STRIKES AT DJIBOUTI PORT AND RUMORS OF EMBASSY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000965

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/E, DRL, AND EB
LONDON/PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ELAB ECON ASEC SCUL DJ
SUBJECT: STRIKES AT DJIBOUTI PORT AND RUMORS OF EMBASSY
INVOLVEMENT

Classified By: Pol/Econ Erinn C. Stott for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On September 14, the Port of Djibouti's
general union, Union of Port Workers (UTP),launched a strike
denouncing what it called "catastrophic management of the
port's Human Resources Division." Further protests took
place on September 24th following a breakdown in mediations
and resulted in the arrest of 167 workers. A primary cause
of the strike is a build-up of anger among Djiboutian port
workers over operational changes implemented since management
of Djibouti Port was taken over by Dubai Ports International
(DPI) in 2000. The discontent may also have its origins in
larger, unsettled political issues that continue to pierce
Djibouti's social fabric -- such as tribal "advantage" and
opposition participation in governance. Pol/Econ officer's
coincidental presence at the port for a meeting on the day of
the strike fueled a rumor -- possibly initiated by UTP for
its advantage-- that she had supported the striking workers.
Ambassador raised the rumor of U.S. sanctioning of the port
strike with the Foreign Minister, who advised that he had not
given it any substance. (septel to follow) End summary.


2. (C) During the last four months, disagreements between the
Port of Djibouti's general union, the Union of Port Workers
(UTP) and Dubai Ports International (DPI),the Dubai-based
company which manages the port, have escalated over
management procedures and rights of workers. DPI has tried
to modernize the port's Human Resources management; however,
its new methods did not fit with the legacy of the French
system of law in the Djiboutian labor code, which gives more
protection to workers. The first contact between labor and
management was on June 30, 2005, when the Minister of
Transport and the Minister of Labor first addressed social
discontent in the port. On August 14, the two sides began
negotiations over various issues, but talks dissolved over
the manner in which allowances were being calculated into
wages, the perceived "haughty" character of management and
other issues. On September 7, UTP decided to launch a strike
after facing what it termed "continuous harassment" from port
management. The strike was scheduled for September 14.


3. (C) On September 14, the day of the strike, port
management downgraded the positions of three people active in
the strike. The reasons for the downgrades are unknown. On
the same day, Prime Minister Dileita, acting in the absence
of President Guelleh who was attending UNGA in New York,
initiated a process to bring the two sides back to the
negotiating table. On September 17, the strike was suspended
to hold a one-week mediation. On the 24th, UTP decided that
port management did not consider its Union as a serious
interlocutor and recommenced its strike as an unlimited,
general strike -- as opposed to a focused section-by-section
strike. Meanwhile, the port claimed that during the strike
it lost five million dollars per day. (Note: Embassy sources
indicate that these numbers may be exaggerated because
information available does not compute properly to break down
annual profit to figures close to this amount. End note.)


4. (C) The real issue that divides the parties is likely the
difference between DPI's management focus and long-standing
French-based tradition. On one hand, DPI uses a modern
concept of management that supports the latest procedures in
managing human resources. On the other hand, Djbouti is
operating under the Labor Convention of 1973 put in place
during the colonial era. UTP wants to protect a requirement
that employees receive three-months' notice prior to
dismissal. DPI is reluctant to implement such practices due
to the considerable burden it would place on efficient port
management. In a press release, Abdourahman Borreh,
President of the Port and Free Zone Authority called the
strike "illegal because the employees had no serious claims
to present and paralyzed a vital public enterprise in an
irresponsible way." The statement continued that "the
employees failed to favor the interest of the collective and
preferred their personal interests." He threatened to punish
in an extreme manner any employee attempting to impede the
economic development of the nation. Seventeen workers were
dismissed on September 25 because of "serious and grave
professional faults." (Comment: Information available to
post indicates these firings may be retribution for the
strike. End comment.) The 17 cases were transferred to the
National Prosecutor on September 28.


