countries that are on the fence," and that an exchange of
ambassadors by Qatar and Iraq would be helpful. HBJ said he
would consider the Jeffrey,s offer that the U.S. provide
safe housing for a Qatari ambassador.

Iraqi Debt
--------------

8. (C) When encouraged by Treasury representative MacDonald
to reengage with the Iraqis on Iraq,s external debt, HBJ
responded that the USG had his word that "at the right time
Qatar) will be helpful." HBJ noted that Qatar was the only
country that pledged to help during Jim Baker,s January 2004
visit, but even so the Iraqi government had not "mentioned"
Qatar,s willingness to forgive its external debt. HBJ
pledged to work with Ambassador Untermeyer and assured the
delegation that it could rely on Qatar. MacDonald said an
announcement along those lines would be helpful, as would
Qatar,s receiving the Iraqi finance minister and encouraging
countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to do the same.

Al Jazeera
--------------

9. (C) HBJ ensured Jeffrey and delegation that Qatar was
"working hard to improve it," but that they did not want
their relationship with the U.S. to be affected by this
issue. He said that Qatar can deliver on a wide range of
issues, recalling that Qatar "supported your policy on
Israel, on energy "We were the first country to allow joint
ventures," and stated that Qatar deserves to be considered a
serious small partner by the U.S. HBJ indicated that they
were very sensitive to pressure on Al Jazeera. He told the
delegation, "I wish I could close Al Jazeera. Some
journalists think I own 40% of it. If that were true, I
would sell it."


10. (C) HBJ expressed his willingness to continue dialogue
with the USG and stated he would report the meeting to the
Amir. HBJ also stated that he would meet with Ambassador
Untermeyer within a week to continue the discussion.
UNTERMEYER