5. (C) Rumors about town assert that the UTP is backed by a
"foreign power" such as France or the United States. Other
rumors assert that the U.S. Embassy was inciting or
encouraging the strikes. This reached as high as the
Ministry of Presidential Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. There were several allegations that Embassy
personnel, namely the Pol/Econ officer, were seen at the port
on the days of the strikes. Embassy sources within the Union
of Djiboutian Workers (UDT) said that Djibouti's National
Security Service (NSS) had asked UTP delegates "why the U.S.
was talking to them? What did the U.S. want? Did the U.S.
offer bribes in exchange for striking?" In a meeting 9/29
with Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Ali Yousuf (reported
septel),Ambassador raised with the Minister the existence of
the rumors and emphatically denied U.S. Embassy involvement
in the port strike. She noted, however, Embassy efforts to
finalize its 2005 Human Rights Report and officers' efforts
to be as inclusive as possible in fact-gathering. The
Minister responded that he had heard these rumors but had not
taken them as of substance. Instead, he attributed the
strike to the difficulties workers are having grappling with
requirements that will take port operations to a new, more
efficient level. (Comment: These rumors may have their
origin, actually, in the UTP. UTP leaders may have chosen to
interpret Embassy officers' meeting with them, for purely
informational purposes, as a show of support for strike
efforts. End comment.)


6. (U) Eleven UTP members and delegates were dismissed for
cause and arrested as a result of the strike. They are:
-
Ahmed Ali Aramis, Secretary General of UTP
Ali Ibrahim Darar, Deputy Secretary General of UTP
Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, Personnel Delegate
Ibrahim Moussa Sultan, Personnel Delegate
Kamil Mohamed Ali, Personnel Delegate
Samira Hassan Mohamed, Personnel Delegate
Djibril Houssein Walieh, Personnel Delegate
Mohamed Abdillahi Dirieh, Advisor to the Secretary General of
UTP
Moustapha Abchir Egueh, Member UTP
Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, Member UTP
Koulmiyeh Houssein, Member UTP


7. (C) Embassy sources told Regional Security Officer (RSO)
on September 27, that 25 additional firings had taken place.
A UTP official confirmed that 24 persons were dismissed from
their positions on the 27th. This same source indicated that
the second strike occurred to protest the dismissal of 11
workers on the day of the first strike. The exact reasons
for dismissal are unknown.


8. (C) Comment: The port of Djibouti is seen by the
Government of Djibouti as its principal economic lifeline.
Any serious efforts at national revitalization, income
generation, business development and investment from outside
will depend, for the long-term, on the port's viability.
Realizing this, Djibouti took a giant step to improve the
port's operational effectiveness by placing management
responsibilities in the hands of a company with an already
proven track record in Dubai for efficiency -- DPI. To
achieve the same in Djibouti, especially greater fiscal
profitability for the Djibouti port, DPI is mandating serious
adjustments in behavior, privileges, rights and
responsibilities of port workers. These adjustments are not
necessarily in parity with long-standing port practices.
From simple measures such as banning the chewing of qat
during working hours, to more serious measures such as longer
worker hours, the government of Djibouti is supporting
"positive change" as a way to win investor confidence. DPI's
practices are a difficult pill for many port workers to
swallow and therein may lie the source of their discontent.


9. (C) Comment continued: The discontent may also have its
origins in larger, unsettled political issues that continue
to pierce Djibouti's social fabric -- such as perceived
tribal "advantage" and opposition participation in
government. The Government of Djibouti realizes the
existence of these larger issues and worries about public
manifestations of social discontent stoking the fires of
these unsettled issues.


10. (C) Comment continued: It is also clear that the
Government of Djibouti is very sensitive about human rights
and how its support, or non-support, of such rights are
played out in the U.S. annual Human Rights Report. Debt
cancellation or Millennium Challenge Account eligibility
issues could be affected by a negative report -- especially
on governance. Therein may lie the origins of discontent
within some quarters of the Djiboutian government--
especially in the presidency -- about the perceived actions
of the embassy Pol/Econ officer. The officer's inquiries may
have been seen as too pointed for comfort and too inclusive
of those who harbor special grievance against the current
government.


11. (C) Comment continued: It is important to note as well
the inherent weakness of a labor institution such as UTP in
Djibouti. It is not surprising then that it may have
perceived an advantage in trying to make the most,
politically, of its American encounter. Post will continue
to monitor the port situation, including getting the input of
DPI's general manager (who has been in Dubai on
consultations) on how he sees the way forward at the port in
the short and long-term. End comment.
RAGSDALE